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Dedicated to Julia Stollery, 
the high-school music teacher who pushed me to aim higher than I thought reasonable or 
possible, who with a single phrase of encouragement set me on this twenty-five year journey of 
discovery. 
This is an examination of early-stage capital markets among venture capital investors 
and entrepreneurs, and the role information asymmetry plays in influencing the 
strategies that market participants adopt. It explores the thesis that venture capital 
investors who operate in early-stage capital markets do so to attract desirable 
entrepreneurs, and thereby improve the quality of investment opportunities they are 
presented with. A combination of theoretical arguments and empirical research on 
venture capital investors frames the types of investors and the reasons they use to 
justify their operation in early-stage capital markets. An empirical study of 
entrepreneurs and their capital-sourcing decisions then elucidates the effect of 
various investor strategies on the decisions of entrepreneurs. 
This research suggests that venture capitalists are not homogeneous in their 
approach to this market, and these variations are due to differences in their ability to 
"screen" investment opportunities. Moreover, investors with particularly high skill will 
operate in this market to attempt to signal this quality to entrepreneurs, as successful 
operation in this market does convey private information about the investors skill. 
Yet, entrepreneurs do not value this signal. When selecting their capital providers, 
they pay little practical attention to the information this signal conveys. 
This research contributes to the extension of previous theoretical models of investor 
screening, by allowing heterogeneity in screening skill, and by developing a range of 
strategic alternatives that skilled investors can pursue, which are not evident in 
previous models. 
This research also contributes to an enhanced understanding of the role of signalling 
in financial markets with high information asymmetries, by developing a theoretical 
justification for the emergence of such signals, by demonstrating their formation in 
early-stage capital markets, and by examining their poor efficacy with respect to one 
of the target audiences (i. e., entrepreneurs). 
Finally, this research contributes a novel perspective to our understanding of how 
early-stage entrepreneurs evaluate potential venture capital investors, and the 
degree to which their own understanding of this is marred by poor introspection. 
Through these contributions, this research provides an improved understanding of 
key elements of the entrepreneurial process in relation to high-growth firms. 
An earlier version of chapter 7 has been published in Silicon Valley Review of Global 
Entrepreneurship Research, 2(1): 25-45. 
Keywords: venture capital, adverse selection, information asymmetry, screening, 
signalling, entrepreneurial finance, conjoint analysis. 
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This research is an investigation into early-stage private equity markets among 
venture capital (VC) investors and entrepreneurs. The effective operation of these 
financial markets is an essential precursor to the development of many successful 
new firms and the various social benefits associated with their launch and growth: 
economic growth, job creation, regional development, efficient deployment of 
resources, exploitation of technological innovation, provision of new products and 
services, and funding of research. When early-stage markets operate effectively, 
capital is directed to firms with the greatest potential for growth and the creation of 
these benefits. Consequently, it is important to understand the unique challenges in 
these markets, and to gain insight into how market effectiveness can be enhanced. 
Towards this goal, this research specifically examines the effects of information 
asymmetries among the actors in early-stage markets, by investigating how it shapes 
their various strategies and influences their objectives. Early-stage private equity 
markets are characterized by uniquely high information asymmetries, where investors 
have few mechanisms for obtaining information to help them determine whether a 
particular entrepreneur and firm represent an attractive investment opportunity. These 
markets lack the institutionalized information transfer mechanisms of the public capital 
markets, and the early-stage firms themselves face uniquely high uncertainties 
regarding their own future prospects. Yet the effective functioning of early-stage capital 
markets is a critical antecedent to the economically more significant later-stage public 
capital markets - the public markets cannot sustain and evolve without the periodic 
injection of new firms through initial public offerings (IPOs). And these new IPOs 
depend on the earlier-stage private capital markets for the infant feeding, selection, 
and development of IPO-ready candidate firms. Therefore, the effective resolution of 
information asymmetries and associated risks in early-stage markets is an important 
precursor to all later-stage capital markets. Yet, despite this importance, the extant 
research into the methods by which information asymmetries are resolved in early- 
stage markets remains underdeveloped. 
This research adopts a positivist paradigm to attempt to objectively describe how the 
market actors respond to the challenges of information asymmetry, and how these 
responses Interact to shape the process of matching investors with entrepreneurs that 
is needed for successful investment transactions to occur. In particular, this research 
examines the role of screening processes on the part of VC investors, the way in 
which these processes mitigate information asymmetries about entrepreneurial firms, 
and how they also signal hidden qualities of the VC Investor to other stakeholders. 
Although current models assume a homogeneity of VC abilities and behaviour, the 
wide differences in screening abilities and procedures suggest heterogeneity, and that 
any differences between types of VC need to be taken into account. This research is 
conducted using a combination of theoretical and empirical arguments, supported by 
data obtained from VC investors. This is followed by an examination of the effects 
these processes have on entrepreneurs, through an exploratory empirical examination 
of how entrepreneurs choose their venture capital investors, using data obtained from 
entrepreneurs. 
Investing in private companies Is fraught with risk, largely due to the high information 
asymmetries between the company and the investor. These asymmetries are 
particularly high in markets comprising young start-up companies, where little may be 
generally known about the firm, and where relatively few institutionalized information 
dissemination mechanisms exist. Information asymmetries can exist prior to an 
investment being made, and can lead VC investors to fund poor companies or to not 
fund good companies, leading to poor investment returns. And the efforts that 
investors might make to mitigate this risk may have the effect of driving to good 
companies out of the market -a condition of adverse selection. Information 
asymmetries also exist after an investment being made, and can lead VC investors to 
continue to support poorly managed companies or to cut off support to well-managed 
companies -a condition of moral hazard. Of these two challenges, the problem of 
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adverse selection is particularly significant because it occurs ex ante, when uncertainty 
is highest and the costs of a misjudgement are also highest. 
Venture capital investors operating in early-stage markets often attempt to mitigate 
information asymmetry and adverse selection risks by requiring entrepreneurs from 
such firms to disclose private information about themselves prior to any agreement for 
investment; they "screen" entrepreneur through an information gathering and 
evaluation process. The screening process creates the potential for an adverse 
selection problem, whereby the more vigorously the investors attempt to gather private 
information from the entrepreneurs, the more likely they are to drive away desirable 
entrepreneurs - these entrepreneurs can obtain financing from other investors who 
impose less onerous screening processes. The investor challenge therefore is to 
mitigate the information asymmetries without creating adverse selection. An inability to 
do this can effectively bar some investors from the market. 
Accordingly, it is the VC investors with extraordinarily high screening skill who are 
especially willing to participate in early-stage investment markets, despite the high 
risks they face due to information asymmetries. One reason they do so is to signal to 
observers that they possess this high degree of screening skill and the ability to 
reduce information asymmetries. By signalling this level of skill they hope to attract 
desirable stakeholders in general and entrepreneurs with desirable firms in particular. 
These entrepreneurs are attracted by this potential to reduce asymmetries, since it 
would result in more favourable financing terms for them. Entrepreneurs with less- 
desirable firms are not attracted by this potential, since it would result in less- 
favourable financing terms for them. As a result, making investments in companies in 
early-stage markets can act to mitigate the potential for adverse selection. 
It is this logic that motivates the fundamental thesis of this present research. In a single 
and greatly simplified form, this thesis can be given in a single statement: 
Venture capital investors invest in early-stage capital markets partly to appear more attractive to 
desirable entrepreneurs. 
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Figure 1-1 outlines the approach taken to exploring this thesis and arguing for specific 
conclusions. 
Figure 1-1: Structure of the Argument 
1. Introducton 
2. Research 
Objectives 
3. Theoretical 
Model 
4. Why Invest II 
Sign5. 
How to . al Quality? 
I 17 Entre 
Choiceneu 
6. VC Typology 
I 8. Discussion 
Synthesis 
9. Conclusions 
The research exploration begins in chapter 2, where several related research 
objectives are stated, and where specific research questions are put forth. These 
research questions form the context for the specific research studies reported in the 
subsequent chapters. Chapter 3 then presents a comprehensive literature review to 
position these research questions into streams of interrelated research about venture 
capitalist screening behaviours, information asymmetry and adverse selection in 
various financial markets, and the consumer choice process by which entrepreneurs 
choose their VC investors. This broad literature review is complemented in the 
chapters that follow by more narrowly targeted and deeper reviews of the literature 
relevant to each specific research study. 
The next four chapters comprise the various research studies that have been 
conducted to test this thesis. Chapter 4 is a theoretical and quantitatively empirical 
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investigation into the nature of VC screening skill and its relationship to the degree to 
which VC investors participate in markets with high information asymmetries, such as 
early-stage private investment markets. This investigation attempts to explore the 
question of why a VC investor would choose to operate in early-stage markets with 
high information asymmetries. 
Chapter 5 theoretically and empirically examines the possibility that this early-stage 
investment behaviour may be more than a simple pursuit of economic gain, and that it 
may have an additional information-signalling value. In particular, it explores the 
possibility that early-stage market behaviour on the part of VC investors may act as a 
signal of quality to other market participants, and by so doing, create value for the VC 
investor. 
Chapter 6 further expands on the topics of the previous chapter by triangulating with 
qualitative interview data from practicing VC investors. This triangulation from an 
interpretivist research stance provides some validation of the interpretations draw from 
the preceding positivist investigations. These data are used to develop a typology of 
VC investors that supports the interpretations of chapters 4 and 5. The adoption of a 
multi-method approach to the thesis, by incorporating this interpretivist perspective in 
complement to the positivist perspectives of the other empirical chapters, provides a 
broader and more complete exploration of the constructs and relationships being 
suggested in this research. The alternative research approach used in this chapter 
also highlights some future research topics, pertaining to non-rational goals of VC 
investors, which are beyond the scope of the present thesis. 
Finally, to reflect the potential adverse selection risk that screening may create, 
chapter 7 provides an empirical exploratory investigation into how entrepreneurs 
evaluate potential VC investors for their firms. It investigates the criteria by which VC 
investors are chosen by entrepreneurs and the role (if any) that signals of screening 
quality may play in this choice. 
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The final two chapters integrate the findings of these research studies and use these 
results to address the specific research questions outlined in chapter 2. Chapter 8 
provides discussion and synthesis of the results from the various studies, drawing out 
common themes and observations that emerge upon comparison across studies. 
Chapter 9 directly addresses the specific and detailed research questions, positing 
equally specific and detailed answers that are proposed as a result of the research. It 
also summarizes the limitations of the aggregate research effort, highlights the new or 
related research questions that remain unanswered, and provides some practical 
recommendations for both VC investors and entrepreneurs seeking capital. 
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Purpose 
This research contributes to the extension and integration of three streams of 
literature. First, it extends the economic literature of information asymmetry and its 
effects in capital markets by investigating how the presence of very high asymmetries 
in early-stage markets influences the strategies of participants. Secondly, it extends 
the literature of venture capitalist operations in two ways: by relaxing the assumed 
homogeneity of investor skill levels and demonstrating a resulting range of strategic 
possibilities afforded to different types of investors, and by considering the possibility 
that early-stage investments constitute a signal to stakeholders regarding these 
different skill levels and strategies. And finally, it makes novel application of ideas 
developed in the consumer behaviour literature, to better understand the process by 
which entrepreneurs select their capital providers and to identify ways in which 
differences among investors may influence this selection process. By integrating these 
three perspectives, this research provides a more comprehensive understanding of 
how investors and entrepreneurs in early-stage markets find and evaluate each other, 
and how they adopt strategies to mitigate information asymmetries and maximize their 
expected values. 
This research is focused on financing provided by professional venture capital 
investors, rather than substitute investments from informal "anger investors because 
the VC investors seek purely financial gains, while angels may also seek additional 
non-financial goals (such as meeting a perceived social responsibility, or for pure 
enjoyment) that may confound the effects of information asymmetries on their 
investment decisions. There is an argument that angel investors are not subject to the 
information asymmetry problem as they are investing in principal-principal situations 
rather than principal-agent ones. Moreover, angels typically employ different screening 
criteria and different due diligence approaches than do professional VC investors. The 
research is also focused on financing of early-stage firms because it is with such firms 
that uncertainties are likely to be greatest and information asymmetries highest, yet 
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formal mechanisms for information exchange are least developed. As a result, this 
research focus should offer unique insight into how the challenges of information 
asymmetries are handled. 
Early-stage capital markets are critical enablers of entrepreneurial activity and 
development of new sources of economic gain, a role which motivates the present 
attempt to better understand the strategies and interactions of market participants and 
to develop more complete theories to explain these behaviours. This research should 
therefore advance the understanding of market dynamics between entrepreneurs and 
venture capital (VC) investors, and elucidate the balance between the competing risks 
that the utilization of screening criteria entails. Of specific practical value should be the 
emergence of guidelines by which investors may establish screening criteria that 
adequately compensate for information asymmetries, yet do not result in unacceptable 
levels of adverse selection. 
It is therefore expected that the results of this research may have practical value to 
investment practitioners in designing and evaluating due diligence processes and 
screening criteria, first by providing insights into the relationship between due diligence 
and adverse selection risk for a class of investors with a poor history of introspection 
and internal process improvement, and secondly by providing these same investors 
with practical guidance on how best to improve their due diligence processes to 
mitigate this risk. This research may thereby make some initial steps towards 
responding to the call of Sheppard and Zacharakis for better understanding of 
decision aids and cognitive feedback for VC investors (Shepherd and Zacharakis 
2002). 
Additionally, it is expected that this research will benefit entrepreneurs and SME 
managers by providing an improved understanding of which aspects of a VC 
screening process are essential to mitigating information asymmetry (and must 
therefore be accepted as prerequisite to obtaining any VC financing), and which are 
merely incidental (and can therefore be challenged by an entrepreneur who feels 
averse to them). 
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Finally, this research may lead to insights into the entrepreneurial cognitive processes 
that generate aversion to VC screening, and thereby enhance understanding of the 
role of social psychology in the financing of SM Es, particularly from the perspective of 
entrepreneurs and those types who are drawn especially to VC financing. 
Research Questions 
A contribution towards this overall objective will be attempted by addressing a small 
set of interrelated research questions. 
1) What role does screening play in mitigating information asymmetry in early-stage 
markets? This question is additional to the immediate role that the screening 
process plays in causing entrepreneurs to reveal some degree of private 
information to potential VC investors. 
  Are VC investors homogeneous in how they use screening to mitigate 
information asymmetries? If not, what factors underlie the heterogeneity and 
how are these manifested? 
  What asymmetry-mitigation strategies do VC investors adopt? Is the adoption 
of different strategies dependent on the screening skill of the particular VC 
investor? 
  Does screening ability correlate with willingness to invest in markets with high 
asymmetries, such as potential investments with unknown entrepreneurs, 
business startups, expansions of established firms into new areas of 
business, firms with unproven business models, investments in foreign 
jurisdictions, unsyndicated investments, and investments into firms that have 
been rejected by other VC investors? 
2) Do VC investors use screening ability as a signal of quality for their stakeholders? 
Does differential screening skill meet the requirements of an effective signal? 
What information value would such a signal convey? 
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  Do VC investors signal their screening skill in order to improve the quality of 
their dealflow (i. e., the firms and entrepreneurs that present themselves as 
seeking investment capital)? How else do they attempt to Improve the quality 
of dealf low? 
  What value would such signals have? How much should the market 
participants be willing to pay to cause the effective transmission of the 
information carried by these signals? 
  In practice, do VC investors signal their screening skill by investing in early- 
stage markets? By what other methods do VC Investors think that their 
screening skill can be signalled to observers? And what other reasons do VC 
investors have for investing in early-stage markets? 
3) Do entrepreneurs pay attention to the signal value of differential screening skill 
when seeking and evaluating potential VC investors? How important is this 
potential signal, relative to other selection criteria used by entrepreneurs? 
  How do entrepreneurs believe they choose their VC investors? What criteria 
do they espouse to value? Do they intend to look for signals of screening 
skill? In practice, how and why do entrepreneurs actually choose their VC 
Investors? How well does their actual choice behaviour correspond to their 
espoused beliefs? Are entrepreneurs homogeneous with respect to these 
choice criteria, or does the relative importance of criteria depend on industry, 
firm or individual entrepreneurial attributes? 
To provide an improved context for these questions, the investigation begins by 
developing a theoretically based model of the early-stage capital market and the 
information exchanges among participants in this market. This model development is 
the focus of the next chapter. 
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Markets with Imperfect Information 
This research is an investigation into the early-stage market among venture capital 
(VC) investors and entrepreneurs. By VC investors is meant professional investors, 
acting as agents for some institutional source of capital, and investing in equity-like 
instruments of privately-held firms founded by entrepreneurs. These VC investors are 
thereby differentiated from angel investors (who may not be professional investors, 
and who are typically investing their own money as principal sources of capital), from 
sources of large later-stage private equity investments (e. g., merchant banks), and 
from sources of non-equity finance (e. g., banks and trade creditors). And "early-stage" 
refers to the market for investments in young firms with significant uncertainties with 
respect to the completion of commercialized products, the acceptance of these 
products by customers, operational capabilities of the firm, the skill of the management 
team, or the financial viability of the firm's business model. This market is thereby 
differentiated from investments in later-stage private firms (where most of these 
uncertainties have been resolved or significantly reduced) and from public stock 
markets (which have well-established mechanisms such as disclosure rules for 
addressing imperfect information among market participants, which are not available 
in early-stage markets). 
To approach an understanding of the interrelated behaviours of entrepreneurs and VC 
investors, theorizing starts from the assumption of a classical marketplace of 
transactions among many entrepreneurs and investors, in which the entrepreneurs 
exchange bundles of potential cashflow and control rights (typically in the form of debt 
or equity contracts) for bundles of capital and intangible benefits (such as expert 
knowledge, access to personal networks, or certification value) provided by VC 
investors. 
The operation of the market (such as price formation and the determination of the 
strategies that the actors follow to make their buy/sell decisions) depends on the 
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information available to the actors. Much of this information is "common knowledge" 
(meaning that it is known to all the actors, who in turn know that all others also know it, 
and so on in recursive fashion) (Aumann 1976). Examples of this common knowledge 
include market and general economic conditions, the overall levels of venture capital 
available, and the publicly disclosed terms of recent deals (typically comprising high- 
level descriptors such as the sector in which the company operates, and the total 
amount of the investment made). But some of the information is private to 
entrepreneurs (such as the true state of their firms, their intentions regarding future 
expenditure of effort, and the'potential investment terms they would be willing to 
accept). And some of the information is private to investors (such as their assessment 
and level of desire for each entrepreneur's investment opportunity, the performance of 
their current investment portfolio compared to the performance targets established for 
it, and their assessment of competitive pressures). 
As a result of the existence of this private information, the actors in the market 
necessarily have imperfect information. They may have prior assumptions about the 
information unknown to them, but these assumptions are probabilistic at best. 
Choosing and implementing a strategy in the face of this imperfect information is 
therefore a decision taken under risk. 
How people make decisions under risk is a topic with rich history. Several of the 
theoretical lenses that may be applied to managerial decision-making under risk owe 
their origins to the theory of the firm and associated agency risks (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976) or to various permutations of generalized expected utility theory 
(Machina 1982) that are obtained by successively relaxing individual axioms of 
subjective utility theory (Savage 1954). 
Generalized expected utility theory is an extension of the von Neumann-Morgenstern 
classical utility theory (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944). This theory posits that 
actors make choices from among alternatives based on the utility of these alternatives, 
and that the utility of an alternative is somehow related to the expectation value of the 
economic payoff of that alternative. The generalization is that this relationship, while 
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monotonic, is not necessarily linear. The preferences implied by this relationship must 
only satisfy four axioms: 
  Completeness - Any pair of alternatives can be ranked or compared, and actors 
will have a preference between them. 
  Transitivity - If alternative A is preferred to alternative B, and alternative B is 
preferred to alternative C, then alternative A will be preferred to alternative C. 
  Continuity - In any gamble for an »i chance to win $1000, there exists a value of 
X where the gamble is equally desired as an absolutely certain of win $100 (but X 
might be different than 10%). There is a fixed-value equivalent to any gamble. 
  Independence - Two alternatives that have the same expected utility can be 
substituted for each other in any gamble, and it will not affect the preferences of 
the actors evaluating the gamble. 
Subjective expected utility theory extends this thinking to account for a number of 
observed paradoxes where the expressed preferences of actors appear to violate one 
or more of these axioms. In particular, subjective expected utility replaces the classical 
probabilities used in generalized expected utility with "subjectively estimated" 
probabilities. In this way, the theory can account for decisions made in the face of 
uncertainty (where the risks cannot be quantified). For example, it may describe how 
an entrepreneur evaluates her chances of success in a business venture that has 
never been tried before. 
Each extension to these theories adds an additional perspective to the question of 
decision-making under risk. For example, whereas this traditional economics with 
strong rationality models address the utility maximization behaviour of investors under 
point-in-time and path-independent conditions, prospect theory (Kahneman and 
Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1992) adds a dimension of historical context to 
their cognitions, whereby the utility of a future alternative is partly dependent on the 
path that has led to it. Career concerns and reputation theory (Holstrom 1982; 
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Kanodia, Bushman et al. 1989) further adds a dimension of individual actor utility 
maximization and agency risk, whereby utility is determined with reference to an 
individual actor. Regret theory (Bell 1982; Loomes and Sugden 1982) adds a 
dimension of multivariate utility and opportunity cost, whereby utility is not simply a 
function of wealth but also of emotional components. And signalling theory (Spence 
1973; Stuart, Hoang et al. 1999; Bhattacharya and Dittmar 2000) adds a dimension 
pertaining to access and information economics among actors, and how they 
communicate information about utility. 
Information asymmetry and adverse selection 
In the entrepreneur-investor market, a significant component of the decision risk and 
uncertainty is attributable the asymmetry of private information between the two 
parties. Ex ante, the entrepreneur alone possesses information about her firm', her 
future projects and the effort she is willing to expend towards those projects under 
various ownership and control scenarios. This leads to two problems. First, if the 
entrepreneur believes her opportunity to be better than average, she may be reluctant 
to fully disclose it to others, through fear that either others may copy her ideas and 
expropriate the opportunity (what Arrow refers to as the "paradox of disclosure") 
(Arrow 1962), or that resource providers may raise their prices to attempt to capture 
more of the economic gains available through the opportunity (Shane and Cable 
2002). Secondly, if the entrepreneur believes her opportunity to be worse than 
average, she faces an incentive to misrepresent the opportunity to thereby entice 
resource providers to contribute to it, partly to enjoy private benefit of their resources 
(Jensen and Meckling 1976; Cable and Shane 1997), and partly to trade on their good 
reputations (Sahlman 1990). In response to this, the challenge for the VC investor is to 
reduce this asymmetry through the discovery of additional information, and to mitigate 
the impact of any remaining asymmetry through the design of investment contracts 
that minimize agency risks. 
' In the interests of greater clarity of writing, I have adopted the convention of a masculine pronoun for the VC 
Investor and a feminine pronoun for the entrepreneur. Of course, both roles are open to members of both 
sexes. Nothing gender-specific is being implied In this convention of convenience. 
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Asymmetry mitigation is typically effected through successive phases of due diligence 
investigation by the investor, starting with some form of screening criteria (Fried and 
Hisrich 1994). This includes the creation of bonding costs for the entrepreneur, and 
the creation of monitoring mechanisms and costs for the investor (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976). Ex ante bonding costs in VC investment contracts may take the form 
of due diligence fees and break fees that the investor imposes upon the entrepreneur, 
which thereby create incentives for the entrepreneur to disclose her private information 
truthfully. Ex post bonding costs may take the form of performance-based 
compensation for the firm management and the sharing of equity risks between the 
investor and the entrepreneur. Monitoring may take the form of ongoing reporting 
obligations, active involvement of the VC investor in the management or strategic 
governance of the firm, and the staging of the investment into multiple tranches 
(Gompers 1995; Lemer 1995; Berlin 1998; Kaplan and Stromberg 2001). 
Without these treatments, markets characterized by such information asymmetries 
can suffer from two defects: 
1) Where the asymmetry arises prior to making transactions, adverse selection may 
occur. 
2) Where it arises after the transaction is completed, moral hazard may become an 
issue. 
The general adverse selection problem was first discussed in the literature in Akerlof's 
seminar paper on "lemons" and the potential for market collapse in the markets for 
used cars, insurance, and others (Akerlof 1970). This model was subsequently 
enhanced by Wilson, who showed that markets with adverse selection may be 
characterized by multiple equilibria (Wilson 1979). Rose subsequently provided a 
framework by which markets with adverse selection may be shown to exhibit either no 
equilibrium per Akerlof, multiple equilibria per Wilson (with the highest priced 
equilibrium being preferred by all), or a unique equilibrium under the most likely 
distribution of quality (Rose 1993). This result that suggests that in adverse selection 
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markets, provided collapse can be prevented through some mitigating mechanisms, a 
unique equilibrium typically will emerge (Rose 1993). Yet, this unique equilibrium 
might not be the expected Walrasian market-clearing price, as some participants may 
be using price as a signalling mechanism to overcome information asymmetries, as 
will be discussed below (Wilson 1979). 
Yet, despite continuing work on the problem of markets with information asymmetries, 
there currently exists no single paradigm for competitive markets with incomplete 
information (Gale 1999); a category that includes the capital markets between VC 
investors and entrepreneurs. 
As a consequence of the competitive pressures among VC investors, the most 
desirable entrepreneurs are also the ones least likely to acquiesce in demands that 
they perceive as unjustifiable by the VC investors. Should a VC investor demand an 
unfavourable valuation or investment terms, or indeed make onerous demands of the 
entrepreneur during screening and due diligence investigations, a highly desirable 
entrepreneur may simply walk away into the arms of another investor. In this way, the 
careful screening processes that VC investors use to mitigate risks due to information 
asymmetry can be seen also to perversely exacerbate risks of adverse selection 
(Cumming 2002). 
A number of studies, for example, have looked at how the structure of the financing 
offered by the investor can lead to adverse selection (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981; Myers 
and Majluf 1984; De Meza and Webb 1987). The practical implications of these 
studies has been the realisation that offers of equity attract firms with low expected 
returns, offers of debt attracts firms with higher expected returns but with high 
expected volatility, and convertible instruments attract firms with low expected volatility 
(Brennan and Kraus 1987; Hellmann and Stiglitz 2000). These results demonstrate 
that it is possible to influence the type of entrepreneur attracted to a specific type of 
investor, and thereby to influence the volume and quality of dealflow that a specific 
investor will see. 
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The problem of adverse selection is wide-ranging and significant if left unchecked, and 
has been proposed as a potential cause of capital markets failure (De Meza and 
Webb 1990). Since Akerlof's pioneering work (Akerlof 1970), the phenomenon of 
adverse selection has been found to occur in a wide range of financial markets. In the 
debt financing world of the banking industry, Stiglitz and Weiss found that information 
asymmetry leads to a form of credit rationing, whereby banks would be unable to 
increase interest rates in the face of excess credit demand, because doing so would 
result in adverse selection and a decline in the credit-worthiness of their customers 
(Stiglitz and Weiss 1981; Stiglitz and Weiss 1992). In public equity capital markets with 
high-quality IPO firms, the adverse selection risk in the new issues market can lead to 
underpricing and staged financing (Jain 1997). In M&A activities, adverse selection 
can materially impact the choice and form of consideration when structuring 
acquisition transactions (Datar, Frankel et al. 2001). Adverse selection has also been 
found to contribute to the creation of barriers to entry in the banking industry, and the 
fostering of resultant market inefficiencies due to constraints on competition (Dell' 
Ariccia, Friedman et al. 1999). In aggregate, adverse selection in financial markets can 
lead to over-investment at a socially inefficient level, wherein more attractive projects 
subsidize less attractive ones (De Meza and Webb 1987). 
Yet despite the presence of the adverse selection problem, the market collapse 
foreseen by Akerlof and by De Meza and Webb typically does not occur. Mechanisms 
and market conventions have developed to reduce the information asymmetry in the 
market and mitigate the risk of market collapse. Akerlof suggested that mechanisms 
such as seller liability, guarantees, brand reputation, and third-party certifications could 
arise to reduce information asymmetry in the market. Other mechanisms that have 
been proposed include contract terms and conditions designed to enforce information 
transfer (such as investment structure, monitoring and information rights, and staging 
of investment tranches) (Gompers 1995; Neher 1999; Bascha and Walz 2001), the 
ability of VC investors to obtain information about the entrepreneur and her opportunity 
through external social networks (Shane and Cable 2002), and the incentive value for 
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entrepreneurs to include VC investors as a risk-sharing strategy (Amit, Glosten et al. 
1990a). 
Capital structure within the entrepreneurial firm can also serve as an information 
transfer mechanism. Darrough and Stroughton examined the impact of adverse 
selection in markets where entrepreneurs offer securities to uninformed investors, and 
found the risk can be somewhat mitigated through the combined use of debt and 
equity instruments (Darrough and Stoughton 1986). Notably, several studies have 
reported on the widespread use of combined debt/equity structures or the use of 
instruments with hybrid characteristics by VC investors (Bascha and Walz 2001; 
Bratton 2002). But the extent to which these structures are designed to mitigate the 
potential adverse selection problem, or have had practical impact upon adverse 
selection, appears to have not been researched. 
Venture Capital Seeking Entrepreneurs 
The fundamental investing operations of formal VC firms has been extensively 
described in the literature (Hunstman and Hoban 1980; Tyebjee and Bruno 1984; 
Sahlman 1990; Gompers 1993; Fried and Hisrich 1995; Berlin 1998). Typically, VC 
firms are structured as limited liability partnerships in which general partners, acting as 
agents for the limited partner investors, source investment opportunities, evaluate or 
screen them according to investment criteria for the specific VC fund, structure and 
execute investment contracts with the investee companies, monitor the performance 
of the investees, and eventually liquidate their investment, usually through initial public 
offering or trade sale. 
Venture capital firms seek investments that have the potential for high-growth and high 
returns and, in order to gain the opportunity to secure these high returns, accept high 
risks and uncertainties in the performance of the investments. Their perception of 
these growth expectations, and the attendant levels of risk, is conditioned partly by the 
success or failure of similar investments made by themselves or their peers and partly 
by factors unique to the individual investment opportunity. For example, Roure and 
- Keeley found, in examining the entire portfolio for a specific VC firm specializing in 
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technology-based firms, that the performance expectations held by VC investors were 
primarily driven by their perceptions of the completeness of the founding team, the 
technical superiority of the product, the expected time required to complete product 
development, and the degree of buyer concentration. They also found that most of the 
variance in investee performance could be explained by these factors alone (Roure 
and Keeley 1990). Stuart and Abetti looked more closely into the qualifications of the 
founding team, and found that the number of previous new venture involvements and 
the level of managerial responsibility of the founding team members was by far the 
most significant factor (Stuart and Abetti 1990). Ruhnka and Young contributed a 
study into the expectations of VC firms regarding the level of risk of a new company, 
and found strong correlations between the growth stage of the company and the 
level/type of risks expected (Ruhnka and Young 1991). Subsequently, researchers 
explored other potential predictors of investee performance, for which the degree of 
inclusion into VC expectation models is still not well understood. These include the 
self-assessed competence of the founders (Chandler and Jansen 1992), a range of 
general measures of the human capital of the firm (Cooper, Javier. Gimeno-Gascon et 
al. 1994; Smart 1998), and operational and investment governance factors of the 
contract structure (Jain 2001). 
The high degree of uncertainty in the performance of VC investments results in a wide 
range of performance outcomes, with some investee companies performing 
spectacularly, while others fail and die before the VC firm can exit. Indeed, an industry 
heuristic frequently cited by VC investors is that, of ten investments, two or three will 
die and result in complete investment loss, six will survive but under-perform target 
return rates or provide no easy liquidity path for the VC firm (so called "walking 
wounded" or "living dead"), and one or two will perform so spectacularly well as to 
result in acceptable overall portfolio returns (so called "home runs"). Some empirical 
studies have obtained results that confirm this practitioner viewpoint (Hunstman and 
Hoban 1980; Chiampou and Kallett 1989; Ruhnka, Feldman et al. 1992). 
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Figure 3-1 shows a model of VC investment within a competitive context, by which VC 
Investors observe the successes and failures of competitor investments in a 
marketplace and use this information to adjust their perceptions of potential risks and 
returns of future similar investments (Valliere and Peterson 2004). Within this 
competitive environment, VC firms must strive to become known, differentiate 
themselves from their competitors, and successfully attract the most desirable 
entrepreneurs and investment opportunities. 
Figure 3-1: Context for Investment Screening 
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(Valliere and Peterson 2004) 
Competition among VC firms 
Venture capital firms do not operate in isolation. They compete with other firms for 
access to attractive investment opportunities and for relationships with the sources of 
this access, such as universities, research institutions, and professionals (lawyers, 
accountants, etc. ) serving entrepreneurs (referred to as "deal flow"); in particular, they 
face competition from other sources of capital such as "angel" investors (Sohl 2003), 
foreign VC firms expanding their reach (Sapienza, Manigart et al. 1996), and local VC 
firms who chose not to cooperate in syndicated investments (Gompers and Lerner 
2001). They also exist in an environment of mutual co-operation in sharing or 
syndicating individual investment opportunities, as a strategy for marshalling sufficient 
resources, for amortizing the fixed costs of investment due diligence, or for mitigating 
agency risks (Lemer 1994; Lockett and Wright 2001). The syndication network 
environment often forms stable and persistent subgroups (Campo-Rembado 2005). 
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The existing agency risk between VC firm as agents for their respective capital- 
provider principals can result in VC firms making investment decisions that are 
designed to create a favourable impression on their peers, on current or prospective 
principal sources of capital, or on potential investee companies -a phenomenon 
referred to as grandstanding (Gompers 1996; Gompers and Lerner 1998). In extreme 
cases, this can result in a form of herd behaviour sometimes referred to as capital 
markets myopia (Sahlman and Stevenson 1985; Scharfstein and Stein 1990; Bygrave 
and Timmons 1992). 
Venture capital firms can compete to attract entrepreneurs through a variety of 
strategies, including the industry/stage/geographic scope of their fund (Elango, Fried 
et at. 1995), the price of their capital (i. e., the valuation of the entrepreneur's company 
upon which the VC firms is willing to invest for equity, or the interest rate at which it is 
willing to invest as debt) (Biglaiser and Ching-to 2003), the nature and extent of the 
other terms and conditions of the proposed investment contract (such as capital 
structure, tranches, anti-dilution provisions, vetoes over management, and information 
reporting obligations) (Neher 1999; Bascha and Walz 2001; Bratton 2002; Wang and 
Zhou 2002), the degree of expertise the VC firm can make available to assist the 
entrepreneurial management (Schultz, Murray et at. 2002), the nature and extent of 
business networks the VC firm can make available (Stuart, Hoang et al. 1999; Schultz, 
Murray et al. 2002), the VC firm's reputation and any associated referrals from sources 
trusted by entrepreneurs (such as word-of-mouth recommendations by the 
management of existing investee companies), and the perceived certification and 
affiliation value that entrepreneur expects to receive through association with the VC 
firm (Megginson and Weiss 1991; Stuart, Hoang et at. 1999; Lange, Bygrave et al. 
2001; Hsu 2002). 
The net impact of this competitive VC environment is that those entrepreneurs with 
attractive opportunities (being ones that pass the various screening criteria), can 
become objects of competitive demand among VC firms. The better an entrepreneur's 
opportunity appears on the screening results, the more that VC firms will wish to add 
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her firm to their own investment portfolios. The relative scarcity of high-quality 
entrepreneurial investment opportunities among the total deal flow seen by VC 
investors only serves to amplify this competitive pressure. As several studies have 
shown, good investment opportunities are relatively rare among the deal flow most VC 
investors see (Hunstman and Hoban 1980; Ruhnka, Feldman et at. 1992; Fried and 
Hisrich 1994). As a result, an entrepreneur with an attractive firm and with the ability to 
pass the various screening criteria of VC investors will be in a strong position to 
negotiate favourable investment terms with interested VC investors. This is in stark 
contrast to an average or low-quality entrepreneur who, if she can attract venture 
capital at all, is forced into a position of a simple price-taker. 
VC investors screening entrepreneurs 
In dealing with entrepreneurs, VC investors are at an intrinsic information 
disadvantage, in that the entrepreneurs possess private information about the nature 
and prospects of their businesses, and about the level of effort they are willing to 
expend towards making their businesses successful. This information asymmetry has 
the effect of creating risk, uncertainty and inefficiency in early-stage capital markets 
(De Meza and Webb 1987; Cumming and Macintosh 2001). 
If the VC investor chooses to invest in an entrepreneurial company, it creates an 
agency relationship by which the entrepreneur acts as an agent of the investors, 
charged with effectively utilizing their capital to cause the firm to grow. As a result of 
this relationship, an agency risk exists between VC investor principals and 
entrepreneur agents (Darrough and Stoughton 1986; Ruhnka and Young 1991; 
Kaplan and Stromberg 2001; Cumming 2002). 
So, VC firms face the challenge of evaluating potential investee companies in an 
uncertain environment where moral hazard and adverse selection may exist (Sahlman 
1990). Some of the strategies used to mitigate these risks include use of formal 
screening criteria (Wells 1974; Tyebjee and Bruno 1984; MacMillan, Seigel et at. 
1985; MacMillan, Zeman et at. 1985; Silver 1985; MacMillan and Subba Narasimha 
1987; Sandberg, Schweiger et al. 1988; Hall 1989; Hall and Hofer 1993; Fried and 
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Hisrich 1994; Shepherd 1997; Shepherd 1999; Shepherd, Ettenson et al. 2000; 
Kaplan and Stromberg 2001), reliance on syndicate partners (Lemer 1994; Lockett 
and Wright 2001; Wright and Lockett 2003), imposition of high hurdle rates (Gompers 
1995; Mason and Harrison 1999), use of convertible or preferred securities (Bascha 
and Walz 2001; Bratton 2002), staging of investments into separate tranches (Neher 
1999; Wang and Zhou 2002), and close monitoring of investee companies and 
mentoring of their management (Sapienza and Gupta 1994; Gompers 1995; Lerner 
1995; Kaplan and Stromberg 2001). 
Over time, a range of mechanisms have developed in capital markets to mitigate 
information asymmetries between company managers and their investors. These 
have included: information disclosure regulations (Forsythe, Lundholm et al. 1999), 
capital structures that provide incentives for truthful disclosure (Leland and Pyle 1977; 
Darrough and Stoughton 1986), voluntary disclosures by managers (Lang and 
Lundholm 2000), the increasing use of convertible shares to force the sharing of 
"monitoring" information (Houben 2002), and the use of staged financing to mitigate 
moral hazard (Neher 1999). 
The primary method employed ex ante by VC investors for reducing information 
asymmetry has been the use of screening criteria (i. e., a set of evaluative criteria by 
which investment opportunities may be ranked and scored against some acceptable 
benchmarks). The application of these screening criteria typically occurs over several 
successive phases or stages, wherein only the entrepreneurs who meet or exceed the 
criteria of one evaluation stage are considered for evaluation at the next stage. 
Whereas early research into VC screening largely dealt with its application as a single- 
stage event (Hall and Hofer 1993); Fried and Hisrich have identified a model that more 
accurately reflects the successive nature of staged screening (Fried and Hisrich 1994). 
The VC activities related to the addition of a new company to the investment portfolio 
(origination, screening, evaluation, structuring, and closing) are therefore done within 
an overall context that conditions perceptions and expectations of risk and return. The 
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nature of these activities has been investigated by many previous researchers. Figure 
3-2 summarizes a range of alternative conceptualisations for these activities. 
Figure 3-2: Alternative Views of Screening 
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The alternative models shown in figure 3-2 differ only in details as to the steps and 
depth of particular screening stages. But broadly they reflect a consensus view of the 
activities that VC investors undertake to determine whether to make a new investment 
and add a new company to the investment portfolio. 
From the perspective of the VC investor, the ideal set of screening criteria would 
effectively separate entrepreneurial investment opportunities based on their likely 
future success: minimize Type I errors (erroneous elimination of "good" opportunities), 
minimize Type II errors (erroneous acceptance of "bad" opportunities), and do so in an 
efficient manner (e. g., quickly, at low cost, reliably, robustly, and deterministically) 
(Zacharakis and Meyer 2000). 
Research into screening has evolved into two streams: 
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1) Espoused ("do what I say"). 
2) Attribute-based ("do what ought to work"). 
The majority of research has been directed at the espoused stream (MacMillan, Seigel 
et al. 1985; MacMillan, Zeman et al. 1985; Sandberg, Schweiger et al. 1988; Hall and 
Hofer 1993; Fried and Hisrich 1994; Elango, Fried et al. 1995; Shepherd 1999; Kaplan 
and Stromberg 2001). This stream of research attempts to capture the screening 
criteria used by VC Investors by asking the investors to introspect and identify the 
criteria they employed, either during or after the evaluation process. But as social 
judgement theorists have demonstrated (Priem and Harrison 1994), espoused criteria 
are not always reflective of what is actually happening - here exacerbated by the 
observation that VC investors are notoriously poor at introspection into their own 
decision-making processes (Zacharakis and Meyer 1998; Shepherd 1999). Moreover, 
despite poor introspection, VC investors are overconfident in their selection abilities 
(Zacharakis 1997; Zacharakis and Shepherd 2001). This overconfidence encumbers 
their already poor introspection, and inhibits learning and ongoing improvement. 
The methodology employed in several such studies has also been criticized on 
several points (Sandberg, Schweiger et al. 1988). The use of actuarial "bootstrap" 
models using espoused criteria (Zacharakis and Meyer 2000) was an improvement, 
but was still based on potentially flawed espousals by VC investors. Some areas of 
methodological weakness in some of these early studies include: 
  Assuming that screening is a single-pass operation, rather than a successive 
application of different, more refined filters. This presupposes that if a criterion is 
found to have low significance then it must be unimportant, overlooking the 
possibility that it may have simply been already applied in a pre-screening step. 
  Assuming that screening criteria or weightings are not endogenously impacted by 
the nature of heterogeneous company datasets. This presupposes that the criteria 
reported by one investor are comparable to those reported by another even 
though they were reporting on the criteria used to evaluate different companies, 
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overlooking the possibility that investors may apply different criteria to different 
classes of firm. 
  Limiting data collection to very few company evaluations per respondent. This 
presupposes that the criteria used for one or two study companies are accurate 
measures of general criteria, and are not biased by the choice of study 
companies. 
  Lack of normalization of reported data based on number of evaluations per 
respondent, thereby not correcting for the fact that criteria used by an investor 
reporting on three study companies will be over weighted relative to an investor 
reporting on only a single company. 
  Potential for post-hoc rationalizing by respondents and self-reporting of criteria 
that make the respondent look good, whereby respondents may claim that the 
reported criteria were all in fact used, and no unreported criteria were used. This 
potentially undermines the validity of the measures of which criteria are actually 
used. 
  Potential for overweighting minor criteria and underweighting major criteria, 
whereby respondents may claim that screening decisions are based on a broad 
set of criteria, and not driven primarily by a small dominant set). This potentially 
undermines the validity of the measures of the weights used for the criteria that 
are actually used. 
  Assuming that VC investors act uniformly and do not exhibit subsectors with very 
different criteria or weightings. This presupposes there are no differences among 
investors, in terms of strategies, stage or style - or that these differences are 
immaterial to the screening process. 
Despite these methodological shortcomings, there has been a good degree of high- 
level agreement on the espoused criteria of VC investors, leading to the general 
recognition of market characteristics, product characteristics, entrepreneur/team 
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attributes, strategy and financial characteristics as the predominant factors in VC 
screening decisions. 
The alternative approach to the research into VC screening criteria has been attribute- 
based. This stream has evolved from the venture performance area of business 
strategy research. Under this approach, an attempt has been made to identify 
theoretically justified attributes of successful new ventures, without reference to the 
criteria espoused by investors through their own introspection (MacMillan and Subba 
Narasimha 1987; Rea 1989; Roure and Keeley 1990; Shepherd 1997). The results of 
these studies appear mixed, with no common set of theoretically anchored attributes 
clearly emerging as the optimal predictors of venture prospects and outcomes. 
Nevertheless, despite the uncertainty around the choice of attribute-predictors, the 
attribute-based screening approach appears to hold some promise of providing a 
higher level of predictive capability; in one study, an actuarial model based on 
attributes identified by Mitchell (Mitchell 1998) was found to be superior both to 
unaided VC investor intuition and to the use of espoused criteria in predicting venture 
performance (Mainprize, Hindle et al. 2002). 
Figure 3-3 integrates these screening perspectives into a single high-level model, and 
illustrates points at which the contextual influences of figure 3-1 may be felt. 
Figure 3-3: Contextual Influences on Screening 
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Information obtained from screening may cause increases or decreases In perceived 
risks due to degree of fit with the VC fund area of specialisation. Evaluation may also 
uncover information that leads to changed perceptions of potential risk and return. 
These changed perceptions are in turn reflected by changes in the structuring of terms 
and conditions of the investment. For example, if evaluation uncovers a key 
dependency on a single employee or founder, then structuring may be adjusted to 
include a stock vesting schedule or earn-out provisions to encourage that key 
employee to remain with the firm for many years (Datar, Frankel et al. 2001). 
Entrepreneurs Seeking Venture Capital 
Entrepreneurs can have many motivations for launching and growing their firms. 
Some aim to achieve particularly high growth in order to capture high-value market 
opportunities or to otherwise achieve personal objectives. Among these 
entrepreneurs, those who lack sufficient financial resources to fund the growth of their 
companies are forced to seek outside investors (Bank of England 2001). Amit et a! 
show that some entrepreneurs will seek outside investors, in the form of VC investors, 
even when the entrepreneurs have adequate alternative sources of funds, in order to 
obtain additional non-financial benefits of association with these investors (Amit, 
Glosten et al. 1990; Amit, Glosten et al. 1990a). 
Several studies have reported on the sources of capital that entrepreneurs seek and 
access, and the importance that venture capital plays as a source of entrepreneurial 
capital (Bruno and Tyebjee 1983; Bruno and Tyebjee 1985; NVCA 2002). In particular, 
the studies of Bruno and Tyebjee, summarized in table 3-1, have found general 
consistency in the major role the VC investment plays in the financial sourcing 
strategies of entrepreneurs. The range of sources cited, and their relative preference 
shows that venture capital and private equity remain very important sources of 
financing for entrepreneurs. 
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Table 3-1: Sources of entrepreneurial capital 
1983 1985 
preferred Anticipated preferred 
Venture capital 28% 38% 28% 
Bank debt 19% 34% 19% 
Private equity 20% 13% 20% 
Public equity 8% 8% 8% 
Corporations 4% 0%, 4% 
Others' 1% 26% 1% 
None 20% 0% 20% 
' Includes SBA, retained earnings and unclassified 
Percentage of mentions. Totals greater than 100% reflect choice of more than one source. 
(Bruno and Tyebjee 1983; Bruno and Tyebjee 1985) 
These studies show that VC investment is an important factor for many entrepreneurs. 
Yet they also show that many entrepreneurs anticipate and obtain capital from 
alternative sources. This raises numerous questions about when entrepreneurs 
access venture capital and when they do not, and why they make these choices. 
However, there have been few research efforts into understanding the reasons for 
these choices - such as determining whether, when VC funding is not successfully 
obtained, it was a decision of the VC investor or a decision of the entrepreneur. 
Indeed, the one study into proposed VC deals that were not consummated (Bruno and 
Tyebjee 1983) failed to make this important distinction, treating both cases as a 
rejection of the entrepreneur by the VC investor. 
Subsequent studies by Amit et al have developed a theoretical basis for predicting 
these financing choices (Amit, Glosten et at. 1990; Amit, Glosten et at. 1990a). They 
first show that where all entrepreneurs and VC investors have access to the same 
information (i. e., where there is no information asymmetry), all entrepreneurs will 
choose to access VC investors in order to enjoy the risk-sharing benefits. However, 
when entrepreneurs have private information (such as their expected level of personal 
effort), only some entrepreneurs will seek VC investment, while many will reject it - 
often out of fear or resentment of the appropriation of benefits by a prospective VC 
investor. Moreover, they show that in such circumstances, it will be the weakest 
entrepreneurs (those with projects with low prospect, and who therefore are in a weak 
negotiating position with VC Investors) who seek VC investment, while the stronger 
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entrepreneurs will exercise their rights to consumer choice -a situation of classic 
adverse selection. 
Entrepreneurs as consumers 
Consumer marketing textbooks typically describe the consumer choice process as a 
series of steps in which a number of brand alternatives are identified and then 
winnowed down to a final selection. The original set of alternatives is drawn from the 
set of brands of which the consumer is aware (the "awareness set"). The marketing 
challenge at this step is to raise awareness of a brand with the potential consumer, so 
that it comes to mind when a purchase decision is required. The awareness set is 
subsequently divided by the consumer into those alternatives that she may consider 
buying (the "consideration see' or "evoked set") and those that are rejected out of hand 
as unsuitable (the "inept set'). Finally, some decision rule or decision process is 
applied so that the members of the consideration set can be examined and evaluated, 
and a decision made. 
The concepts of these search sets originates from Stigler's economics work, in which 
he shows that, in the presence of search costs, rational consumers will not search all 
the brands available in the market (Stigler 1961). The concept of search cost was then 
further developed to reflect information processing requirements, such as the cost and 
energy required to think through the evaluation and decision (Shugan 1980; Alba and 
Hutchinson 1987), which is a function of the number of decision criteria, the range and 
variability of the values of these criteria, and the number of brands to be evaluated 
(Belonax and Mittelstaedt 1978). 
The consumer purchase process begins with the search for information and 
alternatives. The buyer seeks information about the range of alternatives available and 
the attributes of each alternative. Naturally, to the extent that the buyer has some of 
this information available through prior knowledge, this search will be more efficient - 
an outcome that was confirmed by Brucks (1985). To further enhance the efficiency of 
the search, the buyer may prioritize the information sought according to the nature of 
the task at hand. Simonson et al found that the prioritization of these searches for 
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brand attribute information depends on the consumer's prior beliefs about the brand, 
and on the level of uncertainty she has about prior brand attribute knowledge - high 
priority is given to searching for information about brand attributes when the attribute 
values are uncertain, when prior evaluations of the brand attribute were negative, or 
when the task is a choice among brands with positive prior experience (Simonson, 
Huber et al. 1988). In the early-stage capital markets this may correspond to Investor 
reputation. 
This prioritization of information search, combined with the existence of search costs, 
creates an advantage for first-mover suppliers, which is particularly strong for 
experience-based goods that are high-risk and low-frequency purchases (such as 
obtaining venture capital) (Schmalensee 1982). First-movers have the opportunity to 
define the reference standard and to influence the choice of attributes by which all 
followers will be evaluated, towards attributes on which they rank well, or for which the 
search costs for competitor information is especially high. 
From the information garnered, the consumer then forms an. "evaluation set" or 
"consideration set" of those alternatives that will be evaluated to reach the purchase 
decision. In the early-stage capital markets this set may correspond to the set of VC 
investors who are targeted to receive the entrepreneur's business plan in order to 
initiate a conversation that may lead to a financing transaction. For certain major 
purchase items, Punj has found that consumers make evaluations of some selected 
attributes priorto their need to purchase (Punj 1987). If a brand alternative is known to 
be poor on a materially important attribute, this prior pre-search information may be 
sufficient to cause the brand to be excluded from the consideration set. Otherwise, the 
decision of whether to include the brand into the consideration set is based on a 
balance of opposing factors. Adding a brand to the set increases the cost and 
complexity of the decision process; but it also may incrementally increase the utility of 
the outcome and may provide valuable data for future decisions. The result is that 
additional brands are likely to be considered when they are easy to research and 
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evaluate, and when they promise the potential of incremental benefit relative to the 
existing alternatives in the consideration set (Hauser and Wernerfelt 1990). 
Having formed a consideration set of brand alternatives, the consumer next chooses 
and applies some decision process, consisting either of a simple application of' a 
decision rule, or the successive application of several decision rules, to evaluate the 
alternatives. The choice of decision rule is a trade-off between "simplifying" rules 
(which emphasize the efficiency of the decision process) and "optimizing" rules (which 
emphasize the effectiveness or utility of the decision reached). As the complexity of 
the decision increases (more attributes to be considered, and a wider range of values 
within each attribute), the balance shifts towards simplifying rules (Wright 1975). 
The behavioural psychology influences discussed above in the context of VC investor 
decision making can also influence the decision process of entrepreneur consumers. 
For example, the skewing of probability weighting functions, as described in prospect 
theory, can similarly affect the evaluation and decision processes of consumers. How 
a consumer will evaluate a given attribute and brand may be influenced by the path 
taken to reach this decision point - making it part of the seller's marketing challenge to 
attempt to influence either the path taken by the consumer or to otherwise influence 
the "reference point" she uses to evaluate the incremental benefits of the proposed 
brand alternative (Puto 1987). 
Finally, as Cote and Gardner both illustrate, for some purchase decisions, situational 
factors can override the results of the formal decision process, and yield a different 
final purchase outcome (Cote, McCullough et al. 1985; Gardner 1985). These 
situational factors can include affective aspects of the purchase event, or the last- 
minute occurrence of contextual events. The determination of which situational factors 
can affect a specific purchase choice apparently depends on the nature of the item 
being purchased. In the early-stage capital markets, these situational factors may 
correspond to investment transaction attributes, such as the speed, cost, and difficulty 
of completing the screening process. 
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Entrepreneurs and the capital buying decision 
The early-stage capital marketplace (like all markets) is a two-sided exchange of 
value. High-quality entrepreneurs can therefore be viewed not simply as marketers of 
their equity, but also conversely as consumers searching for and evaluating offers 
from investors wishing to sell capital in exchange for equity or other rights in their new 
ventures. So, when financial negotiations between an entrepreneur and a VC investor 
break down without a deal being made, these failures cannot simply be ascribed to the 
investor discovering unfavourable information during the screening process - some of 
the failed deals may be due to entrepreneurs breaking off discussions with a VC firm 
that they perceived as being uncompetitive or too intrusive. One investigation made 
into unconsummated VC deals examined a number of potential reasons for failure, 
some of which would support an interpretation that it was the entrepreneur (not the 
investor) who broke off talks (Bruno and Tyebjee 1983). However, the analysis 
accompanying this study did not entertain this possibility, and ascribed all failed deals 
to a presumed termination decision by the investor - so the opportunity to make a first 
examination of this potential scenario was not realized. However, this study did shed 
some initial light on some of the irritants for entrepreneurs in the negotiation process. 
In particular, the researchers found that entrepreneurs were often dissatisfied with five 
aspects of the negotiation process: 
  Valuation of their firm 
  Operating restrictions or covenants in the proposed deal 
  Lack of speed in the negotiation process 
  Poor understanding of the business by the VC investor 
  Low risk appetite by the VC investor. 
The final two of these aspects were found to be especially irritating for entrepreneurs 
who subsequently abandoned the search for venture capital financing - perhaps 
suggesting that some VCs are inadvertently signalling their own poor quality. 
Alternatively, these entrepreneurs may have been ones with businesses that were 
wholly unsuitable for VC financing, and so their expressed frustration was simply a 
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reflection of them learning this unhappy reality. But, as the study was not designed to 
investigate further into the reasons for their subsequent departure from the market, 
this was unconfirmed. This study at least suggests that the suitability of a given 
entrepreneurial firm for VC financing can be independently assessed from the 
perspectives of both the VC investor and the entrepreneur. 
In a later study, Rea found further confirmation that valuation and the terms and 
conditions of a proposed deal can influence an entrepreneur's decision of whether to 
break off negotiations (Rea 1989). In this study, VC investors cited competitive 
pressures (on valuation or on added services) and an insistence by entrepreneurs for 
different deal structure as significant reasons for the failure of deal negotiations. 
Both of these studies were focused on the VC investors, and obtained information or 
made inferences about the negotiation preferences of entrepreneurs as incidental 
product of the data obtained from investors. There appears to have been but a single 
paper investigating the market directly from the perspective of the entrepreneurs (i. e., 
entrepreneurs shopping for capital from among competing sources) (Smith 1999). 
That study looked at criteria used by entrepreneurs in identifying potential sources and 
applying decision rules to them, but did not address the phenomenon of aversion 
during the screening process, and the subsequent rejection of VC firms by 
entrepreneurs. 
Entrepreneurs are frequently placed in conditions which increase the likelihood and 
degree of certain human cognitive biases and errors (Baron 1998). As a result of this, 
the psychological effects of decisions under risk, described above, may be especially 
relevant for entrepreneurial decision-making. Of particular relevance may be decisions 
regarding the choice of VC investments and sources, and the processes and criteria 
used by entrepreneurs in making such decisions. 
The entrepreneur's search for VC investment is a complex information processing and 
purchase decision challenge. As Brucks points out, in such situations the degree of 
objective prior information that entrepreneurs have about VC investors is important 
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(Brucks 1985). Possessing significant -amounts of such information leads to asking 
more and better questions of prospective VC investors, and not asking questions 
about inappropriate or irrelevant VC attributes. It therefore can make the search 
process more efficient for the entrepreneur, both by making the information search a 
more focused exercise, and by permitting the entrepreneur to more efficiently process 
whatever new information is learned about each VC investor. 
Even in the specific case of entrepreneurs intending to rapidly grow their firms through 
access to external professional capital sources, research into choice criteria has been 
very limited. Some studies have investigated individually hypothesized factors for 
selection of capital sources, including affiliation for prestige (Hsu 2002), quality of the 
negotiation process (Rea 1989), and the reputation of investors and the risk of 
opportunistic behaviour on the part of investors (Zacharakis 2002). But these studies 
have not attempted any comprehensive identification of relevant decision criteria used 
by entrepreneurs, nor have they attempted to link any specific decision criteria to the 
potential for adverse selection in the VC capital market. 
A recent study into the affiliation benefit that entrepreneurs can obtain by accepting VC 
investment has examined a mechanism by which VC screening skill can act as a 
signal or endorsement of the quality of the entrepreneur's firm and thereby improve 
her ability to raise additional capital in subsequent rounds (Janney and Folta 2006). 
Choosing an investor with known good screening ability is valuable to the 
entrepreneur, particularly for firms that are perceived to be more uncertain. This 
uncertainty can be due to differences in firm value, firm age, industry, amount of 
previous funding, or number of previous investment rounds. In this particular study, 
"industry experience" was defined as how long ago the investor made his first industry 
investment that has since gone public, which is a useful but somewhat narrow view of 
relevant experience of an investor. The direct effect of investor experience in 
increasing the ability of the entrepreneur to raise subsequent capital was found to be 
moderated by a number of firm and environmental variables. Generally, the effect 
showed greater influence in situations of higher uncertainty, such as with firms with 
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few prior investment rounds, or when these prior rounds were long ago. It also showed 
greater influence when industries are young or the financing environment Is 
seasonally unreceptive to financing requests by entrepreneurs. This study concluded 
by recommending that firms that are very young or are undifferentiated seek capital 
from prominent investors, even at the expense of accepting poorer contractual terms. 
More established firms can afford a more balanced trade-off, and therefore should 
place more emphasis on other criteria. 
One of the very few studies looking at criteria used by entrepreneurs in selecting VC 
sources found some consensus on the general prioritization of criteria, but also found 
some variations among subsets of entrepreneur types (Smith 1999). That study 
proposed 29 specific criteria, under the categories of reputation of the VC investor, 
other attributes of the VC investor, value-added services provided, and valuation. 
Overall, the study found that, while valuation matters dearly to entrepreneurs, it was 
not the most important criterion in selecting a VC investor. Three other criteria were 
rated higher: 
  The investor's reputation for creating past successes 
  Providing a "sounding board" service to the entrepreneur 
  The personality and cultural fit between the VC investor and the firm. 
The full set of criteria examined by Smith, sorted by category and ranked into quartiles 
according the importance to average entrepreneurs, is summarized in table 3-2. 
Table 3-2: Preliminary VC selection criteria 
Quartile Reputation Attributes Services Valuation 
I Past successes Industry Sounding board Price 
Personality fit Stage 
Follow-through 
II Service competence Available funds Fundraising 
Co-Investing Operating Recruiting 
Not firing founders experience Meeting Investors 
III Not diluting founders Years as a VC Strategy development 
Managing team gaps Monitoring 
Crisis management 
Soliciting customers 
IV IPO orientation Location Marketing plans 
SBIC Motivating staff 
Product development 
Vendor selection 
(Smith 1999) 
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In addition to these results regarding the criteria used by entrepreneurs, Smith also 
arrives at a number of interesting findings relevant to the present research. First, 
entrepreneurs devote significant effort to the decision of which investor to choose; it is 
a high-involvement purchase. He finds that entrepreneurs typically spend more the 40 
hours on researching and evaluating investors, and involve teams of three or more 
people from their firms in the decision-making process. 
Secondly, entrepreneurs draw upon several sources for information about prospective 
investors (average of 5 sources used), but are not particularly efficient in the sources 
they draw upon. The most commonly cited sources were other entrepreneurs, the VC 
investors themselves, and the entrepreneur's past experience with investors. 
Interestingly, these sources share the characteristic of being narrow viewpoints and 
being limited in the contextual or reference information they can provide. Broader and 
potentially more useful information sources, such as accountants, lawyers, and 
consultants, were used much less frequently by entrepreneurs. This may reflect the 
tremendous time pressures that constrain them from accessing sources that are not 
immediately close to hand, or may reflect the independent nature of some 
entrepreneurs and their reluctance to seek outside advice. 
Thirdly, entrepreneurs frequently use the expressions of interest of one VC investor to 
attempt to make a market for their firms. If not contractually constrained from doing so, 
they use the term sheet tendered by one VC investor to try to influence other VC 
investors to issue competitive term sheets. In doing so, entrepreneurs are akin to other 
consumers who play one seller off against another to get a better deal. 
Finally, Smith suggests that effective consumer choice behaviour on the part of 
entrepreneurs can be learned. He found that the satisfaction entrepreneurs later feel 
with their choice of VC investor varies with the degree of prior experience the 
entrepreneurs has; more experienced entrepreneurs make choices that lead to higher 
satisfaction. 
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This literature provides an initial view of the criteria that may be applicable to the 
entrepreneurial decision regarding investment sources. Table 3-3 lists an aggregate 
set of potential decision criteria for entrepreneurs engaged in the choice of which VC 
investor to deal with, based on these studies. These potential criteria have been 
grouped for convenience into categories loosely based on Smith's pioneering study. 
This suggests a rather broad set of starting criteria for any subsequent research into 
entrepreneurial capital selection. However, this broad set is likely to impair empirical 
research with low discrimination and the potential for over fitting the data. What is 
needed is a theoretically informed subset that is directed to the key issues in early- 
stage market operation. 
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Table 3-3: Potential criteria used by entrepreneurs 
Category Criterion 
Terms & Conditions Valuation of firma' 
Corporate structure required d 
Operational constraints and covenants' 
Form of financing provided n 
Services Access to corporate partners d 
Sounding board to management 
Fundraising' 
Recruiting management' 
Interfacing with investor group' 
Business strategy development' 
Performance monitoring' 
Crisis management' 
Soliciting customers/distributors' 
Marketing plan development' 
Motivating staff' 
Product development' 
Selecting vendors/equipment' 
Reputation Past investment successes' 
Compatible personality*" 
Follow through on tranches' 
Competence of services' 
Co-investing" 
Keeping entrepreneurs In management' 
Not demanding too large a share of equity" 
Investing in incomplete teams' 
Preferring IPO exit to M&A' 
Non-opportunistic behaviourb t 
Reputational rank 
Networking resources° 
Ethical behaviour' 
VC Attributes Industry specialization' 
Stage specialization' 
Amount of funds available` 
Operational experience' 
Years experience as a VC 
Location' 
Speed of deal-making' 
Knowledge of industry"" 
Potential conflict with existing investees' 
a (Bruno and Tyebjee 1983); b (Cable and Shane 1997); c (Hsu 2002); d (Rea 1989); e (Smith 1999); 
f (Zacharakis 2002); g (Hellmann and Stiglitz 2000); h (Brennan and Kraus 1987); 1 (Janney and Folta 2006) 
Market Model 
Building upon the theoretical perspectives outlined above, a model for the exchange of 
value among participants in the early-stage capital markets will be developed. The 
objective of this model is to provide a framework for better understanding the role that 
information asymmetries play in the ongoing operation of this market, in shaping the 
behaviours and strategies of ongoing participants. This framework provides a new 
theoretical basis for proposing and empirically testing hypotheses with respect to 
these behaviours and strategies. Actors in the model include the primary participants 
in the financing transactions (the entrepreneurs and the VC investors), as well as 
secondary participants who indirectly facilitate these transaction by supporting or 
providing value to the primary participants. The scope of the model comprises the 
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exchange of information and other types of intangible value among the participants, 
whether directly exchanged, mediated through other participants, or exchanged by 
reference to some shared context. The model is meant to reflect the net exchange 
patterns that occur, and therefore does not capture the sequence or time-based 
nature of some exchange interactions. 
Model development 
The above discussion of the early-stage capital markets and the operations of VC 
firms suggests that this market can be characterized as having a knowledge base that 
is complex, wherein expertise is dispersed among many market participants. Under 
such conditions, the locus of learning and innovation that supports the development of 
effective strategies is found in networks of complementary participants (Powell, Koput 
et al. 1996). Accordingly, firms that need to exchange unformalized knowledge and 
skills will be more successful in doing so when they adopt an approach of collaborative 
information sharing. Such an approach can lead to a network form of governance in 
which social dimensions of the transactions define and reinforce a framework for the 
exchange structures (Larson 1992). Using this perspective, the development of the 
model proceeds by examining each participant dyad, in turn, and explicating the forms 
of value exchange within each social relationship. 
The primary dyad in the market comprises the entrepreneurs and VC investors at the 
heart of the market. As described earlier, a substantial literature has grown to describe 
how these participants assess each other, and how contracts are formed whereby 
entrepreneurs provide investors with bundles of potential cashflow and control rights, 
and investors provide entrepreneurs with capital and intangible services (Fried and 
Hisrich 1994; Fried and Hisrich 1995). The entrepreneurs seek VC investors for this 
capital and these services, and to benefit from risk-sharing (Amit, Glosten et al. 
1990a). In order to attract the most desirable VC investors, entrepreneurs try to signal 
their own high quality through a range of observable behaviours and attributes 
(Dobson 1993; Shane and Cable 2002; Deutsch and Ross 2003; Busenitz, Fiet et al. 
2005; Reuber and Fischer 2005). The VC investors likewise attempt to influence their 
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"dealflow quality"(the entrepreneurs they attract) by signalling their own high quality as 
investors (Kelly and Hay 2000; Leshchinskii 2003), as entrepreneurs choose their VC 
investors partly based on their perceptions of Investor quality (Berkovitch and Serban- 
Levy 2004). 
The actions of the VC investors in the market are contingent on their access to capital 
to invest with promising entrepreneurs. This capital access is enabled through the 
dyad that includes institutional investors. Typically these institutional investors are 
financial institutions, pension funds, or other large funds that seek to invest a portion of 
their portfolios into high-risk, high-return instruments that VC investors represent. The 
institutional investors evaluate VC investors by objective financial measures that allow 
the performance of VC investors to be compared to the performance of other portfolio 
holdings (Berlin 1998). Principally, the institutional investors expect to receive an 
acceptable risk-adjusted rate of return on their capital. The VC investors, in exchange 
for providing this return, have free use of the capital within the mandate and scope of 
their fund objectives (Gompers 1995; Gompers 1996; Gompers and Lerner 1998; 
Gompers and Lerner 2000). 
Entrepreneurs are supported in their search for capital by another dyad that 
incorporates their professional advisors. These advisors provide professional services 
(accounting, legal, consulting, etc. ) to entrepreneurs in exchange for fees. But they 
may augment their professional services with assistance in raising capital, typically by 
referring high-quality entrepreneurs to VC investors that are known to that professional 
(Bruno and Tyebjee 1985; Fiet 1995; Harrison and Mason 2000; Kelly and Hay 2000). 
This endorsement by the professional is of value to the entrepreneur, because it acts 
as a signal of quality, one which VC investors heed (Stuart, Hoang et al. 1999). 
In the dyad comprising professionals and VC investors, this endorsement signal is 
valued by the VC investors; VC investors regard professionals with good reputations 
as excellent sources of dealflow -a source of pre-screened investment opportunities 
consisting of entrepreneurs known to the professional, and upon - whom 
the 
professional will stake some portion of his reputation. The professional in effect 
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provides some pre-screening effort and benefit for the VC investor - so much so that 
many VC investors will not even consider making deals with entrepreneurs unless 
those entrepreneurs have been endorsed through a referral from a trusted 
professional (Chan 1983; Kelly and Hay 2000). These endorsements signal quality, 
especially for young companies where uncertainty is highest and where the reputation 
risk to' endorser is highest (Stuart, Hoang et al. 1999). The referring professional 
therefore has an incentive to maintain a good reputation with the VC investor, so that 
referred clients will be funded by the VC investor and will grow and become more 
successful. In exchange, the professionals have some assurance that their clients will 
grow and thrive with VC support and thereby will come to require greater amounts of 
professional services. VC-backed firms tend to grow faster and have better survival 
odds than other firms (Megginson and Weiss 1991; Jain and Kini 2000; Manigart, 
Baeyens et al. 2002), and as they grow they require greater professionalization and 
support services (Hellmann and Puri 2002). This suggests that the importance of this 
value exchange will depend on the stage of the company and the prior experience of 
the entrepreneur, both with the specific company and with VC investments in general. 
The role of professionals as credible sources of dealflow can potentially be 
generalized to include other sources of dealf low who also benefit from the involvement 
of the VC investor with the entrepreneur. In the case of early-stage equity markets, 
these could include angel investors who have made previous investments in the 
entrepreneur's firm. By making such generalizations, the model may be applicable to 
other later stages of the investment market, whereby VC investors seek dealflow from 
earlier-stage investors, grow the firm, and in turn pass it along as qualified dealflow to 
later-stage investors. But the first step in developing such as fully generalized model, 
and the primary intent of the present research, will be to establish some aspects of the 
model solely in the case of early-stage VC investments where the challenges of 
information asymmetries are particularly salient. 
In making investment transactions with entrepreneurs, VC investors often form 
syndicates with other VC investors (Lemer 1994). A number of benefits accrue to 
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participants in this dyad, including knowledge-sharing and risk mitigation (syndicate 
relationships help to protect the VC investor on the downside). These benefits are 
particularly important in early-stage markets (Lockett and Wright 2001). And, as trust is 
developed within the dyad, these syndicate relationships tend to persist over time, 
held together by reciprocal non-legal sanction mechanisms (Wright and Lockett 2003), 
and thereby to transcend individual investment transactions with individual 
entrepreneurs (Campo-Rembado 2005). So, individual VC investors form dyad 
relationships with their peers. 
Finally, when the investment with a particular entrepreneur matures and the 
entrepreneurial firm grows and becomes more successful, the VC investor seeks an 
exit path by participating in a final dyad with later-stage investors. VC investors 
typically specialize by the growth stage of companies in which they will invest: early or 
later (Gupta and Sapienza 1992; Elango, Fried et al. 1995). Some accept the very 
high information asymmetries and risks of investing in startups. Some invest only in 
more established companies that have been groomed by the earlier-stage investors. 
The early-stage VC investors need the later-stage investors for liquidity, to support the 
mature companies as they seek a trade sale or an initial public offering (Berlin 1998). 
The later-stage VC investors need the earlier-stage investors as a source of relatively 
low risk dealflow, since having an early-stage VC investor can be viewed as a 
legitimizing signal that entrepreneurs can use to attract later-stage VC investors for 
subsequent rounds of financing (Harrison and Mason 2000). 
Integrating these various dyads yields an interesting overview of the market. Figure 3- 
4 shows the transactional relationships among the participants in early-stage venture 
capital markets. Here the VC investors have been separated into early-stage venture 
capitalists (ESVCs) that invest in this market, and later-stage venture capitalists 
(LSVCs) who do not. 
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Figure S-4: Relationships Among Market Participants 
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In figure 3-4, the Institutional Investors are the providers of capital to the VC investors, 
for which they demand an acceptable risk-adjusted rate of return. The Professionals 
represent the advisors to entrepreneurs, such as lawyers, bankers and accountants, 
who assist the entrepreneurs with access to venture capital. They provide 
entrepreneurs with their professional services in exchange for fees. They also provide 
the ESVCs with high-quality dealflow, by introducing the best of their entrepreneurs to 
the ESVCs. In return, the ESVCs cause the entrepreneurial firms to grow to become 
larger consumers of professional services. 
The ESVCs in turn provide grown and established deals to the LSVCs by nurturing the 
young entrepreneurial firms in the early days. In return, the LSVCs make investments 
that provide the ESVCs with an exit liquidity path (such as a trade sale or IPO). 
Both the ESVCs and the LSVCs provide financing to entrepreneurs, typically in 
exchange for equity in the firm, or some other bundle of potential cashflow and control 
rights. 
For some investment deals, the ESVC may syndicate the investment among VC - 
Peers, by allowing them access to the good deal. In return, these peers provide a 
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portion of the investment capital. But more Importantly, they provide additional 
expertise for the ongoing monitoring and nurturing of the entrepreneur. 
Figure 3-5 shows a simplified representation of this market model, where the details of 
the value exchanges have been omitted. 
Figure 3-5: Basic Market Model 
The direct value exchanges shown in figure 3-5 are not the only information 
exchanges possible in this market. Other implicit communication mechanisms may 
arise to meet the information-exchange demands of screening. The screening process 
shown earlier in figure 3-3 requires the exchange of a great deal information between 
the entrepreneur and the VC investor. This exchange can be explicit (such as formal 
budgets and product description information), or can be implicit (through signals that 
are intended to refer to elements of shared common knowledge). 
Entrepreneurs who seek VC investment are commonly viewed as having to actively 
market their companies to VC investors, attempting to sell their equity (and associated 
rights) in exchange for capital. They attempt to capture the notice of investors to 
present their firms as desirable investments, and to conclude an investment deal on 
attractive terms. One strategy that they may adopt in this marketing challenge is 
signalling their hidden qualities to prospective VC investors and thereby attempting to 
differentiate themselves from all the other entrepreneurs likewise seeking VC 
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investment. This signalling consists of creating an observable attribute that is 
somehow correlated to hidden dimensions of firm quality, and can therefore be used 
as a proxy indicator of quality. 
The theoretical examination of signalling in a market, as a means of overcoming 
asymmetries of information about quality, has its origins in Spence's examination of 
labour markets (Spence 1973). Spence shows how signalling can emerge in markets 
with adverse selection, as a method to prevent market collapse. Under this model, 
sellers of high-quality goods will invest in an observable attribute that is difficult for 
lower quality sellers to mimic. Buyers can then look for the presence of this attribute 
with any given seller and, from its presence or absence, infer the quality of the goods 
being sold. By providing a reliable differentiation between high and low-quality sellers, 
signalling can convert a market of pooled equilibrium into a separating equilibrium in 
which high-quality sellers receive a higher price. For this reason, high-quality sellers 
may choose to invest in signalling even when the signal has a cost to them (and not 
just to the low-quality sellers). 
Although signalling can mitigate information asymmetries and thereby mitigate the risk 
of market collapse, Gale demonstrates that signalling represents an inefficiency that is 
a net loss to society, and therefore that equilibria in which actors signal their private 
information are typically inefficient (Gale 1996). In a transparent and efficient market 
without information asymmetry, these costs of signalling (production, transmission, 
reception and interpretation) could be avoided. These costs are associated with the 
prevention of market collapse. 
Interpreting signals is not always straightforward; it is simple and effective only in 
markets where quality is univariate and binary (low and high quality) and where the 
costs of generating the signal are sufficiently different for the two types of sellers such 
that the low-quality sellers cannot mimic the signals given by high-quality sellers. 
When the costs are not sufficiently different, the low-quality sellers will mimic the 
signals and the pooling equilibrium will remain (i. e., investors will not be able to reliably 
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distinguish between low and high-quality entrepreneurs by observing the signal, so 
they will initially treat all entrepreneurs as having equivalent quality). 
The situation is further complicated in markets where quality is ternary (low, medium, 
and high quality). In such markets, the medium-quality sellers will attempt to separate 
from the low-quality sellers by generating a signal of their higher quality. The high- 
quality sellers then face the challenge of separating from both the low-quality sellers 
and the medium-quality sellers. If the Highs also generate the signal to separate from 
the Lows, they will be pooled together with the Mediums. Feltovich et al found that in 
such circumstances, many Highs will choose to not signal (or even to countersignal 
with the reverse signal to what the Mediums are generating), as a means of 
separating from the Mediums (Feltovich, Harbaugh et al. 2002). In this strategy they 
save the cost of signalling, but they risk being pooled with the Lows (i. e., being 
mistakenly assessed as having low quality). 
For example, the personal wealth of individuals and their associated social status can 
be characterized as having ternary quality: the very wealthy (Highs), the rich 
(Mediums), and the not-wealthy (Lows). To separate from the not-wealthy Lows, the 
Mediums generate signals of their wealth through conspicuous consumption (fancy 
cars and jewellery, for example). The Highs then face the choice of separating from 
the Lows through similar ostentatious signals (and thereby being pooled with the 
merely rich Mediums), or separating from the Mediums by countersignalling (driving a 
very modest car, for example) and thereby potentially being mistaken for not-wealthy 
Lows. This confusion can be somewhat ameliorated through other contextual or 
environmental clues - the driver of a modest car parked outside a tony shop is more 
likely to be thought a countersignalling High than to be a Low. In markets with well- 
developed signalling protocols, this risk of confusion may actually benefit the Highs, 
who can more effectively demonstrate their confidence in their high quality, as the 
potential for confusion between Highs and Lows increases. For example, one might 
suggest the hypothesis, the shabbier the car, the wealthier the driver. 
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Alternatively, the Highs may switch to a different type of signal, one on which they 
separate from the Mediums. In the example of the wealth of individuals, this might be 
the display of possessions so costly that they are utterly beyond the reach of 
Mediums. 
This signalling regime can evolve to become quite dynamic, as costs change and as 
actors learn new signalling methods. Riley theoretically demonstrates that diverse and 
dynamic signalling regimes can emerge as market participants explore the many 
potential dimensions for signalling in an ongoing attempt to separate from lower- 
quality sellers and to pool with higher-quality sellers. In such real-world circumstances, 
it may happen that the market is never in true equilibrium (Riley 1975). 
Figure 3-6 illustrates how signals can efficiently exchange information by reference to 
common knowledge shared by the parties. It also shows how this information transfer 
can be subjected to noise (in practice this might cause the misinterpretation of an 
observed signal - it is interpreted to carry meaning not intended by the sender, or an 
intended meaning is not interpreted by the receiver). So it is not enough that an 
observed behaviour may act as a signal. It must also be unlikely that the behaviour 
arises from other non-signalling origins, so that the effects of this "noise" can be 
minimized. The ability of VC investors to invest successfully in early-stage firms is 
believed to act as a signal of their skill. But this signal is noisy, in that other VC 
investors believe there are additional valid reasons for making early-stage 
investments, reasons which may partly obscure the information value of the signal. It 
is correspondingly difficult for a desireable entrepreneur seeking a skilled VC (in order 
to receive a fair valuation) to rely solely upon early-stage investment behaviour as a 
signal of this skill. 
Figure 3-6 suggests that participants can be expected to convey some information 
explicitly, to convey some by signals, and to keep some private. It is the existence of 
this private information that creates information asymmetries. Screening is an attempt 
to mitigate these asymmetries through the forced sharing of information. The greater 
the overlap of private knowledge domains, the greater the amount of information will 
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be common to both parties, and the more effective can be a signalling regime in 
transferring information. 
Figure 3-6: Explicit and Signalled Communications 
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This perspective provides one additional explanation for syndication of VC 
investments. In figure 3-7, the addition of a second VC investor "VC2" can be seen to 
further reduce information asymmetries. Region 1 is knowledge shared by the VC 
investors but not relevant to the investment being considered. Region 2 is knowledge 
shared by all parties and therefore not asymmetric. But region 3 is relevant knowledge 
unavailable to VC1 without the participation of VC2. It can be conveyed by signals 
from the entrepreneurs that are received and interpreted by VC2 alone. 
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Figure 3-7: Information Effect of Syndication 
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By signalling, the parties try to efficiently convey private information in a manner 
designed to improve their chance at finding an attractive market partner. 
Entrepreneurs try to signal that they are "high quality" investment opportunities and 
thereby establish a high price for their firms, in the form of a high valuation. VC 
investors try to signal that they are "high quality" advisors and thereby establish a high 
price for their capital, in the form of a low valuation. This differentiation of quality in 
entrepreneurs and VC investors can be reflected in the proposed market model. 
Figure 3-8 shows a refinement of a the subset of the figure 3-5 model wherein the 
ESVCs have been separated in high-quality (H) and low-quality (L) investors, and the 
entrepreneurs have been separated into high-quality (H) and low-quality (L) 
entrepreneurs. As before, this "quality" attribute is in the eye of the beholder - VC 
investors are "high-quality" when so perceived by entrepreneurs, and vice versa. 
However, in this general model it is assumed that quality may include measures that 
are not directly observable (either being latent attributes, or being contingent on private 
information). For example, the perceived "quality" of an entrepreneur may reflect her 
degree of personal commitment to the success of her firm, and this commitment is not 
directly observable by VC investors. In this situation, signals can be used to convey 
information about this hidden quality to the other market participants. For instance, the 
entrepreneur might choose to signal her strong commitment by investing all of her 
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personal wealth into the business (having a lot of "skin in the game"). This observable 
fact then acts as a signal to VC investors of her degree of commitment. 
Figure 3-8: Introducing Levels of Quality 
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In this market, entrepreneurs want to be perceived as high-quality and may therefore 
attempt to use signalling to convey their quality to potential investors (Leland and Pyle 
1977). Several mechanisms for signalling from entrepreneur to capital provider have 
been researched, including the amount of collateral offered (Wilson 1992), the amount 
of equity retained by the entrepreneur (De Meza and Webb 1987), the quality of 
directors that have been attracted to the firm (Deutsch and Ross 2003), and the 
certification of the firm by intermediaries of good reputation (Leland and Pyle 1977; 
Stuart, Hoang et al. 1999; Hsu 2002). 
Some studies (Busenitz, Fiet et al. 2001; Busenitz, Fiet et al. 2005) have raised doubt 
about whether the particular signal of the amount of entrepreneur's retained equity is a 
reliable indicator of quality, since they found no significant correlation to subsequent 
venture outcome in their sample. The latter study further examined the signalling value 
of the relative share of the entrepreneur's personal wealth invested in the business as 
a signal of quality to reduce information asymmetry, but also found no significant 
relationship to venture outcome. The questions raised by these contrary findings 
deserve further and broader investigation. 
51 
Myers and Majluf further point out the possibility that some signals of entrepreneurial 
quality can be observed and interpreted by investors, even when such signals were 
not deliberately issued by the entrepreneur. In particular, they report on the signalling 
inherent in the issuing of shares to fund new projects, and show that this can be 
interpreted as an indicator of private information that the project opportunity is 
relatively poor, since the best opportunities would presumably be funded by 
mechanisms less dilutive to existing shareholders (Myers and Majluf 1984). 
In this market model, VC investors will also want to be perceived as high-quality, and 
may similarly attempt to issue signals of their high quality. The market is two-sided, 
and entrepreneurs may have some degree of choice in the VC investors they take 
capital from. As a result, VC investors who are able to signal high quality may attract 
more and better entrepreneurs, and thereby have opportunity to invest in more 
attractive projects. VC investors who are unable to signal this quality will be left with 
less attractive entrepreneurs, having projects of higher risk or lower expected returns. 
Full market model 
Figure 3-9 illustrates the fully developed market model that reflects binary quality 
levels for VC investors and for entrepreneurs, and also permits both direct and 
indirectly signalled exchanges among participants. 
This model illustrates how, by issuing signals of their quality, the actors can influence 
the exchange of information among various market participants. In this way, it provides 
a framework for contextualizing and investigating many possible interactions among 
market participants, and many possible direct and Indirect (signalled) information 
exchange mechanisms. A full exploration of all of these interactions is beyond the 
scope of this thesis, particularly for exploratory research where the nature of any 
indirect information exchanges among each pair of participants is poorly understood. 
The present research is designed therefore to explore but a subset of the interactions 
illustrated in figure 3-9 -a subset of market participants, a subset of signals between 
those participants, and a subset of the potential effects of those signals. In particular, 
the subset will explore the effects of receiving a credible signal of the high quality of a 
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particular ESVC investor, and how the other market participants can use this 
knowledge to make decisions about which market participants they want to transact 
with. This suggests that six effects may be observed. 
Figure 3.9 Full Market Model 
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These effects are stated as propositions that follow from the developed model. The 
present research focuses on the last two of these propositions (H5 and H6), with an 
exploratory purpose designed to illuminate or improve conceptualization rather than 
confirmatory hypothesis testing. The six proposed effects are: 
  H1: Professionals will prefer to refer their high-quality client entrepreneurs to an 
ESVC issuing a "High" signal, so that these clients can grow to become large 
consumers of professional services. 
  H2: Professionals will avoid referring their high-quality client entrepreneurs to 
ESVCs who do not issue the "High" signal, on the assumption that these ESVCs 
are less able to grow their client firms. 
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  H3: Institutional Investors will prefer to invest capital with the ESVC issuing the 
"High" signal, on the expectation that the high-quality of these ESVCs will result in 
better investment returns. 
  H4: Institutional investors will avoid investing capital with ESVCs who do not issue 
the "High" signal, on the assumption that these ESVCs cannot earn high 
investment returns. 
  H5: High-quality entrepreneurs (the ones with superior growth prospects) will be 
attracted to, and will seek financing from, the ESVC issuing the "High" signal, so 
that their growth prospects will be recognised and so that a financing deal can be 
easily obtained on attractive terms. 
  H6: Low-quality entrepreneurs will avoid approaching the same ESVCs who issue 
the "High" signal, on the assumption that their lower growth prospects will be 
discovered and that financing will not be provided, or will be provided on very 
unattractive terms. 
Figure 3-10 illustrates the hypothesized moderating effects of this signal. In the 
extreme, these signals can have the effect of isolating low-quality VC investors and 
low-quality entrepreneurs, as shown in figure 3-11, while the other high-quality market 
participants continue to interact as before. 
Figure 3-10: Effects of a "High" Signal 
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Figure 3.11: Signal Effects In Extremis 
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This model development and supporting review of the literatures of information 
asymmetry in capital markets, venture capitalist operations and screening, signalling in 
financial markets, and consumer choice behaviours sets the stage for the specific 
research questions that will be subsequently addressed. Establishing a broad context 
is crucial for the successful positioning of research that attempts to integrate a variety 
of perspectives to address the overall thesis that venture capital investors invest in 
firms in early-stage capital markets to make themselves appear more attractive to the 
desirable entrepreneurs in those markets. 
In particular, this research examines the role of screening processes on the part of VC 
investors, the way in which these processes mitigate information asymmetries about 
entrepreneurial firms, and how they also signal hidden qualities of the VC investor to 
other stakeholders. 
The next four chapters comprise the various research studies that have been 
conducted to support this thesis. Chapter 4 is a theoretical and quantitatively empirical 
investigation into the nature of VC screening skill and its relationship to the degree to 
which VC investors participate in markets with high information asymmetries, such as 
early-stage private investment markets. This investigation attempts to address the 
question of why a VC investor would choose to operate in early-stage markets with 
high information asymmetries. Chapter 5 theoretically and empirically examines the 
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possibility that this early-stage investment behaviour may be more than a simple 
pursuit of economic gain, and that it may have an additional information signalling 
value. In particular, it explores the possibility that early-stage market behaviour on the 
part of VC investors may act as a signal of quality to other market participants, and by 
so doing create value for the VC investor. Chapter 6 further expands on the topics of 
the previous chapter by triangulating with qualitative interview data from practicing VC 
investors. These data are used to develop a typology of VC investors that supports the 
interpretations of chapters 4 and 5. The alternative research approach used in this 
chapter also highlights some future research topics, pertaining to potential non-rational 
goals of VC investors, which are beyond the scope of the present thesis. Finally, 
chapter 7 provides an empirical exploratory investigation into how entrepreneurs 
evaluate potential VC investors for their firms. It investigates the criteria by which VC 
investors are chosen by entrepreneurs and the role (if any) that signals of screening 
quality may have in this choice. 
With respect to the theorized market model, developed above, these empirical studies 
will seek to test support for three specific model attributes: 
1) Early-stage venture capital investors are not homogeneous, but rather display 
different levels of quality. This quality includes differing levels of screening skill. 
2) Early-stage venture capital investors may deliberately issue signals of their quality 
for the purpose of conveying information to other market participants, in an 
attempt to influence the behaviour of these participants. 
3) Entrepreneurs may observe and interpret signals of quality from early-stage VC 
investors, and use this information in their capital sourcing decisions. 
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This chapter examines the separation of VC investors and entrepreneurs by levels of 
quality, as proposed in figure 3-8 in the previous chapter, and the effects of this 
differential quality on the interrelationships among these actors. It does this by 
proposing theoretical extensions to an extant model previously developed to explain 
the existence of venture capital investors. These extensions can accommodate 
variations in the screening capabilities of different venture capital (VC) Investors. This 
leads to the identification of two additional investment strategies available to VC 
investors with high screening abilities. Predictions from the extended model are 
empirically examined via a factor analysis of data from twenty-nine VC investors in 
North America and Europe. The results suggest that VC investors are not 
homogeneous in their screening abilities, and that these differences influence their 
willingness to invest in markets with high information asymmetries. These novel 
results may suggest a rationale for the participation of some VC investors in early- 
stage markets. 
Introduction 
In their work on the theoretical basis for the existence of VC investors, Amit, Brander 
and Zott develop an insightful model in which the ability to reduce information 
asymmetries through screening is crucial to mitigating information asymmetries and 
the adverse selection problem (Amit, Brander et at. 1998). In this model, which 
encompasses only the VC investor - entrepreneur dyad, the investors incur costs C 
comprising their capital investment, the cost of providing value-added services, and 
the monitoring costs associated with the mitigation of moral hazard risks. In exchange, 
entrepreneurs provide investors with an a share of the positive cashf lows R from their 
projects. In their paper, they argue that, for most entrepreneurs, (aR-C) is negative and 
therefore that the expected value for the market as a whole is also negative. Figure 4- 
1 summarizes their view of the market, where a single early-stage venture capital 
investor has invested in a single entrepreneur. 
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Figure 41: Model Implied by Amit 
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While providing a firm theoretical starting point, the model makes a number of 
simplifying assumptions that may not fully capture the range of VC Investor abilities 
and behaviours. In particular, the existing model treats VC investors as homogeneous, 
in that it does not take into account the variations among investors of their screening 
abilities, and the resulting existence of investment strategies that can differ from the 
model's general predictions. The role played by different venture capitalist screening 
abilities in mitigating adverse selection and enabling competitive strategies for 
investors has been a somewhat neglected area of research. One study into VC 
decision-making has found differences in the decision-making behaviours of VC 
investors operating in early or later-stage markets, which may be indicative of strategic 
differences based on abilities to screen effectively and to manage information 
asymmetries (Jorge 2004). The current study seeks to extend the previous model and 
thereby to permit differential predictions based on the degree of screening ability an 
investor possesses. This should provide an enriched understanding of how variations 
in VC investor abilities drive different investment strategies and behaviours. After 
developing this extension to the Amit model, some illustrative empirical observations 
are provided to support the practical use of these different investment strategies by VC 
investors of different levels of screening ability. 
In dealing with entrepreneurs, VC investors are at an intrinsic information 
disadvantage, in that entrepreneurs possess private information about the nature and 
prospects of their businesses and about the level of effort they are willing to expend 
towards making their businesses successful. This information asymmetry has the 
effect of creating risk and inefficiency in early-stage capital markets (De Meza and 
Webb 1987; Cumming and Macintosh 2001). This risk and inefficiency may be factors 
in the low returns typically offered by early-stage investment markets (Bygrave, Fast et 
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al. 1988), low returns that cannot be easily mitigated without Increasing the VC fund 
size and the related deal size and target firm lifecycle stage (Murray and Marriott 
1998). As Amit, Glosten et al point out, the mitigation of adverse selection risk Is 
fundamental to venture-capital investing (Amit, Glosten et al. 1993). Sahlman further 
demonstrates that the adverse selection challenge is an important determinant in the 
practice of VC contracting (Sahlman 1990). 
Although organizational theorists have suggested that social ties play an important 
role for investors seeking to overcome this information asymmetry (Venkataraman 
1997), much of the research into the methods used by VC investors has been based 
in economics. A primary method employed ex ante by VC investors to reduce 
information asymmetry has been the use of screening criteria (i. e., a set of evaluative 
criteria by which investment opportunities may be ranked and scored against some 
acceptable benchmarks). As Chan shows, the presence of informed investors (such 
as VC investors who are skilled screeners) can improve the overall quality of dealflow 
in the entire VC market (Chan 1983). And the risk-sharing benefits of the presence of 
these investors has been shown to act to prevent the market collapse normally 
associated with adverse selection (Akerlof 1970; De Meza and Webb 1990; Amit, 
Glosten et al. 1990a). The presence of skilled screeners who can resolve information 
asymmetries brings many benefits, and in an efficient market these investors are 
rewarded for this value creation (Ippolito and Berton! 2004). 
There have been a wide range of studies into the dimensions and effectiveness of 
screening criteria (MacMillan, Seigel et at. 1985; MacMillan, Zeman et at. 1985; 
MacMillan and Subba Narasimha 1987; Sandberg, Schweiger et al. 1988; Hall and 
Hofer 1993; Fried and Hisrich 1994; Shepherd 1997; Shepherd 1999; Shepherd, 
Ettenson et al. 2000; Kaplan and Stromberg 2001). Whereas early research into VC 
investor screening largely dealt with its application as a single-stage event (Hall and 
Hofer 1993), Fried and Hisrich have identified a model that more accurately reflects 
the successive nature of staged screening (Fried and Hisrich 1994). The application of 
these screening criteria typically occurs over several successive phases or stages, 
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wherein only the entrepreneurs who meet or exceed the criteria of one evaluation 
stage are considered for evaluation at the next stage. 
Much of the research into VC screening has treated VC investors as a homogeneous 
group, without allowing for differences in their abilities, efforts or strategies towards the 
screening challenge. Consequently, there is a lack of a robust theory for the various 
strategies that different classes of VC investors adopt to address the problem of 
adverse selection. 
Theory 
The effects of information asymmetry that create adverse selection increase the risk 
that entrepreneurs with attractive projects will exit the market, while entrepreneurs with 
unattractive projects will be funded by VC investors. Exploring this theoretical model in 
greater depth can benefit from a more rigorous treatment of the expected value of 
project investments made under risky conditions. For this, theorizing begins with a 
mathematical model taken from the literature. The model developed by Amit, Brander 
and Zott (1998) for adverse selection culminates in an equation that shows the 
expected value of projects that meet or, exceed the threshold quality level qo for 
profitability 
EV = P(d) f (9) -C(9)]f(qpq-d 
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where 
EV is the expected value of a VC investor's investment in all the high-quality firms in a 
market, for a given level of due diligence 
p is the probability of correctly identifying the quality of a firm, as a function of the due- 
diligence costs expended 
d is the amount expended on due diligence investigations 
a is the fraction of net cashf low claimed by the VC investor 
(1) 
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R is the net cashflows generated by a firm of a given quality 
C is the cost incurred by the VC investor in investing in a firm of a given quality, which 
includes the amount invested, the cost of monitoring the investment to mitigate 
moral hazard, and the cost of providing any value-added services to help the 
entrepreneur to realize R 
f is the probability density function of firm quality in the population 
q is the quality of a given firm 
qo is the "threshold quality' defined implicitly as the value of q above which aR(q)-C is 
positive 
and where the implied integral limits have been explicitly shown. 
Following Amit, C is assumed to be constant for different VC investors. In practice, it is 
likely that C is a u-shaped function of q, where VC investors spend more on their 
winners (trying to maximize their value by adding services) and on their losers (trying 
to rescue them), but spend comparatively less on the middle-performing firms. 
Similarly, the detection function p, would in practice likely not be constant with respect 
to q, but would be u-shaped. It would be relatively easy for a screener to accurately 
assess a project that was very high quality or very poor quality, so that at constant d 
the function p(dq) would be close to 1. On the borderline, with projects of middle 
quality, it would it be more difficult to accurately assess project quality, so that p((4q) 
would be correspondingly lower. However, for the remainder of this analysis, Amit's 
assumption of the independence of p and q will be allowed to stand. 
The necessity of using a probabilistic detection function p suggests that the threshold 
quality project cannot be clearly identified as the lower bound of the summation, nor 
can projects be explicitly and accurately rank-ordered. Therefore, if one has only 
probabilistic ability to sum these desirable projects, one must also accept the 
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probability of including some of the undesirable projects (i. e., type I and type II errors 
are possible). The expected value should therefore correctly include these. 
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EV = P(d) 
J[aR(4) 
- C(q)]f 
(q14 + (1- P(d )) j[aR(4) - C(4)]f 
(4)d4 
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To further simplify the notation, variables are introduced to represent the summed 
value of the good (G) and bad (B) projects. 
EV=pG+(1-p)B-d 
where G>0, B<0 
From the perspective of the market model of chapter 3, this characterization of the 
entrepreneurs in the market is akin to viewing entrepreneurs as having two types 
Entrep (H) and Entrep (L) - but here the H and L quality designations are determined 
by the sign of the investment profitability expression aR(q) - C(q). The value of the 
Entrep (H) projects is represented by G, while the value of the Entrep (L) projects is 
represented by B, as shown in figure 4-2. 
Figure 4-2: Modelling the Market Mix of Entrepreneurs 
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This model assumes that all investors are equally skilled in screening and quality 
detection. But the model can be extended to allow for differential screening abilities 
(that is, the responsiveness of p with regard to d). This suggests that p is a function 
also of the talent and skill of the individual making the assessment, which may vary 
over time as the individual gains experience and learns to screen more effectively. 
(3) 
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Suppose average VC investors can screen with low accuracy pL, while good 
screeners have a higher accuracy of pN, in both cases at a due diligence spending 
level of d. Further suppose the existence of two different investment markets. The first, 
characterized by G, and B,, is one where any average VC investor can profitably 
detect project quality. The second, characterized by G2 and B2, is such that only 
unusually good screeners can profitably detect quality. For example, the first market 
might comprise more established companies with proven track records, while the 
second market consists of startups. Under these conditions 
pLGJ+(1p1)B, -d>0 
pGj+(1py)Bj-d>0 
pLG2 + (1 pj)B2 -d <0 
pG2+(1 pH)B2-d>0 
From the later two inequalities can be seen that the second market is dangerous for 
any average VC investor when 
PL S 
d-B2 
G2-B2 
While it is safe for good screeners when 
PH 
d-B2 
G2-B2 
The critical screening ability threshold therefore is 
d -B2 
G2 - B2 
(4) 
(5) 
(s) 
(7) 
(S) 
(9) 
(10) 
For example, consider a market where G= $100M, B= ($100M) and d= $100k. By 
calculation, 0=0.5005 is the threshold screening ability. If an average VC investor can 
screen with 40% accuracy, this market will be unprofitable for them to invest in. But if a 
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good screener can provide 60% accuracy, they may invest in this market where the 
average VC investor cannot tread. This differential screening ability gives the good 
screener a competitive advantage when operating in this market. 
Markets therefore become attractive for average VC investors when the average 
project quality q is high and when the quality distribution function f is such that very 
many projects exceed the threshold quality level qo. Such markets are characterized 
by G much larger than B, and 0 correspondingly low. Markets that do not have these 
characteristics are unsuitable for average VC investors, and may be profitable for only 
the highly-skilled screeners. 
These highly-skilled investors are those who have a high value of p for any given level 
of d (i. e., where dp/dq is large), which is to say that they can more accurately assess 
the prospects of an entrepreneurial firm for any given level of expenditure on 
screening efforts. 
Predictions 
The result of this theoretical model extension is the identification of investment 
strategies not entertained by Amit's original model. These alternatives are available to 
VC investors having an unusually good screening ability. 
The first alternative strategy is to operate in the same sectors and stages as average 
VC investors (as suggested by Amit's first two hypotheses), but to obtain higher profits 
than an average VC investor. Under this strategy, the good screener provides that 
same level of detection p necessary to profitably identify the good projects, but does 
so at a lower due diligence cost d. He therefore obtains a higher overall profit. 
The second alternative strategy, which runs counter to the prediction of the original 
model, is to invest the same due diligence costs as an average VC investor, but 
thereby obtain a high level of detection and use this to operate in sectors and stages 
where average VC investors cannot. This strategic alternative can be represented by 
the following general prediction: 
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  There is a correlation between screening ability and willingness to invest in 
markets where information asymmetries are high. 
Within the context of the particular focus of the present research, this can be 
interpreted to mean that VC investors with extraordinarily high screening abilities 
would be more likely to invest in early-stage markets than would less-skilled VC 
investors. Operationally, this general prediction can be reflected in the following initial 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: VC investors with high screening abilities (i. e., where the effectiveness 
of their due diligence dp/dq is large) are more likely than other VC investors to make 
investment deals with unknown or unreferred entrepreneurs. This is based on the 
assumption that less-skilled VC investors are less able to assess entrepreneurs who 
lack track records or strong references. As Shane and Cable have shown, social ties 
play an important role in beneficial information transfers to mitigate asymmetries 
(Shane and Cable 2002). Where the entrepreneur has an established relationship with 
the VC investor, or where a trusted intermediary gives reference (Leland and Pyle 
1977), this social information transfer reduces the asymmetry the investor faces. A 
reference from a trusted sources is particularly effective in reducing information 
asymmetry for young companies, and where the reputation risk to the endorser is high 
(Stuart, Hoang et al. 1999). 
Hypothesis 2: VC investors with high screening abilities are more likely than other VC 
investors to invest in start-up companies and company expansions into new 
businesses. This is based on the assumption that less-skilled VC investors are less 
able to assess the risks and thereby reduce the information asymmetries of dealing 
with companies that lack an observable track record in their chosen business. The 
heightened information asymmetries associated with start-up firms have been 
considered extensively in the literature (Ruhnka and Young 1991; Amit, Brander et al. 
1998; Cumming and Macintosh 2001). Expansion-stage firms have also been 
associated with higher information asymmetries that may be associated. with lack or 
relevant track record and the potential for window-dressing (Cumming 2002). 
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Hypothesis 3: VC investors with high screening abilities are more likely than other VC 
investors to invest in companies having unproven business models. This is based on 
the assumption that less-skilled VC investors are less able to assess the risks and 
thereby reduce the information asymmetries of dealing with companies that lack an 
observable track record with this business model (Ruhnka and Young 1991; Kaplan 
and Stromberg 2002; Zott and Amit 2002). 
Hypothesis 4: VC investors with high screening abilities are more likely than other VC 
investors to invest in companies in foreign countries. This is based on the assumption 
that less-skilled VC investors are less equipped to understand and manage the 
information asymmetries regarding foreign markets and business/regulatory 
environments (Hall and Tu 2003). It is worth noting that this hypothesized relationship 
runs counter to the often observed "home bias" of investors favouring investments 
close to their home base (Coval and Moskovitz 1999; Ackert, Church et al. 2003). This 
bias has also been observed with VC investors in early-stage markets, who may 
prefer to invest close to home so they can keep close monitoring of their investees 
(Gupta and Sapienza 1992). 
Hypothesis 5: VC investors with high screening abilities are more likely than other VC 
investors to invest in companies without syndicating the investment, so that they can 
claim all of the upside gains and can avoid the complexities of managing a syndicate 
of investors with possibly divergent objectives. This hypothesis is based on the 
assumption that less-skilled VC investors will seek the comfort of knowing that their 
syndication partners have also performed some degree of screening, which may 
mitigate their own lack of skill. Lemer, in extending the logic of Sah and Stiglitz, argues 
that syndication improves the quality of investment decisions by bringing more 
experience to bear, thereby compensating for the reduced skill of an inexperienced 
investor (Sah and Stiglitz 1986; Lerner 1994). Lockett and Wright have found this risk 
reduction benefit of syndication to be particularly significant for investors who 
participate in early-stage markets (Lockett and Wright 2001). Nevertheless, 
syndicating does entail sharing the upside of an investment with other VC investors. 
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So, for VC investors who feel confident in their abilities to manage the investment risks 
alone, syndication may appear undesirable. 
Hypothesis 6: The investee companies of VC investors with high screening abilities 
are more likely than the investee companies of other VC investors to have many prior 
rejections by other VC investors. This is based on the assumption that good screeners 
are able to spot opportunities that less-skilled VC investors might overlook. As Bruno 
and Tyebjee show, denial of capital from one VC investor does not mean that capital 
cannot be obtained from another VC investor or other source; some VC investors fund 
companies that have been rejected by other Investors (Bruno and Tyebjee 1983). 
Empirical Study 
During the summer and fall of 2004 an email-based survey of VC investors was 
conducted, to examine the relationship between screening ability and willingness to 
invest in asymmetric markets. This examination was exploratory in nature, with the 
aim of better understanding how VC investors may vary in screening ability, and the 
role (if any) this variability may have in their participation in investment markets that 
have high information asymmetries. A quantitative positivist approach was adopted to 
provide an objective basis for this exploration - the goal was to understand actual 
differences in VC investor beliefs and strategies, rather than the sense-making or 
social construction of the perspectives that they take on these differences. 
Methodology 
The selected unit of analysis was the individual VC investor working in a professional 
VC firm. Respondents were asked to provide information on their unique individual 
background and experience, and on the characteristics of investee firms for which 
they had direct personal involvement in the decision to invest. 
The survey was limited to professional VC investors in North America and Europe. In 
particular, it used a database of VC firms and individual VC investors, based on the 
membership lists of the respective national venture capital associations (i. e., CVCA, 
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NVCA and BVCA)2. From this list were excluded firms that did not invest capital, but 
instead provided intermediary services (such as assisting entrepreneurs in raising 
capital or assisting VC investors in evaluating or managing their investments). Further 
excluded were firms that had no website, nor any listed contact email address. 
Within the range of each VC firm that fell within the sample frame, the individual 
respondent was identified. These specific respondents were chosen by consulting the 
contact information provided on the firm's website. The survey sought senior 
personnel in the firm who were responsible for making investment decisions. 
Accordingly, named individuals with titles such as "Managing Director", "Partner" or 
"Investment Manager" were selected, while individuals with titles that suggested they 
either did not have independent investment decision making responsibility ("Associate" 
or "Venture Associate") or were focused on other aspects of firm management 
("Chairman" or "CFO") were rejected. Whenever a contacted individual declined to 
participate, a referral to another individual in the same VC firm was sought. Biweekly 
reminders were sent to non-respondents to encourage participation and completion of 
the survey (Yu and Cooper 1993). The sample frame and contact information yielded 
a list of 400 individual email addresses. 
Alternative recruitment and contact methods that were considered included direct 
solicitation at VC conferences ("venture fairs"), telephone cold calling, and personal 
networking. Forming the list of potential VC respondents in the chosen manner (email 
solicitation) offered certain advantages over these alternatives. Attendance at venture 
fairs, while possibly yielding higher response rates due to personal relationships, 
would be significantly more costly and would introduce a bias against VC investors 
who are active in early-stage markets but do not attend such fairs (either they do not 
solicit business plans in this manner, or they see little incremental marketing or 
networking benefit to their attendance). Telephone contact, while less costly, would 
exacerbate low response rate challenges, because it would demand not only the busy 
VC investor's time, but also a fixed schedule commitment. Moreover, telephone 
2 Canadian Venture Capital Association, National Venture Capital Association (USA), and British Venture 
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contact can introduce additional gatekeeper personnel, making it much more difficult 
to get the survey in front of the targeted person. And personal networking, while likely 
yielding a high response rate among VC investors approached, would be severely 
limited in geographic scope, and can also introduce an availability bias. On this basis, 
direct email contact was felt to offer an acceptable trade-off of reach, response rate, 
cost, and selection bias. 
The underlying theoretical constructs of the survey were essentially two: the screening 
ability of the individual VC investor, and the extent to which they invest in markets 
where they face high information asymmetries. For each of these, several measures 
were developed. Some of these were based on the findings of Cumming's study of 
adverse selection with VC investors (Cumming 2002). 
A panel of experts was used to validate the content of the instrument, in terms of the 
appropriateness of the items to the domain of interest, the categories and scales used, 
and the clarity of the questions. This panel comprised three professional investors and 
two academic scholars experienced in research in the VC industry. Their feedback 
was incorporated into the design of the survey instrument used in pilot testing. 
The instrument was tested by administering it to a pilot group of fifteen VC investors 
(distinct from the panel of experts) not included in the survey sample, not being 
members of the national associations. Based on information available on the websites 
of the survey sample VC firms, no pattern of differences was detected between the 
pilot investors and the national association members, in regard to their chosen 
investment sectors and stages and the typical background experience of the individual 
investment practitioners. It appears that the pilot group is thus reasonably 
representative of the intended sample group for the purpose of instrument validation. 
Responses from this pilot group were analyzed for reliability and construct validity. 
With respect to screening ability, the following variables were operationalized as 
potential measures of VC screening. 
Capital Assodation respectively. 
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  YPSE - Number of years of post-secondary education for the respondent. 
  YIET - Total number of years of industry experience, in any role and any industry. 
  YFPI - Number of years of experience in the primary target industries of the 
current investment fund. 
  YEET -Total number of years experience as an entrepreneur, in any industry. 
  YEPI - Number of years of entrepreneurial experiences in the primary target 
industries of the current investment fund. 
  YVC - Number of years of experience as a venture capital investor. 
  YOl - Number of years of experience as some other type of investor (banker, 
angel investor, etc). 
  PLEAD - Percentage of investments in the current portfolio, for which the 
respondent acted as the leader of a syndicate. 
  NARSECT - Breadth or narrowness of sectoral focus for the current investment 
fund. Calculated as a percentage of the following sectors in which the respondent 
actively invests: IT software, IT hardware, Biotechnology, Nanotechnology, 
Advanced energy technology, Other advanced technology, and non advanced- 
technology based. 
  NARSTAGE - Breadth or narrowness of company-stage focus for the current 
investment fund. Calculated as a percentage of the following growth stages in 
which the respondent actively invests: Seed, A-round (start-up), B-round (high- 
growth), C-round (expansion, pre-1130), Public companies, Management buy-outs, 
Acquisitions, Turnarounds. 
With respect to investing in markets characterized by high information asymmetries, 
the following variables were operationalized as potential measures of willingness to 
invest in asymmetric markets. 
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  PUNK - Percentage of investments in the current portfolio where the 
entrepreneur was completely unknown to the respondent before the investment. 
  PSTAR - Percentage of investments in the current portfolio that were start-up 
companies. 
  PEXPD - Percentage of investments in the current portfolio that were expansion 
financings. 
  PNOV - Percentage of investments in the current portfolio that had novel and 
unproven business models. 
  PFOR - Percentage of investments in the current portfolio that were companies in 
a foreign jurisdiction. 
  PSYN - Percentage of investments in the current portfolio that were syndicated 
with other investors. 
  NREJ - Average number of prior rejections (by other investors) received by 
successful companies in the respondent's current portfolio. 
Analysis of results 
Of 400 surveys sent, thirty-two were returned and eight were undeliverable (these 
cases are not included in the determination of response rate). This data was 
transcribed from the returned survey Word documents (received either by fax or by 
email attachment) and collated in Excel. In three cases, minor interpretations of data 
were made (such as a written-in response of "practically none" being coded as 0). Of 
the total replies, three were eliminated due to being incorrectly completed, leaving an 
overall response rate of 7.5%. Securing research participation from VC investors can 
be very difficult. This is demonstrated by the paucity of primary data source utilization 
in the extant VC literature. Even a highly practitioner-oriented survey with direct value 
to practicing investors, such as conducted by Forbes Magazine, can have VC 
response rates of less than 5% (Keller 2001). Academic research of more theoretical 
bent may expect even lower priority from VC investors, and correspondingly lower 
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response rates. Partly this may be due to the extreme time pressures that VC 
investors face, as evidenced by the emphasis they place on developing quick rejection 
mechanisms in their screening processes (Rea 1989; Fried and Hisrich 1994; Elango, 
Fried et al. 1995). It may also be due to the overconfidence that many VC investors 
exhibit, whereby they may perceive the value proposition of participating in research 
studies to be low - they may overestimate their own knowledge, and therefore believe 
they have little to learn from such research (Zacharakis 1997; Zacharakis and 
Shepherd 2001). 
Faced with this challenge of small sample sizes, the statistical power (1-/ß) of the 
dataset takes on increased importance. High statistical power increases the likelihood 
that all significant relationships that may exist in the data will be detected in the 
analysis. Statistical power ranges from 0.34 to 0.99 for the correlation analyses 
reported below3. 
Table 4-1: VC respondent descriptions 
Country 
Canada 31% 
UK 31% 
USA 38% 
Investment Sectors 
Software 76% 
Hardware 45% 
Biotechnology 38% 
Nanotechnology 21% 
Advanced energy technolo 28% 
Other advanced technologies 45% 
Non high-tech 10% 
Investment Stages 
Seed 52% 
A-round 72% 
B-round 69% 
C-round 45% 
Public companies 10% 
Management buyouts 24% 
Acquisitions 14% 
Turnarounds 7% 
3 Statistical power was determined using the online calculator provided by the UCLA Department of Statistics, 
at httpY/calculators. stat. uclaedu/powercaldnormaVn-1/ which Is based on Mace, A. E. (1974). Sarnole-size 
determination. Huntington NY, Robert E. Krieger Publishing Company. 
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Table 4-1 provides descriptive measures of the respondents obtained for this survey, 
by their base country, the sectors in which they invest, and the company stages in 
which they invest. The sector and stage descriptions total more than 100% because 
many VC investors target multiple sectors or stages. While the exploratory sample is 
relatively small, Table 4-1 reveals that the sample is quite diverse. 
This exploratory study utilizes single-item measures to attempt to uncover or suggest 
relationships reflective of the theory work above. However, current theory has not yet 
evolved to the point of providing clearly defined and unidimensional constructs for 
screening skills and behaviours, and the forms of information asymmetry present in 
early-stage markets. Consequently, reliability and predictive abilities for hypothesis 
testing should be expected to be somewhat low. 
The data were analyzed using SPSS software (version 12.0). Table 4-2 provides 
some descriptive statistics for each screening ability variable. Table 4-3 provides some 
descriptive statistics for each investment asymmetry variable. 
Table 4-2: Screening measures 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Ypse 29 2 20 6.52 3.398 
Yiet 29 4 30 15.72 7.530 
Yfpi 29 0 30 12.36 7.143 
Yeet 29 0 25 5.47 6.793 
Yepi 29 0 20 3.47 5.251 
Yvc 29 2 18 7.38 5.281 
Yoi 29 0 17 3.86 5.572 
Plead 29 0 100 60.90 28.059 
Narsect 29 0 . 857 . 374 . 221 
Narstage 29 . 125 . 875 . 366 . 163 
For ease of reference, variable names and descriptions are summarized in appendix A-1. 
Measures for Ypse through Vol are in years. Measures for Narsect and Narstage are dimensionless. 
Table 4-3: Asymmetric Investment measures 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Punk 29 0 75 21.59 23.615 
Pstar 29 0 100 59.59 35.618 
Pexpd 29 0 100 31.28 29.852 
Pnov 29 0 100 38.43 38.117 
Pfor 29 0 100 12.90 24.332 
Psyn 29 0 100 74.03 31.745 
Nrej 23 0 15 4.39 5.141 
Measures for Punk through Psyn are % of portfolio. The measure for Nrej is integer count 
73 
The data were examined for significant correlations between variables. Table 4-4 lists 
the observed correlations. Within the screening variables, several highly significant 
correlations were observed among the various measures of experience. Combining 
these various measures (YIET, YFPI, YEET, YEPI) into a single scale yields a 
Cronbach's alpha of 0.76. 
Within the asymmetry variables, the strong negative correlation between PSTAR 
(percentage of startups in portfolio) and PEXPD (percentage of expansion in portfolio) 
reflects the specialization of investors along the lifecycle stages of companies, where 
investors who finance startups are not the same investors who finance later-stage 
expansions (although both cases have potentially high information asymmetries). The 
strong positive correlation between PSTAR and PNOV (percentage of novel business 
models in portfolio) reflects the situation where novel business models are frequently 
treated as experiments by young companies and new entrepreneurs, and are less 
frequently tried by more established companies with already-proven alternative 
business models. 
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Several interesting correlations are also seen between the screening and asymmetry 
variables. The correlation between NARSECT (narrowness of sectoral focus) and 
PSYN (percentage of syndicated deals in portfolio) may represent investors with 
highly focused industry specializations attempting to broaden their knowledge base by 
involving investors with other knowledge and experience, as breadth of knowledge 
has previously been found to be a factor in the focused selection of potential investees 
(Jungwirth and Moog 2004). The correlation between NARSTAGE (narrowness of 
lifecycle stage focus) and PUNK (percentage of unknown entrepreneurs in portfolio) 
may reflect the trust that later-stage investors (such as a C-round investor) place in the 
judgements of earlier-stage investors (such as a B-round investor), so that a deal 
coming from a trusted early-stage investor will be considered despite the fact that the 
entrepreneur is unknown to the later Investor. The correlation between YFPI 
(experience in the target industry) and NREJ (investments in "overlooked" companies) 
suggests that entrepreneurs with many prior rejections are more likely to find 
acceptance among investors without a lot of experience in the specific industry sector 
- in a positive light this may be viewed as an escape from groupthink by these 
"inexperienced" investors, and in a negative light it may be a case of "fools rushing in" 
to invest where the more experienced fear to tread. The correlation between YVC (VC 
experience) and PSTAR (percentage of startups in portfolio) is particularly interesting, 
as it suggests that as VC investors gain more experience as investors, they tend to 
move "up-market' and away from startups (in model parlance, ESVCs migrate to the 
LSVC role). And finally, the correlation between YVC and PSYN suggests that more 
experienced VC investors may also gain self-confidence to make deals without 
syndication partners to rely upon for risk reduction. These correlations provide some 
initial support for the contention that VC investors are indeed non-homogeneous with 
respect to their screening abilities and investment approaches. 
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Due to the small sample size, normal distribution of these variables should not 
generally be assumed4. Therefore normality checks were conducted for each variable. 
These checks included visual inspection of quantile-quantile plots5, calculation of 
Kolmogorov-Smimov statistics (with the Lilliefors significance correction) (Kolmogorov 
1941; Lilliefors 1955), and calculation of the Shapiro-Wilk statistic (Shapiro, Wilk et al. 
1968). These statistics are provided in appendix 4, table A4-1. After removing outliers 
through visual inspection, these statistics suggest normality assumptions may be 
questionable for YOI, PFOR and PNOV, which may be exhibiting bimodal tendencies. 
To check for non-response bias in the data, descriptive means and variances were 
recomputed for the dataset with 10% of the cases removed, being those received after 
the longest delays. Since a common reason for busy VC investors to not respond to a 
survey such as this is that they are simply too busy to respond, these slow responses 
were taken as indicative of the views of VC investors who were too busy to respond, 
and thereby adopted as a theory of non-response (Groves and Couper 1996). Under 
the null hypothesis, the earlier responses should not be significantly different from 
these later responses. The means and variances of the attenuated dataset were 
compared via t-test and F-test to the full dataset. For all variables, the null hypothesis 
could not be rejected at x. 05, which suggests that the later responses do not 
represent a different population than the earlier responses. From this, no significant 
non-response bias can be inferred, suggesting that non-response bias has not 
materially affected the results presented. Furthermore, to the extent that the self- 
selection of respondents may have yielded a bimodal "interest" bias, this bias is likely 
desirable for research of an exploratory nature such as this as it acts to accentuate the 
range of views. 
` Normality can be generally assumed for samples of n> 30 
5 'The quantile-quantile (q-q) plot is a graphical technique for determining I two data sets come from 
populations with a common distribution. A q-q plot Is a plot of the quantiles of the first data set against the 
quantiles of the second data set. By a quantile, we mean the fraction (or percent) of points below the given 
value. That Is, the 0.3 (or 30%) quantile Is the point at which 30% percent of the data fall below and 70°/a fall 
above that value. A 45-degree reference line Is also plotted. If the two sets come from a population with the 
same distribution, the points should fall approximately along this reference line. The greater the departure 
from this reference line, the greater the evidence for the conclusion that the two data sets have come from 
populations with different distributions' NIST (2006). NIST/SEMATECH e-Handbook of Statistical Methods: 
section 1.3.3.24. 
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With the small sample obtained, it would be inappropriate to attempt specific testing of 
hypotheses, such as those proposed earlier in this chapter, through the development 
of multivariate regression models and the like. Small samples are more likely to fail to 
meet the assumptions underlying such statistical techniques (these being linearity, 
normality of the predictors and residuals, independence of residuals/heteroskedacity, 
zero mean of residuals, and no autocorrelation) or to lead to overfitted models (where 
the number of variables exceeds the number of observations, leaving insufficient 
degrees of freedom). Accordingly, the analysis focused on exploratory technique more 
suited to discovery of information in small samples. 
To explore an improved conceptualization of the data, a principal components analysis 
was therefore performed on the combined screening and asymmetry variables. The 
factors were extracted using varimax rotation with Kaiser normalization (Kaiser 1958), 
which converged after eight iterations. Using a threshold of eigenvalues greater than 
unity (Kaiser 1960)6, six orthogonal factors were extracted. Table 4-5 summarizes the 
factor loadings calculated for each variable. 
° The Kaiser criterion for factor extraction is an elgenvalue of at least 1, meaning that the extracted factor 
explains at least as much as one original variable. This criterion Is more conservative than the auernative 
"scree" test, which tends to retain fewer factors. 
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Table 4-5: Principal components factor loadings 
Com onent 
Genexp Asym Broad Vcexp Lead 
_Othexp Yfpi 
. 890 . 000 -. 012 . 226 . 200 . 061 Yiet 
. 792 . 025 . 095 . 044 . 083 . 446 Yepi 
. 709 . 197 -. 149 -. 271 -. 326 . 210 Yeet 
. 705 . 003 -. 133 -. 284 -. 204 -. 173 Ypse 
. 516 . 129 . 409 -. 147 . 231 -. 485 Nrej -. 461 . 453 . 165 -. 082 -. 288 . 086 Pstar 
. 165 . 882 . 284 -. 105 . 157 -. 012 
Pexpd -. 203 -. 833 -. 160 -. 002 -. 168 . 216 Pnov -. 108 . 820 -. 082 . 070 . 019 . 061 Psyn -. 031 . 059 . 914 -. 009 -. 010 -. 076 Narsect -. 223 . 296 . 634 . 180 . 093 . 192 Punk -. 091 . 242 . 031 . 857 -. 043 . 096 
narstage . 121 -. 331 . 416 . 653 -. 098 -. 136 Yvc -. 074 -. 280 -. 392 . 571 . 257 -. 261 Plead 
. 163 . 047 . 199 -. 158 . 828 . 232 
Pfor 
. 177 -. 299 . 182 -. 171 -. 752 . 220 Vol 
. 176 -. 052 . 046 -. 072 . 054 . 872 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
The first extracted factor appears to represent the general experience measurements 
of the screening variables, and is therefore labelled GENEXP. This factor, 
incorporating formal education and industry experience, seems to correspond to the 
degree of professionalism in the operations of the VC firm (Bottazzi, Da Rin et at. 
2004; Jungwirth and Moog 2004; Dimov and Shepherd 2005; Jungwirth 2005). 
Several interesting conclusions can be drawn from the factor loadings of items onto 
this first factor. The four highest loading items represent respectively (with loadings): 
  Experience in this industry, in any role (0.890), 
  Experience in any other industry, in any role (0.792), 
  Experience in this industry, as an entrepreneur (0.709), 
  Experience in any other industry, as an entrepreneur (0.705). 
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These loadings demonstrate that this factor captures braadth of oxporlonco In 
additional to simple amount of experience; it Is more heavily determined by experience 
gained in other industries and in other roles than just the entrepreneurial role. 
The second factor appears to represent the willingness of the Investor to participate In 
markets characterized by high Information asymmetries (such as startups with novel 
business models), and is therefore labelled as ASYM. The NREJ variable 
(investments in "overlooked" or "rejected" companies) exhibits significant cross loading 
across these two factors, of approximately equal magnitude but opposite sign. 
Conceptually, the loading of NREJ onto ASYM Is expected, as Investments made In 
companies that have been rejected by many other Investors can be expected to 
correlate with other Indicators of high asymmetry. However, the negative loading of 
NREJ onto GENEXP Is more difficult to conceptualize, as there ought to be no causal 
path between the rejection behaviours of other Investors and the experience level of 
the respondent Investor. 
Loadings for this factor also are very strong, exceeding 0.8 for three of the items. The 
negative sign on the PEXPD hem shows that VC investors treat expansion financings 
(of firms with proven track records) as not being analogous to highly asymmetric 
financings such as startups or novel business models with unknownlunproven 
entrepreneurs. Also of note is the observation that PSYN did not load significantly onto 
this factor. The degree of syndication employed by VC Investors appears to not be 
strongly related to the degree to which these Investors are willing to tackle information 
asymmetries. 
The third factor appears to represent the effort by the Investor to broaden their 
knowledge base by Involving others In the evaluation, and Is therefore labelled as 
BROAD. It is loaded primarily by PSYN and NARSECT, which represent the breadth 
of Industry sectors Invested In, and the degree of Involvement of other investors 
(through syndication of the Investment). BROAD also shows smaller secondary cross- 
loadings from NARSTAGE (another measure of investment scope), and from YPSE 
d0 
and YVC (which suggests that more educated and experienced VC Investors are less 
likely to require and seek input from others). 
The fourth factor appears to represent some dimension of the specific VC Investment 
experience level, including dealing with new entrepreneurs, and is therefore labelled 
as VCEXP. As discussed, two of the variables in this factor also have secondary 
cross-loadings onto BROAD. 
The fifth factor appears to represent the syndicate leadership propensity, and the 
resulting unwillingness to invest in distant companies in foreign jurisdictions, and is 
therefore labelled as LEAD. 
The final factor represents unexplained variance due to experience as some other 
type of investor, which surprisingly was not found to load significantly onto VCEXP, 
and is therefore labelled separately as OTHEXP. 
Collectively these extracted factors explain over 77% of the variance in the dataset. 
Table 4-6 shows sums of squared loadings and variance explained for each factor. 
Overall general experience level was found to explain the largest portion of the 
variance, at 18.5%. After controlling for this variance, the next largest source of 
variance was found to be the willingness to invest in asymmetric markets. In the 
dataset, over 16.6% of the variance can be explained by this factor alone. 
Table 46: Explained variance 
Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings 
Component Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
Genexp 3.146 18.508 18.508 
Asym 2.838 16.694 35.202 
Broad 1.997 11.749 46.951 
Vcexp 1.832 10.774 57.725 
Lead 1.725 10.149 67.874 
Othexp 1.571 9.242 77.116 
An analysis of variance was performed for these emergent factors, using three 
successive independent variables: home country of the VC firm (Canada, UK, USA), a 
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logistic variable for whether the VC firm invests in early-stage markets (seed or A- 
round financing), and a logistic variable for whether the VC firm invests in technology- 
based companies. No significant differences were found (p=. 05) for all factors and 
independent variables, except one. Only the BROAD factor was found to differ for 
early-stage investors. These early-stage VC firms averaged higher scores on the 
BROAD factor (mean 78.8 vs. 30.7, unstandardized) (p=. 004). Venture capital 
investors who make seed-stage or A-round investments are more likely to focus their 
activities on specific and narrow industry sectors, and to syndicate their investments. 
From these initial factor analysis results, three measured variables were subsequently 
trimmed. YOl did not load together with other variables onto any factor, and was 
therefore dropped from the structure. And the YPSE and NREJ variables cross-loaded 
significantly (greater than 0.40) onto more than one factor and were therefore dropped 
from this exploratory analysis (Ford, MacCallum et al. 1986). After elimination of these 
three measures the factor analysis was rerun, converging after seven iterations. Table 
4-7 summarizes the factor loadings calculated for each variable. 
Table 4-7: Principal components factor loadings 
Component 
Genex Asym Broad vcexp Lead 
Yiet 
. 875 -. 027 . 103 . 053 . 154 
Yfpi 
. 870 . 013 -. 057 . 256 . 225 
Yepi 
. 775 . 182 -. 067 -. 297 -. 281 
Yeet 
. 679 . 010 -. 176 -. 241 -. 177 
Pstar 
. 155 . 877 . 315 -. 
112 . 162 
Pexpd -. 153 -. 846 -. 153 -. 009 -. 167 
Pnov -. 120 . 844 -. 049 . 033 -. 031 Psyn -. 034 . 041 . 920 . 035 . 021 
Narsect -. 201 . 275 . 633 . 194 . 082 Punk -. 078 . 259 . 063 . 814 -. 047 
Narstage 
. 100 -. 329 . 347 . 705 -. 064 Yvc -. 167 -. 210 -. 496 . 591 . 187 Plead 
. 189 . 028 . 224 -. 160 . 857 Pfor 
. 216 -. 299 . 224 -. 174 -. 777 
Extraction Method: Principal Componen t Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax wit i Kaiser Normalization. 
Together these trimmed factors explain over 76% of the variance in the data, as 
shown in table 4-8. Most of the variance among VC investors is due to the wide range 
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of general business experience they have. But importantly, the second largest 
component of variance is their tolerance and willingness to manage information 
asymmetries. This suggests important heterogeneity among Investors in terms of their 
willingness and ability to operate in early-stage markets. 
Table 4-8: Explained variance 
Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings 
Component Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
Genexp 2.813 20.094 20.094 
Asym 2.617 18.695 38.789 
Broad 1.890 13.503 52.292 
VCexp 1.831 13.079 65.371 
Lead 1.625 11.608 76.979 
Limitations 
This study has relied upon VC investors to self-assess the nature of their investment 
portfolios, making judgements on the extent to which they are "early-stage", with 
"novel, unproven" business models and with unproven entrepreneurs. The ability of 
VC investors to accurately make such assessments can be questioned. Studies of the 
specific criteria VC investors use to screen investments found VC investors to be 
relatively poor at introspection (Zacharakis and Meyer 1998; Shepherd 1999); this 
deficiency may also cloud their judgement of the nature of the companies and 
entrepreneurs in their portfolios. Moreover, some VC Investors may have incentive to 
mischaracterize the nature of the deals they do (Gompers 1996), either overstating the 
risks they manage in order to enhance a reputation for skilful monitoring of 
investments, or understating the risks in order to enhance a reputation for prudence; 
this incentive may also introduce social desirability bias into the self-assessed data 
such VC investors provide. 
Even if VC investors in this sample were accurate in introspection and free of social 
desirability bias, the potential remains for common rater bias in these empirical results. 
However, a Harman's test of the exploratory factor analysis did not yield a single 
dominating factor in the unrotated solution, which provides support for the conclusion 
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that common-rater bias is not a significant threat to these results (Podsakoff and 
Organ 1986; Podsakoff, MacKenzie et al. 2003). 
Although this study has demonstrated some connection between VC screening ability 
and the willingness of VC investors to participate in early-stage markets, it may be that 
this relationship is significant only to some components of the generic screening ability 
investigated here; screening ability may be a composite, multivariate construct. These 
components might include the evaluation of new investment opportunities and the 
initial decision to offer a term sheet, the creation of a syndicate to form the required 
amount of investment capital, and the investigation of subsequent information and the 
decision to complete the investment deal. Success in early-stage markets, or in other 
markets with high information asymmetries, might therefore be specifically due to skill 
at only one or more of such components. 
Variables omitted from the model may also have significant predictive value. In 
particular, it may be suggested that regional differences among VC investment 
practices may influence willingness to invest in asymmetric markets, or that 
governmental policies (such as matched availability of funding) may provide local 
investment incentives. Similarly, cyclical effects on asymmetric investing may exist 
and may be uncovered through a longitudinal empirical approach. 
One possible alternative explanation for the observed relationships was that the 
apparently good screeners are simply more risk-averse than other VC investors. But 
this explanation appears somewhat unconvincing. Risk aversion in investors in 
characterized by a reduction in false positives (making fewer investments that ex post 
prove unprofitable), but at the expense of increasing false negatives (also making 
fewer investments that ex post prove highly profitable). Risk adverse investors are 
likely to make fewer investments overall and particularly fewer where they believe the 
information asymmetries are unfavourable and large. In contrast, highly skilled 
screeners have the ability to reduce both false positives and false negatives, and 
thereby make more investments under conditions of apparent information asymmetry. 
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One of the negative results obtained in this study suggests that the operationalization 
of information asymmetry in business expansions was flawed. Contrary to hypothesis, 
the study found a negative loading of expansion financing onto the asymmetry- 
tolerance factor, unlike the positive loadings found for other measures of uncertain 
investment scenarios. Unfortunately, it appears that the relevant survey question did 
not adequately account for a potential difference between simple expansions of 
volume (with little perceived risk) and expansions into new lines of business (with 
higher perceived risk and correspondingly higher information asymmetries) (Cumming 
2002). As a result, no test could be made as to whether the tolerance of information 
asymmetries that highly skilled VC investors display in the face of startups with 
unknown entrepreneurs and unproven business models Is similarly evident in the 
support of firms that wish to expand into unfamiliar territory. 
Conclusions 
This study used theoretical extensions to a previous model of VC investing to suggest 
a relationship between the screening ability of an investor and their corresponding 
willingness to invest in markets where the information asymmetries between 
entrepreneur and investor are high. Overall, support was found for the general 
prediction that a positive correlation could exist. 
The theoretical extension also identified two alternative investment strategies that may 
be pursued by investors with unusually high screening ability. In the first, the investor 
operates in the same markets as less-skilled investors, but obtains higher profits. In 
the second, the investor uses their higher screening skill to invest in highly asymmetric 
markets that other investors avoid. Evidence was found to suggest that some VC 
investors do practice this second strategy. 
The hypothesis suggesting that good screeners would be more willing to invest 
without syndication was supported; investors with more experience as a VC investor 
and with narrower industry sector specializations were found to make more 
investments without syndication. 
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The hypothesis suggesting that good screeners would be more willing to invest in 
companies that had been rejected by other VC Investors was supported; Investors 
with greater overall industry experience were found to make investments in companies 
that had experienced more prior rejections by other VC Investors. 
The hypothesis suggesting that good screeners would be more willing to invest in 
foreign countries was not supported; investors who often lead their syndicates were 
found to make fewer investments in foreign companies. This likely reflects the 
importance of the lead investor being located close to the entrepreneurial company in 
which they invest - an importance that may overshadow the hypothesized effect. 
An exploratory principal components analysis of the data revealed the existence of five 
factors that together explain almost 77% of the variance in the data. These factors 
comprise the general level of experience for the investor, their willingness to invest in 
asymmetric markets, the effort to broaden the investor's relevant knowledge base, the 
level of VC-specific experience of the investor, and their propensity to lead syndicates. 
This factor analysis found that a willingness to invest in asymmetric markets is an 
important conceptual and explanatory construct for VC investor behaviour, and that it 
alone explains almost 18% of the variance found in the data set. This factor varies 
markedly for different individual investors, suggesting that VC investors are indeed not 
homogeneous in their attitudes and behaviours towards asymmetric markets. 
In summary, it appears that VC investors do differ in their screening abilities, and that 
these differences are important determinants of their behaviour in markets 
characterized by high information asymmetries. These findings lend some support the 
theoretical extensions presented above. With respect to the model developed in 
chapter 3, these results lend empirical support to the bifurcation of VC investors into 
separate levels of quality (as in figure 3-8) and further suggest than this differentiation 
may influence the market strategies of different VC investors. 
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This chapter examines the indirect information exchanges of the chapter 3 model, as 
indicated in figure 3-9 above. It specifically explores whether investors, such as 
venture capital (VC) investors, signal their skill regarding screening Investments 
accurately, in order to influence the quality of their dealflow, as illustrated In figure 3-10 
above. A simplified theoretical model, based on a market comprising only Investors 
and entrepreneurs, each having two possible levels of quality, Is developed to 
establish the potential value of such signals to the entrepreneurs receiving them and 
to the investors generating them. This is followed by an empirical exploration of data 
from 29 VC investors in North America and Europe, which leads to the Identification of 
three specific observable signals of VC screening skill: the returns earned by VC 
investors on their investment portfolios, the independence of VC investment activities, 
and the ability of VC investors to specifically pick winners for their portfolios. These 
results suggest that successfully investing in early-stage firms can act as a signal of 
VC investor screening skill. 
Introduction 
As discussed in chapter 1, financial markets are fraught with information asymmetries. 
In order to have an equitable exchange of equity and financial capital, entrepreneurs 
and VC investors must have a mechanism to understand a venture's true prospects, 
despite these asymmetries (Busenitz, Fiet et al. 2005). One such mechanism is the 
communication of signals, being new information that changes their views of future 
states of the world. A signal provides a means for one market participant to reliably 
and accurately provide to other participants some information that mitigates the 
information asymmetries. 
Much of the research into the role of signalling in the entrepreneurNC market has 
focussed on signals provided by entrepreneurs in order to communicate to VC 
investors the prospective investment opportunity that the entrepreneurs' firms 
represent (Leland and Pyle 1977; Amit, Glosten et al. 1990; Forsythe, Lundholm et al. 
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1999; Busenitz, Fiet et al. 2001; Deutsch and Ross 2003). Comparatively little 
research has yet examined the complementary signalling on the other side of the 
market - signals provided by VC investors to entrepreneurs. In a competitive market, 
VC investors may be expected to signal to entrepreneurs their desirable but hidden 
attributes, such as their ability and willingness to screen skilfully, to provide services to 
the venture management, and to add other sources of value to the firm. The foregoing 
leads to the research question of whether VC investors signal their screening skill to 
entrepreneurs, and what value the information contained in such signals would have. 
One possible role for such signalling may be to reduce the risk of adverse selection. In 
addition to the mechanisms suggested by Akerlof, several other mechanisms have 
been proposed by subsequent researchers. Capital structure can serve as an 
information transfer mechanism; in markets where entrepreneurs offer securities to 
uniformed investors, it was found the risk can be somewhat mitigated through the 
combined use of debt and equity instruments (Darrough and Stoughton 1986). More 
recent studies have reported the widespread use of combined debt/equity structures 
or the use of instruments with hybrid characteristics by VC Investors as a means of 
overcoming asymmetries (Bascha and Walz 2001; Bratton 2002). Contract terms and 
conditions can also be designed to enforce information transfer (such as investment 
structure, monitoring and information rights, and staging of investment tranches) 
(Gompers 1995; Neher 1999; Bascha and Walz 2001). In addition, organizational 
theorists have suggested that social ties play an important role for investors seeking to 
overcome this information asymmetry (Venkataraman 1997), which suggests that VC 
investors to obtain information about the entrepreneur and her opportunity through 
external social networks (Shane and Cable 2002). Some researchers have further 
argued that there is a benefit for entrepreneurs to include VC investors as a risk- 
sharing strategy, and that this incentive is sufficient to encourage entrepreneurs to 
share their private information (Amit, Glosten et al. 1990). 
Starting from the work of Leland and Pyle, a considerable stream of research has 
emerged on the role of signalling in financial markets (Leland and Pyle 1977; 
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Forsythe, Lundholm et at. 1999; Gale 1999; Houben 2002). This research has 
demonstrated the importance of signalling In mitigating Information asymmetries, as 
well as illuminating mechanisms by which signals are created, exchanged and 
interpreted. Within the specific context of the market between VC investors and 
entrepreneurs, researchers have examined the mechanisms by which entrepreneurs 
can signal their private information to prospective Investors. These methods Include 
the amount of equity and personal wealth the entrepreneurs have invested In the firm, 
and the type and quality of advisors and directors they have been able to attract 
(Deutsch and Ross 2003; Busenitz, Fiet et at. 2005). Considerably less attention has 
been devoted to illuminating the role of signalling on the other side of this market, that 
is, signalling by VC investors. Some research has shown that VC investors signal 
private information to mitigate information asymmetries with key stakeholders in the 
VC firm, such as principal investors and sources of dealflow (Gompers 1996; Kelly 
and Hay 2000), but this research has not yet extended to other stakeholders in the VC 
enterprise. The signalling mechanism has potential to reduce Information asymmetry 
in other key relationships of the VC investor, such as those with current or prospective 
investee entrepreneurs. These results suggest that, rather than simply receiving and 
interpreting signals from entrepreneurs, VC investors may also be actively generating 
and sending signals to entrepreneurs. This study is an attempt to begin to understand 
the potential role for this signalling from VC investor to entrepreneur - under what 
conditions would such signalling make sense, and would VC investors engage In the 
practice of signalling to entrepreneurs. 
Two-party Market Model 
As precursor to an exploratory empirical examination of signalling by VC investors, the 
research begins with simple theoretical modelling of a market between entrepreneurs 
and VC investors in which both types of participant exhibit two levels of quality. In 
terms of the market model of chapter 3, this assumption corresponds to the 
participants of figure 3-8, where the roles of Professionals and Institutional Investors 
are being omitted from the model. 
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In this market model, the quality of the participants is left deliberately undefined. It is 
assumed that the participants in the market apply their own definitions and measures 
of quality for each other; that is, VC investors know what a high-quality entrepreneur 
means, and entrepreneurs know what a high-quality VC investor means. This simple 
model is then to establish limits to the value of hidden information about the quality of 
others. Such limits would represent the maximum value of any perfect signal of this 
hidden information. 
Entrepreneurs 
Suppose that there are many entrepreneurs, who each own a firm with some future 
project opportunities and having a pre-money' value V (the value of the firm, excluding 
the new investment being contemplated). They have private information about these 
firms, including details about the projects, and insight into their own level of effort 
devoted to the firm. These entrepreneurs can be high-quality (E) or low-quality (EL). 
The proportion that are high-quality is given by a and the low-quality proportion by (1- 
a), where 0: 5 a: 5 1. Entrepreneur quality can depend on many factors (including their 
skills and the financial investment they are able to make into their firms), but for 
simplicity, it can be assumed that this is reflected in the current valuation of their firms, 
which may be high (V, i) or low (VL) relative to the average firm. The entrepreneurs 
seek investors to provide capital to fund their projects, and a variety of services and 
intangible benefits to increase the value of their firms/projects (Elango, Fried et al. 
1995; Lange, Bygrave et al. 2001; Hsu 2004). 
Investors 
Suppose also that there are many investors who invest in many firms and provide 
services to the management of these firms. The investors can be high-quality (IN) or 
low-quality (! L). The proportion of investors that are high-quality is given by 6 and the 
low-quality proportion by (1- 6), where 0: 5 6: 5 1. The investor quality can depend on 
many factors, but this model looks solely at their ability to screen projects/firms 
accurately. By this is meant their ability to resolve information asymmetries and 
' That is, the valuation of the firm prior to the investment of any new cash by a prospective investor. 
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therefore accurately determine whether a given entrepreneur is an E or an EL. 
Lacking the entrepreneur's private information, they are disadvantaged in dealing with 
entrepreneurs due to information asymmetries. The two types of investor, by 
construction, have different abilities to screen accurately, the I are able to screen with 
accuracy Q, where 0 <_ ft <_ 1, while the 1L are able to screen with accuracy of only y, 
where ß>yand0_y<_1. 
The deal 
Suppose the investment deal is a simple cash-for-equity exchange. The investors 
provide capital in the amount K for which they claim the right to a proportion of the 
future value of the firm i= KI(V+K), 0 <_ i <_ 1. The entrepreneur retains right to the 
residual value in the proportion c= V/(V+K), 0: 5 c: 5 1. 
The investor contributes ongoing services (such as expertise, networks, or 
reputational endorsement). It is assumed that the ongoing involvement of this investor 
increases the future prospects of a high-quality firm, and therefore has some multiplier 
effect ,u on 
the immediate post-money valuation of V+K. The incremental value thus 
created, relative to the immediate post-money valuation of V+K is (A) times (V+K). It 
is also assumed that, despite the provision of these services by the investor, a low- 
quality firm will eventually fail, and therefore have a future value of zero (i. e., the 
investor will lose their investment K). 
Screening 
The valuation established for firm depends on the expectations of the person setting 
the valuation. Without separation due to screening, all firms are assessed at the 
average value for the pool VAVG = aVH + (1- a)VL. By reducing the information 
asymmetry, screening allows separation. High-quality firms are valued separately from 
low-quality firms, thereby raising the value for the EH and lowering the value for the EL. 
To reflect this dependency of valuation upon the person doing the valuation and the 
separation of firm qualities, following notation will be used: VV is the value of a firm 
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owned by an entrepreneur of quality t, as assessed by an Investor of quality], where ij 
can take on values H or L. 
  When an E is screened by an'H, the expected firm value is V,,,, =ßVH+(1/i) VL 
  When an EH is screened by an IL, the expected firm value is Vc = yVH+ (1- y) VL 
  When an EL is screened by an 1,,, the expected firm value is V,  = (1 /i) Vy+ßVL 
  When an EL is screened by an IL, the expected firm value is V ,L= (1-y) V+ yVL 
Quality-dependent strategies 
Under the market situation described above, low-quality participants will adopt unique 
strategies that depend on their perception of the quality of their corresponding partner 
in the exchange. For example, when an EL is screened by an investor of unknown 
quality IX, the expected value for their firm is VLK = BVG, + (1- b) V. So, the incremental 
value of knowing that the investor is an IH is AVG = Vom, - VLx = -(1-6) (8- y) (V - VL). 
This is strictly negative for VI, > VL and ß>y. Therefore the EL is better off being 
unscreened and thus being assessed at VAVG rather than being correctly screened and 
assessed at only VL. 
Similarly, the incremental value of knowing that the investor is an 11, is AVG= VV- Vom= 
& (, 6- y) (VH - VL). This is strictly positive for VH > VL and ß>y. So the EL is better off 
being unskilfully screened and thus potentially being mistakenly assessed at V rather 
than being correctly screened and assessed at only VL. 
On the other side of the market, an 1L will keep their quality private, in the attempt to 
not repel any E and not attract an undue proportion of EL entrepreneurs. They hope 
to attract a typical mix of high and low-quality entrepreneurs, and invest at the average 
valuation of VAG. 
The situation is complementary for high-quality participants. When an Ey is screened 
by an investor of unknown quality Ix, the expected value is Vx = cV11 + (1- 6) VL. So, 
the incremental value of knowing that the investor is an t is AV,,,, = VII, - Virx = 
(1-6) (/1- y) (V - VL). This is strictly positive for VH > VL and ß>y. Therefore the E is 
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better off being skilfully screened and assessed at V than risking being assessed at 
only VAVG. 
Similarly, the incremental value of knowing that the investor is an IL is AVHL = V, IL - Via 
-6 (8- y) (V - Vi). This is strictly negative for V > VL and, B > y. So the EH is better off 
being unscreened and assessed at VAvG than being poorly screened and mistakenly 
assessed at only VL. 
An EH will seek screening by an I,,, and avoid screening by an IL. The incremental 
value to the E in pursuing this strategy is in redirecting the (1- 6) portion of 
opportunities that would have gone to an IL. The benefit to the Ey is therefore 
BE =e(1-UXVHH - VHL) 
(11) 
BE -VV+Ký1-öX3-yXVH -VL) (12) 
H 
This represents the maximum amount the EH should invest in obtaining information 
about investor quality. 
On the other side of the market, an In will seek to communicate their screening quality 
to all entrepreneurs, and thereby attract EH and repel EL. Under perfect signalling, they 
will attract only E and will invest at valuations of V,,. But without the ability to signal or 
communicate the investor's screening quality, a mix of entrepreneurs will be funded, in 
the proportion a being E and (1- a) being EL. So, the incremental value to the 1 in 
signalling their quality is through replacing these bad (1- a) projects of -K value with 
good projects of i(u-1)(VH+K) value. The benefit to the investor is therefore 
B, =(1-a)i(p-1XV +K)+(1-a)K (13) 
B, = (1- a), uK (14) 
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This represents the maximum amount the 1 should invest in signalling information 
about their own quality. 
The quantities BE and B, represent upper bounds on the costs that should be incurred, 
by entrepreneurs and VC investors respectively, to support a signalling regime in 
which the quality of VC investors is indirectly communicated to prospective 
entrepreneurs. Note that the upper bound for entrepreneurs depends on attributes of 
the deal being negotiated with one specific VC investor (the size of the entrepreneur's 
claim on the upside) and attributes of the market overall (the quality mix of good and 
bad screeners among the VC investors in the market, and the different valuations 
these investors would place on her firm). On the other hand, the upper bound for VC 
investors depends solely on attributes of the specific investment deal being made 
(amount of capital invested, size of the investor's claim on the upside, and the 
expected magnitude of the upside), and does not depend on the quality mix of 
entrepreneurs in the market. 
As a result of this examination, it appears that both high-quality investors and high- 
quality entrepreneurs have incentive to separate the pool of investors according to 
screening ability, prior to incurring any screening efforts and costs. They both have 
incentive to spend up to B in signalling private information to the other, or in obtaining 
and interpreting information from the other. This result supports Leshchinskii's 
argument that project screening by VC investors increase the project's value 
(Leshchinskii 2003), and provides additional theoretical support for the proposed effect 
H5 described in chapter 3. 
But entrepreneurs in particular have an added incentive to understand the market 
overall, and the range of quality types among the VC investors in the market. The 
benefits that an entrepreneur receives from a signal of VC investor quality depend on 
her accurate contextualization of this specific investor's quality within the mix of all VC 
investors active in the market. 
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Signals of screener quality 
The question next arises, how can investors signal their screening ability? What 
methods do 1 have for signalling or otherwise communicating their skill to 
entrepreneurs? As Spence first described, there are four key attributes of a good 
signal (Spence 1973): 
  It must be an alterable characteristic of investors which Is observable by 
entrepreneurs. 
  It must be informative about the hidden attribute, such as being positively 
correlated with screening ability. 
  The benefits obtained from the signal information must exceed the signalling 
costs. 
  It must be hard to mimic, in that the signalling costs must be higher for low-quality 
investors, and ideally should be prohibitive for them. 
Each of Spence's criteria in turn can lead to further detailed criteria for effective 
signalling to occur. For example, the requirement that the signal be observable by 
entrepreneurs suggests that it must also be accessible, noticeable, reliable and 
sufficiently free of interference or noise to function as an information carrier (cf. figure 
3-6 above). This is equivalent to saying that the signal must have adequate strength 
and adequate clarity (i. e., a high signal-to-noise ratio). Thus when a signalling regime 
lacks one or more of these characteristics this situation becomes problematic. In a 
simple signalling regime, noise leads to mistaken information transfer and mistaken 
decisions. In a more complex signalling regime, noise can confound attempts at 
countersignalling or meta-signalling. And at sufficiently high noise levels, it becomes 
difficult to assert that any meaningful signalling is occurring at all. In effect, as noise 
destroys the information value of a signal, the upper bounds for investment In 
maintaining the signalling regime, BE and B1, are reduced pro rata. 
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The previous chapter found some suggestion that a potential signal that VC Investors 
may use to convey information about their screening abilities is investing in firms in 
early-stage markets. This study found that VC investors who invest in early-stage 
markets are the ones with less experience, and that more experienced VC Investors 
are less likely to invest in early-stage markets, a pattern that suggests the possibility 
that VC investors may be using their early-stage investing to demonstrate their 
abilities, and subsequently moving to later-stage markets. This behaviour exhibits the 
four attributes of a good potential signal, in that success is observable when the 
investee firms seek follow-on money, selecting investee firms requires some degree of 
screening ability, both BE and B, are positive if differential screening ability exists ((ß- y) 
> 0), and early-stage markets are generally unprofitable for investors, from which can 
be inferred that they are specifically unprofitable for the least-skilled investors 
(Bygrave, Fast et al. 1988). 
But it is not enough that an observed behaviour may act as a signal. It must also be 
unlikely that the behaviour arises from other non-signalling origins, so that the effects 
of this "noise" can be minimized. In the case of early-stage investing, three alternative 
explanations for the behaviour can be suggested. First, some VC investors have a 
range of funds aimed at different stages of firm growth (e. g., a seed fund owned and 
operated by an investment bank). These VC investors may use early-stage investing 
as a means of identifying and growing clients for their later-stage and more profitable 
investment businesses, even if these early-stage investments are individually 
unprofitable or result in the VC investor expending more than B, in the course of 
signalling. However, such full-range investors are uncommon among VC investors. 
Secondly, some VC investors may pursue early-stage investments for non-economic 
reasons; they seek personal emotional gain by participating in the management of 
young firms (e. g., "giving something back"), and the perceived value of this emotional 
gain may effectively increase the rational bound on signalling investment, B,. Several 
studies have found that, in addition to economic gain motives, angel Investors are 
motivated by a desire to play a role in the entrepreneurial process and to nurture and 
- mentor 
the next generation of entrepreneurs (Freear, Sohl et al. 1995; Aemoudt 1999; 
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Van Osnabrugge and Robinson 2000). Finally, the trend for VC Investors to move 
upmarket as they gain experience may be an artefact of fund size - as they gain 
experience they are entrusted with larger funds which cannot be deployed in early- 
stage markets where the transaction sizes are so small. This suggests that upmarket 
VC investors may be forced out of early-stage markets by practical limitations on their 
ability to deploy funds, and may therefore create noise in the signal value of staying in 
early-stage markets. This noise source may be more diff icult to dismiss. But it may be 
argued by contrapositive that the fact that few large investors operate in early-stage 
markets does not imply that small investors must operate there. The existence of small 
VC investors in the later-stage markets shows that small investors need not remain in 
early-stage markets where profits are less. They could move upmarket unless some 
constraint holds them or some hidden value (such as signalling) compels them to 
remain there for a while. As a result, the signal value of a VC investor operating in 
early-stage markets can be seen to be somewhat noisy, reducing both the strength 
and clarity of it. 
This potential for signalling by investors leads to three possible strategies that 
investors of different screening skill levels might adopt: 
1) IL investors will avoid unprofitable early-stage markets and will seek to invest in 
later stages where they have to compete to attract E firms. Or, if they can, they 
may attempt to join syndicates with I investors and "free ride". 
2) 1 investors might choose to invest in early-stage markets, since they can be 
profitable for them. 
3) IH investors might also choose to make some investments in early-stage markets, 
use the signalling value of this success to build or enhance their reputations, and 
then move to more profitable later-stage markets where this reputation is valuable 
(Kelly and Hay 2000). 
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Empirical Study 
The theoretical development of the preceding section raises the empirical question of 
whether investors actually behave this way, and in particular whether VC Investors of 
high screening ability use investment in early-stage markets as a signal of their skill. 
The theoretical development would suggest that VC Investors who are skilled 
screeners should be willing to invest up to B, in making their early-stage success 
observable to entrepreneurs, and that desirable entrepreneurs should be willing to 
invest up to an additional BE in obtaining this information. A preliminary and highly 
exploratory response to this question investigated some VC investors and their beliefs 
about how screening skill can be observed, and about the various reasons for 
investing in early-stage markets. 
Data for this study was collected as part of the survey exercise reported in chapter 4 
using the same respondents. Essentially, this research was interested to see if any VC 
investors believe that early-stage investing can serve as a signal of quality, as 
theorized above. This objective sought only to find some empirical validation of the 
theoretical direction. The approach taken in the empirical exploration was an attempt 
to triangulate this question by examining their beliefs from two sides: 
  What observable attributes indicate VC investor screening ability? Is successfully 
investing in early-stage companies one of them? 
  Why do VC investors invest in early-stage companies? Is signalling their 
screening skill a reason to invest early? 
Methodology 
The selected unit of analysis was an individual VC investor working in a professional 
VC firm. Respondents were asked to provide information on their unique individual 
perspectives on the VC industry. This study utilized the same set of respondents as in 
chapter 4, through the same survey exercise. 
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The instrument captures several measures for two hypothesized constructs: the 
demonstration screening ability of a VC Investor, and the potential reasons for a VC 
investor to invest in early-stage markets. 
With respect to demonstration of VC investor screening ability, the following variables 
were operationalized as potential measures. These correspond to the information 
content to be conveyed by a correlated signal. 
  ROI - Overall portfolio return. 
  OVER - Investing in companies that have been overlooked by other VC 
investors. 
  EARLY - Investing successfully in early-stage companies. 
  LEAD - Acting as the leader of syndicates with other VC investors. 
  HITS - Percentage of firms in the portfolio that were successful "homeruns° 
Respondents were asked to rate how effective they think each variable is in 
demonstrating/proving the skill a VC investor has in screening opportunities/deals. A 
5-point Likert-type scale was used. 
With respect to potential reasons for VC investors to invest in early stage markets, the 
following variables were operationalized as potential measures. These correspond to 
signals or potential noise sources. 
  HIRET - Expectation of earning high returns on these Investments. 
  COMP - Less competition from other VC investors. 
  SCRN - Having a unique ability to screenlassess early-stage companies. 
  ROFR - Securing a right of first refusal for subsequent investment rounds. 
  ABENT - Demonstrating VC investor abilities to other entrepreneurs. 
  ABINV - Demonstrating VC investor abilities to current/future investors in the 
fund(s). 
  ABPRO - Demonstrating VC investor abilities to others (professionals, other VC 
investors, etc). 
  FLOW - Maintaining relationships with sources of dealf low. 
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Respondents were asked to rate how important they think each is as a reason for a 
VC investor to make investments in early-stage companies. A 5-point scale was used. 
It was expected that some form of correlation or factor structure among these 
measures would be found, but that this structure might not mirror this simple duality. 
Analysis of results 
As with the chapter 4 study, the same 400 surveys were sent, with an overall 
response rate of 7.5% from the same respondents as described in table 4.1 above. 
The previously described checks for non-response bias and normality were also 
performed. 
The data obtained were analyzed using SPSS software (version 12.0). Table 5-1 
provides some descriptive statistics for each "screening ability" variable. These results 
show that overall, VC investors consider portfolio ROI and the proportion of "hits" in 
the portfolio to be the best demonstrators of screening skill, while investing in 
companies rejected by other VC investors is considered to be a considerably poorer 
indicator. Table 5-2 provides some descriptive statistics for each "investment reason" 
variable. These results show that VC investors consider the best reason to invest in 
early-stage companies to be a belief that high returns can be obtained, while they 
believe that demonstration of skill to others is a comparatively poor reason for 
investing early. These results are for the full sample taken together, and do not reflect 
any differences of subsets within the sample. 
Table 5-1: Screening ability measures 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Rol 29 2 5 4.59 . 780 
Over 29 1 4 2.38 1.049 
Early 29 1 5 3.52 1.430 
Lead 29 1 5 2.86 1.060 
1 Hits 29 3 5 4.52 . 785 
For ease of reference, variable names and descriptions are summarized in appendix 1. 
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Table 5-2: Early-stage Investment reason measures 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Hiret 29 3 5 4.76 . 577 
Comp 29 1 5 2.45 1.325 
Scrn 29 2 5 3.66 1.045 
Rofr 29 1 4 2.59 . 867 
Abent 29 1 5 2.41 1.211 
Abinv 29 1 5 2.69 1.365 
Abpro 29 1 5 2.21 1.207 
Flow 29 1 5 2.48 1.153 
The data were examined for significant correlations between and across variables. 
Table 5-3 lists the observed correlations. 
Within the measures of screening skill, the leading of syndicates was found to be 
significantly correlated with successful investing in early-stage companies, and with 
investing in companies that had been overlooked by other VC investors (p<. 05). 
Within the reasons for investing in early-stage markets, high and very significant 
correlations were found among the variables for demonstrating VC investor abilities to 
different stakeholders (entrepreneurs, primary investors, and other professionals) 
(p<. 001). These results suggested that these measures may be indicative of a single 
underlying desire to demonstrate skill to others. Combining these measures into a 
single scale yields a Cronbach's alpha of 0.87. 
Due to the small sample size, normal distribution of these variables should not 
generally be assumed. Therefore normality checks were conducted for each variable. 
These checks included visual inspection of quantile-quantile plots, calculation of 
Kolmogorov-Smimov statistics (with the Lilliefors significance correction) (Kolmogorov 
1941; Lilliefors 1955), and calculation of the Shapiro-Wilk statistic (Shapiro, Wilk et al. 
1968). These statistics are provided in appendix 4, table A4-2. These statistics 
suggest normality assumptions may be questionable for EARLY and HITS, which may 
be exhibiting bimodal tendencies. 
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Non-response bias was tested for, in the manner described in chapter 4. For all 
variables, the null hypothesis could not be rejected at pc. 05, which suggests that the 
later responses do not represent a different population than the earlier responses. 
From this, no significant non-response bias can be inferred, suggesting that non- 
response bias has not materially affected the results presented. 
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Demonstrating abilities to primary investors was significantly correlated with the desire 
to maintain sources of dealf low (p =. 005), and demonstrating abilities to entrepreneurs 
was correlated with desire to secure rights to subsequent investment rounds (p<. 05). 
Between the major two hypothesized constructs, moderate but significant correlations 
were found for three relationships (p<. 05). Investing early to avoid later-stage 
competitors is correlated with leadership of syndicates, and is also correlated with 
success in making early-stage investments. Success with early-stage investments 
was also correlated with desire to secure rights to subsequent investment rounds, 
reflecting that right of first refusal is only available to those who commit funds on the 
early rounds. 
As in the previous chapter, with the small sample obtained, it would be inappropriate 
to attempt specific testing of hypotheses through the development of multivariate 
regression models. Accordingly, the analysis focused on exploratory technique more 
suited to discovery of information in small samples. 
To gain an improved conceptualization of the data, a principal components analysis 
was performed. The factors were extracted using varimax rotation with Kaiser 
normalization (Kaiser 1958), which converged after twenty-one iterations. Using a 
threshold of eigenvalues greater than unity (Kaiser 1960), five orthogonal factors were 
extracted. Table 5-4 summarizes the factor loadings calculated for each variable. 
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Table 5-4: Principal components factor loadings 
Component 
Relation Indep Plckwln Avoid Return 
Flow 
. 803 -. 108 . 282 -. 083 -. 117 
Abinv 
. 791 . 179 . 030 . 220 . 201 
Abpro 
. 622 . 
313 -. 141 . 202 . 460 
Abent 
. 610 . 389 -. 477 . 212 . 285 
Rofr 
. 499 . 359 -. 248 -. 413 . 124 
Early 
. 133 . 798 -. 042 -. 041 -. 120 
Over 
. 176 . 732 . 182 -. 050 . 039 
Lead -. 084 . 685 -. 065 . 359 -. 072 
Scm 
. 080 . 082 . 787 . 146 -. 223 
Hits 
. 022 . 041 . 740 -. 040 . 409 
Comp 
. 012 . 451 . 072 . 736 . 119 
Hiret -. 454 . 195 -. 016 -. 659 . 142 
Rol 
. 125 -. 169 . 012 -. 050 . 848 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
The first factor corresponds to the belief that building and maintaining relationships 
and their associated future business opportunities is a good reason for early-stage 
investing. Venture capital investors who score high on this factor invest early to 
maintain relationships and dealflow, not to make money (as indicated by the sizeable 
negative cross loading this factor receives from the HIRET item (investing in early- 
stage markets in order to earn high returns)). This factor has therefore been labelled 
as RELATION. 
The second factor reflects the belief that skill can be demonstrated by the degree of 
independent action the VC investor displays, by investing early in companies 
overlooked by others, and by leading when involved in syndicated deals. This 
independence of action is further reflected in the sizeable cross loading from the 
COMP item (investing in early-stage markets to avoid competition) suggesting that 
independence allows VC investors to avoid crowding from competitors. This factor has 
therefore been labelled as INDEP. 
The third factor reflects a combined belief that having high screening ability is a good 
reason for early-stage investing, and that such VC investors demonstrate this skill by 
having a high proportion of "hits" in their portfolio. Investors who score highly on this 
factor demonstrate their skill through their ability to pick winners, and invest to exploit 
this skill. This factor has therefore been labelled as PICKWIN. This factor also picks up 
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a sizeable negative cross-loading of the ABENT item (investing in early-stage markets 
to demonstrate VC abilities to entrepreneurs). This suggests that investors who score 
highly on this factor believe that early-stage investing should be driven by the 
exploitation of unique skills, rather than the demonstration of these skills to 
entrepreneurs. This interpretation is supported by the negative correlation' between the 
two factors, as discussed below. 
The fourth factor reflects the belief that early investing is a means of avoiding 
competition, rather than a means of earning high returns. This factor has therefore 
been labelled as AVOID. 
The fifth factor reflects the belief that skill is demonstrated by earning high returns on 
invested funds. This factor has therefore been labelled as RETURN. This factor also 
picks up a sizeable cross-loading of the ABPRO item (investing in early-stage markets 
to demonstrate VC abilities to professionals), which loads primarily onto the 
RELATION factor. This suggests that professionals, peers and other similar sources of 
dealflow may evaluate the reputation of VC investors primarily on the basis of portfolio 
ROI. 
Together these factors explain over 71 % of the variance in the data, as shown in table 
5-5. 
Table 5-5: Explained variance 
Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings 
Component Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
Relation 2.564 19.725 19.725 
Indep 2.342 18.018 37.743 
Pickwin 1.601 12.314 50.057 
Avoid 1.445 11.116 61.174 
Return 1.355 10.421 71.595 
From these initial factor analysis results, three measure variables were subsequently 
trimmed to improve the interpretability of the results. ROI did not load together with 
other variables onto any factor, and was therefore dropped from the structure thus 
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removing the single-item factor RETURN. And the HIRET and COMP variables 
loaded significantly (greater than 0.40) onto more than one factor and were therefore 
dropped from this exploratory analysis (Ford, MacCallum et al. 1986). After elimination 
of these three measures the factor analysis was rerun, converging after six iterations. 
Table 5-6 summarizes the factor loadings calculated for each variable. 
Together these trimmed factors explain over 63% of the variance in the data, as 
shown in table 5-7. 
Table 54: Trimmed principal components 
Component 
Relation Indep Pickwin 
Abinv 
. 857 . 078 . 192 
Abpro 
. 821 . 206 -. 020 
Abent 
. 810 . 296 -. 348 
Flow 
. 625 -. 184 . 393 
Rofr 
. 518 . 234 -. 239 
Lead -. 013 . 796 -. 051 
Over 
. 235 . 734 . 220 
Early 
. 197 . 728 -. 046 
Scrn -. 097 . 131 . 814 
Hits 
. 050 -. 024 . 701 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
Table 5-7: Trimmed explained variance 
Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings 
Component Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
Relation 2.830 28.304 28.304 
Indep 1.945 19.448 47.752 
Pickwin 1.576 15.765 63.516 
Limitations 
As mentioned earlier in chapter 4, the empirical findings of this study are clearly limited 
in statistical significance due to the sample size. However, within these constraints, the 
sample appears to have reasonably good external validity and generalizability to the 
larger VC investor population. 
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This study has relied upon VC investors to self-report their beliefs regarding 
demonstration of ability and rationales for early-stage investments. This represents a 
threat to internal validity as self-reported data can be subject to the common rater 
effects of consistency motif or social desirability bias (Podsakoff and Organ 1986). The 
anonymity of the survey and the general absence of widespread lay theories of VC 
signalling may have served to mitigate this risk of bias. Also, the data were obtained 
from a single source for all variables, which raises the potential for common method 
bias. The data were therefore examined via Harmon single-factor test, which did not 
yield a factor indicative of common method bias. 
The findings of this study, which support the view that some VC investors are active in 
the early-stage capital markets for the purpose of building or maintaining relationships 
with key stakeholders, are open to an alternative interpretation at a different level of 
analysis - that the relationship benefits accrue to the VC investor as an individual, and 
not as a representative of the VC firm. Under this interpretation some VC investors 
may participate in the early-stage capital markets in order to create private personal 
career benefits. Unfortunately, the design of the chapter 5 study did not account for 
this possibility and so did not control for the level at which relationship benefits were 
experienced or expected. 
Finally, this study has been highly exploratory of VC investors as a whole, and has 
treated such investors as homogeneous. Further study would be required to 
determine if the effects described here are dependent on a range of VC investor and 
firm attributes, including portfolio size, stage focus, country, level of education, and 
industry focus, and whether subgroups or types exist within the VC investor 
community. 
Conclusions 
This exploratory study has examined the value of information about the quality of 
participants in early-stage markets between entrepreneurs and VC investors, and has 
used exploratory empirical data to support theorizing of how VC investors may signal 
their screening skill quality to entrepreneurs. Primary of these findings is that VC 
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investors are not homogenous in their beliefs, both about how to demonstrate 
screening skill and about the potential reasons for investing in early-stage markets. 
They differ in their beliefs whether screening skill can be demonstrated by investing in 
early-stage markets, investing in companies overlooked or rejected by other VC 
investors, and leading syndicates. Some VC Investors clearly believe such 
independent investing behaviours are signals of screening skill. But this is not 
universal. Similarly, VC investors differ in their belief that screening skill can be 
demonstrated by earning high returns on the investment portfolio. These two beliefs 
are highly correlated with the belief that early-stage investing is about building and 
maintaining key relationships. Among VC in early-stage markets, there is greater belief 
in the importance of doing so to build relationships, and less in doing so to avoid 
competition or to earn high returns. 
VC investors also differ in their belief that screening skill is closely associated with the 
ability to pick winners, and thereby to exhibit a greater proportion of successful 
companies in the portfolio. Venture capital investors who believe this may choose to 
signal their screening quality through the proportion of successful investments in their 
portfolios, rather than the overall portfolio return on investment. This is a potential 
signal that was not originally envisioned, and suggests the need for future research to 
explore the range of possible other signals that VC investors may be using, and the 
conditions under which each may be used. And these questions also suggest a need 
for complementary research into the reception and interpretation of such signals by 
entrepreneurs - do they look for these observable attributes of VC investors, and do 
they correctly interpret them as signals of VC investor screening ability? 
This study has suggested that investors may wish to exhibit observable attributes that 
signal their screening ability, and that entrepreneurs may benefit from observing and 
interpreting these signals. These results confirm recent similar findings by Berkovitch 
and Serban-Levy, in which they found that investors with high screening ability 
somehow attract better quality of entrepreneurs than other investors, while poor 
screeners are left with the less-desirable entrepreneurs (Berkovitch and Serban-Levy 
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2004). For some VC investors, the ability to Invest successfully In early-stage firms is 
believed to act as a signal of such skill. But this signal Is noisy, in that other VC 
investors believe there are additional valid reasons for making early-stage 
investments, reasons which may partly obscure the Information value of the signal. 
The diversity of observed beliefs about this signal suggests that the signal Is neither 
strong nor clear at the aggregate level. It would be correspondingly difficult for a 
desirable entrepreneur seeking a skilled VC (in order to receive a fair valuation) to rely 
solely upon early-stage investment behaviour as a signal of this skill. This signal could 
only be used in concert with a variety of other indicators of VC investor skill. 
With respect to the market model developed in chapter 3, these results provide 
general support for the existence of indirect (signalled) information exchanges (as 
illustrated in figure 3-9) and specific supported for the proposed effects H5 and H6 (the 
other proposed effects H1 - H4 were not explored as part of the present research). 
ESVCs attempt to influence the behaviour of other market participants (being 
Entrepreneurs, Professionals, Institutional Investors, and LSVCs) by signalling the 
hidden screening abilities. 
Finally, the results reported in table 5-7 may serve as a starting point for the 
development of a robust set of scales for the three emergent constructs in this area: 
importance of relationships, independence of action, and ability to pick winners. Much 
further research will be required to validate and refine these constructs and to 
establish their roles in a theory of venture capital. But this initial support for the 
theoretical framework provided in chapter 3 may provide a useful start. To the extent 
that these factors are seen as noisy signals of VC screening skill, further investigation 
will be required to establish whether they are easily observable by entrepreneurs, or 
whether the cost of observation will exceed the theorized beneficial limits. Some 
limited independence and "winner-picking" information may be inferred by 
entrepreneurs by investigating the portfolio holdings and exits obtained by various VC 
investors. But more detailed information may be elusive. Relationship information may 
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be especially difficult for entrepreneurs to obtain, as it primarily represents attitudinal 
characteristics of the VC. 
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This chapter aims to provide a validity check on the interpretations of the quantitative 
results of previous two chapters, by adopting a broader multimethod perspective that 
compares those positivist findings with findings obtained from an Interpretivist 
approach and based on qualitative data. 
Summarized to a high level, the previous two chapters demonstrate two primary 
findings: 
1) Venture capital (VC) investors are not homogeneous in their beliefs and attitudes 
towards early-stage markets. 
2) They profess highly-rational reasons for holding these various beliefs. 
The design of these quantitative studies did not afford the opportunity to explore the 
potential for any emotional or non-rational reasons behind VC Investor behaviours and 
attitudes, and to validate the findings of previous chapters using a multimethod 
approach. Consequently, a qualitative extension of the results of the chapter 5 study 
was subsequently performed. This interpretative follow-on study was intended to 
afford a more open-ended investigation, whereby VC Investors would have 
opportunity to express additional reasons and themes that were not reflected in the 
original study designs, including personal, emotional and other non-rational aspects. 
As a precursor to this qualitative investigation, an attempt can be made to formalize 
some of the differences among the heterogeneous VC Investors by using the factors 
determined in the previous studies as a basis for an initial typology of VC investors. 
This typology is then used to drive a purposive sampling of respondents. The previous 
quantitative examinations are thereby enriched with a qualitative examination based 
on semi-structured interviews with six VC investors of widely ranging types. Analysis 
of within-group and between-group response patterns is augmented with supporting 
verbatim contributions that amplify the conclusions of chapters 4 and 5. 
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Methodology 
For the qualitative part of this study, six respondents were selected from the individual 
professional VC investors who participated in the quantitative studies above. 
Interviews were approximately 60 minutes in length, were based on the questions 
listed in table 6-1, and were conducted in private at a location chosen by the 
respondent (typically their own offices)8. The interviews were recorded and 
-transcribed, and coded using the factors identified in chapters 4 and 5 as preliminary 
schema. As analysis proceeded, the coding schema was iteratively refined and 
expanded to reflect the developing interpretation. 
Table 6-1: Interview guide 
Broad Question Probes 
Why do some VCs invest in early-stage markets, and others not? 
" Sourcing dealflow (referrals from peers, past Investees) 
" Risk and return tradeoffs 
" Possessing asymmetric knowledge, special skills 
" Future benefits with the Investee (right of first refusal, 
preferential terms for follow-on Investments 
" Future benefits with other parties (keeping In the "dub") 
" What are the key success factors for Investors In your 
sta e? 
What is the role of competition among VCs? 
" Competing for access to entrepreneurs or principal Investors 
" AmounVtype of competitive pressure 
" Basis of competition, strategy differences 
" Stakeholders, constituencies, audiences (nvestors, peers, 
referral sources, entrepreneurs) 
" Types of observable skills (sourcing, screening, structuring, 
monitoring, managing) 
" Role of "skill" in determining who to Invite Into a syndicate, 
and who leads it 
Should VCs try to demonstrate that the are good at screening Incoming opportunities (picking winners )? 
It this Important to demonstrate? To whom? 
" How to separately evaluate this skill from subsequent skills 
(eventual ROI 
" Who benefits from this Information transfer? How do they 
benefit? 
" Examples (senders andlor receivers 
This interview guide Is based on the "grand tour" approach recommended by McCracken, G. (1988). $@ 
long Interview. Newbury Park CA, Sage. 
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Selection of respondents 
Since the objective of this part of this study was to develop an enriched and thicker 
understanding of early-stage investing behaviours and intentions, purposive sampling 
was used to identify investors with some direct experience investing in early-stage 
markets and with broad perspectives on the VC Industry - for example, one 
respondent was also an executive of a national venture capital association, and one 
was also an executive of a private firm that specializes in monitoring and reporting on 
activities and trends in the venture capital industry. 
Cluster analysis and VC typology 
To ensure the selected respondents would reflect a diverse range of perspectives, a 
cluster analysis of the data from chapters 4 and 5 was performed so that respondents 
could be drawn from each major type of VC investor. Figure 6-1 shows a dendrogram 
representation of the results of the cluster analysis, which was performed using the 
SPSS (ver. 12.0) hierarchical cluster analysis function, for average between-group 
linkage and using simple Euclidean distances, based on the calculated values for the 
factors identified in chapters 4 and 5. 
From visual inspection four clusters can be identified'°: cluster #1 comprising eleven 
cases, cluster #2 comprising two adjacent cases, cluster #3 comprising thirteen cases, 
and cluster #4 comprising a final three outlier cases. 
° Simple Euclidean distance calculation has the advantage that the distance between any two objects Is not 
affected by the addition of new objects to the analysis, which may be outliers. 
10 The number of dusters retained is somewhat arbitrary in that, as greater Inter-cluster distances are 
accepted, fewer but larger dusters form. In the present case, increasing the distance serves only to collapse 
the duster #2 outliers Into duster #1, without otherwise simplifying the results. And decreasing the distance 
servers only to split duster #1 Into halves, without otherwise changing the results. Neither change results In a 
markedly Improved interpretation. 
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Figure 6-1: VC Dendrogram 
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To assist with the interpretation of these clusters and the development of a 
corresponding typology, Anova analyses were performed to determine whether these 
clusters differ significantly in their associated values for the underlying factors. As the 
group sizes differ, these Anova analyses were performed using unweighted means". 
Table A4-3 in appendix 4 shows the one-way Anova results testing for significant 
factor differences between cluster #1 members and non-members. This analysis 
shows that cluster #1 members differ in that they have less experience as VC 
investors (p=. 001), less general experience (p=. 050), less willingness to invest in 
asymmetric markets (p=. 001), greater willingness to involve others to broaden their 
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knowledge (p=. 043), and less belief in investing in early-stage markets as a method of 
avoiding competitors (p=. 016). Accordingly they can be given the descriptive label of 
"Cautious Novices". 
Table A4-4 in appendix 4 shows the one-way Anova results testing for significant 
factor differences between cluster #2 members and non-members. This analysis 
shows that cluster #2 members differ in that they have more experience both generally 
(p=. 032) and specifically with other (non-VC) forms of investing (p=. 006), but are less 
willing to invest in asymmetric markets (p=. 002). Accordingly they can be given the 
descriptive label of "Cautious but Experienced". 
Table A4-5 in appendix 4 shows the one-way Anova results testing for significant 
factor differences between cluster #3 members and non-members. This analysis 
shows that cluster #3 members differ in that they have greater willingness to invest in 
asymmetric markets (p<. 001), greater propensity to lead (p=. 033) and less need to 
broaden their knowledge (p<. 001), greater experience as a VC (p=. 001), and greater 
belief in investing early-stage to avoid competitors (p=. 015). Accordingly they can be 
given the descriptive label of "Confident Leaders". 
Table A4-6 in appendix 4 shows the one-way Anova results testing for significant 
factor differences between cluster #4 members and non-members. This analysis 
shows that-cluster #4 members differ in that they have lower propensity to lead 
investments (p<. 001). Accordingly they can be given the descriptive label of 
"Followers". 
The largest cluster comprises experienced investors who tend to operate in markets 
with high information asymmetries where their abilities allow them to avoid 
competitors. They differ in their higher propensity to lead syndicates and invest in 
foreign jurisdictions, and do not seek outside assistance to broaden their knowledge 
bases. This cluster may be indicative of VC investors who are overconfident in their 
" This adjustment is made using the default' unique span of squares" option in SPSS, which attempts to 
minimize the confounding of effects by adjusting for differences in group sizes. Nevertheless, the potential for 
differences in group sizes to inflate or deflate observed differences remains as a reason for caution when 
interpreting statistical results of these analyses. 
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abilities and therefore believe they can operate profitably In highly asymmetric markets 
despite having only limited experience In Industry and as entrepreneurs. 
Overconfidence is a common cognitive bias, where one's estimate of abilities exceeds 
the objective measures of these abilities (Russo and Schoemaker 1992; Klayman, Soll 
et al. 1999). Venture capital investors have previously been found to be overconfident 
in their abilities (Zacharakis 1997; Zacharakis and Shepherd 2001) - although these 
studies treated their VC respondents as a homogeneous group, and therefore did not 
isolate this cluster from other respondents. 
The other large cluster comprises newcomers to VC investing, who exhibit many of 
the opposite traits. They have significantly less experience and are less active in 
asymmetric markets, and compensate for these shortcomings by involving the 
expertise of others. 
Testing for country effects 
Before proposing this interpretation of the identified clusters, it is appropriate to 
understand any potential confounding effects of country of origin. Country-specific 
socio-cultural effects may result in different approaches to VC investor business 
strategy (Sapienza, Manigart et al. 1996). These country-specific effects have been 
found to include government policy (Isaksson and Cornelius 1998; Jeng and Wells 
2000), legal and institutional factors (Cumming 2002a) and the operating parameters 
of individual VC firms (Manigart, De Waele et al. 2002). If such effects are present 
among VC investors, and if these effects are manifest in any of the factors underlying 
the cluster definitions, then these country effects may confound the discriminant 
cluster attributes (the factors that are significantly different between cluster members 
and non-members) and may therefore lead to incorrect interpretation of the cluster 
analysis results. 
To check for this possibility within the two larger clusters (n = 13 and 11 respectively), 
Anova comparison of means tests12 were performed for the cluster attributes, based 
12 Again using the SPSS adjustment to account for differences In group sizes, and with the corresponding 
caveats with respect to interpretation of observed differences. 
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on the specific country in which the VC investor operates primarily. Table 6-2 shows 
the means of each attribute of the cluster, for the total cluster membership. Given the 
small sample sizes, the external validity of these results should be interpreted with 
caution. 
Table 6-2: Cluster attributes by country 
Cluster Attrib. Population 
Total 
Cluster 
Total 
Cluster 
Canada 
Cluster 
USA 
Cluster 
UK 
Confident ASYM + 73.67 105.30 97.99 95.36 134.94"' 
Leaders LEAD + -68.20 -50.16 -39.03 -51.39 -62.55 
VCEXP + 33.78 48.80 50.64 53.84 36.27 
AVOID + 3.05 3.53 3.72 3.43 3.45 
BROAD- 68.85 38.90 44.97 51.59 5.45"" 
Cautious BROAD + 68.85 87.01 77.83 91.24 90.20 
Novices VCEXP - 33.78 16.31 1.70 22.67 21.50 
GENEXP- 38.90 27.39 42.11 27.78 19.90' 
ASYM - 73.67 39.52 29.81 25.86 48.90 
AVOID- 3.05 2.50 2.97 1.86 2.49 
The attribute label "ASYM +" Indicates that the ASYM factor was found to be significantly higher for this 
duster than for the overall sample population (I. e., 105.30 vs. 73.67 was significant, as reported above). 
No differences were significant at the. 05 level, except as noted: 
" Significant at. 05 level 
** Significant at. 01 level 
***Significant at <. 001 level 
Regarding the mean value of the ASYM factor for the UK members of the Confident 
Leaders cluster, the 134.94 value is very significantly different (p<. 001), but this 
difference is in the direction that distinguishes this cluster from the remaining 
population. The other two countries have mean values that are not significantly 
different from the cluster mean. The cluster definition is internally consistent. 
Regarding the mean value of the BROAD factor for UK members of the Confident 
Leaders cluster, the 5.45 value is significantly different (x. 01), but this difference is in 
the direction that distinguishes this cluster from the remaining population. The other 
two countries have mean values that are not significantly different from the cluster 
mean. The cluster definition is internally consistent. 
Regarding the mean value of the GENEXP factor for UK members of the Cautious 
Novices cluster, the 19.90 value is marginally different (x. 05), but this difference is in 
118 
the direction that distinguishes this cluster from the remaining population. The cluster 
definition is internally consistent. 
Regarding the mean value of the GENEXP factor for Canadian members of the 
Cautious Novices cluster, the 42.11 value is marginally different (x. 05), and further, 
this difference is contrary to the direction that distinguishes this cluster from the 
remaining population. A possible interpretation of this anomaly is that for these more 
experienced Canadian investors, the timidity suggested by the other defining attributes 
of the cluster is somehow not mitigated by having an unusually high level of general 
business experience. It could be that these Canadian VC investors do not recognize 
or credit their general business experience as affording them adequate background for 
early-stage investing in asymmetric markets. This might be attributable to the largely 
"branch plant" nature of many Canadian businesses, where chronological measures of 
experience may not correlate with functional expertise or levels of autonomy in 
decision-making (Macintosh 1994; Daniels 1998). But this explanation should be 
considered with caution, as it is based on a small sample. On all other attributes of the 
Cautious Novices cluster, the Canadian VC investors have means that are not 
significantly different from the total cluster. 
The foregoing analysis of country-specific attributes suggests that country-specific 
effects have not significantly confounded these results, and that the proposed cluster 
interpretation is reasonable. Table 6-3 summarizes the discriminant attributes of each 
cluster. 
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Table 6-3: VC typology 
Cluster n Higher factors Lower factors 
Confident Leaders 13 ASYM (p.. 001) BROAD (pc. 001) 
LEAD (p. 033) 
VCEXP (p=. 001) 
AVOID 
. 015 
Cautious Novices 11 BROAD (j. 043) VCEXP (p=. 001) 
GENEXP (pz. 050) 
ASYM (ps. 001) 
AVOID (pa. 01 
Followers 3 LEAD (p<. 001) 
Cautious but 2 GENEXP (p=. 032) ASYM (p=. 002) 
Experienced OTHEXP 
. 006 
Based on this analysis it was decided that, in addition to the purposive sampling 
approach outlined above, sampling would be stratified across the clusters identified, 
with two Cautious Novices and two Confident Leaders, and one each from the 
Cautious but Experienced and Follower clusters. Within these parameters, and having 
shown that country is not a significant factor determining variance among these 
particular participants, VC investors for each cluster were selected from those VC 
investors located in Canada, for reasons of cost and ease of access. 
Qualitative data collection 
Interviews were conducted in the offices of the selected VC investors and were 
recorded electronically. The interviews were each of approximately 60 minutes 
duration. The trustworthiness of the research data and findings was assessed by 
applying criteria from the interpretive research methodology literature, focusing on 
credibility, transferability, dependability, confirmability, and integrity (Lincoln and Guba 
1985; Hirschman 1986; Wallendorf and Belk 1989). This assessment Is summarized 
in table 6-4, which provides an interpretation of the criterion and an assessment of the 
degree to which the current research meets the standard. This assessment suggests 
that the results provide reasonable evidence in support of the developed 
interpretations. 
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Table 664: Trustworthiness assessment 
Criterion Interpretation Assessment 
Credibility The results appear to be an acceptable Emerging constructs were confirmed with 
representation of the data - akin to participants as Interviews progressed. Key 
positivist internal validity points were triangulated with a variety of 
Interview probes. 
Transferability The interpretations are applicable to other Purposive sampling was employed to enhance 
contexts - akin to positivist external generalizability to other VC populations. 
validity 
Dependability The results are stable and consistent Findings are analyzed and compared with 
over time and place - akin to positivist previous quantitative findings of chapters 4 and 
reliability S. 
Confirmability The interpretations are supported by the Interpretations were confirmed with participants 
data - akin to positivist objectivit for reasonability and r nizabili . 
Integrity The interpretations are free of Respondents were assured confidentiality and 
misinformation or evasions by anonymity. Hypotheses from chapters 4 and 5 
participants - akin to positivist self-report were not presented to respondents. bias 
Analysis and Interpretation 
Interview recordings were transcribed for subsequent analysis. The coding and 
analysis of this material proceeded in an iterative fashion. Initial coding was based on 
schemata developed from the previous two studies, which reflected the super-rational 
dimensions, and on the expectation of additional dimensions reflecting less super- 
rational drivers (such as agency risks, emotional objectives, or other irrationalities). As 
the iterative analysis progressed, themes and patterns of response were identified and 
developed. Within and across case comparisons were performed and tabulated to 
provided a higher-level basis for interpretation. Appendix 5 provides a summary of the 
concordance of these coded themes across the six respondents. The validity of these 
proposed interpretations was tested in follow-up discussions with interview 
respondents. 
Support for earlier findings 
Respondents from all VC clusters provided support and agreement with the 
conclusion that VC investors with higher degrees of screening ability are more willing 
and able to participate in markets characterized by high information asymmetries, 
such as early-stage markets. Confident Leaders expressed it as, "If you do it [early- 
stage investing] right, there is an opportunity to get the homerun. And what I mean by 
that is, we realize that by doing this early-stage investing, before May of this year, that 
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the biggest gap was with (the] management gap, management expertise... Why are 
we into early-stage? We think that if you really roll up your sleeves, there is a potential 
to (a) preserve the capital you're putting, and (b) to optimize ft and really ensure 
there's some meaningful events taking place". Cautious Novices said things like, 
'Well, from an investor thesis, it's all about return. So its return-driven risk. Why do we 
invest in early-stage? Buy more of the company at a lower valuation" and "Those of us 
who came in and were looking at early-stage, it didn't work that well, and so we're out. 
And the ones that were in that more mature capital market could sustain themselves". 
Even the outlier Cautious but Experienced respondent said, "The earlier you go, the 
higher the rate of return. So if you're really good at it, you get much better rates of 
return... If you're not good at it, you crash and bum". 
The different VC types also expressed similarity of views about the importance of 
widespread general business experience, as reflected in by the GENEXP factor. The 
Confident Leaders said, "You need judicious business judgement... More than half the 
population are IT guys. So they're more comfortable with IT investments, not 
surprisingly, because they can touch and feel it and they can analyze it based on their 
experience and education. Whereas another company... for a lot of these guys its 
more of a flyer because they can't evaluate it - the technology, the market potential. 
So it really comes down to sound business judgement", and "I think you need a two- 
fold approach to it. One, you do need to have the strategic kind of thinking, which you 
get by having done or doing a lot of venture capital activity. The experience comes 
from that, the exposure. So you do get the benefit of that. You need that level of 
expertise involved. The second is definitely operational expertise, whatever that might 
be. 'Operational' meaning creating a sense of accountability, systems, processes, 
discipline... Most of the time there is a gap in the rigors of sales and marketing". While 
the Cautious Novices expressed it more as, "You have to have somebody who 
understands the business, who's done it, who's run a business just like that, who 
knows how to get economies of scale, who already has the networks" and "It comes 
down to what kind of investor you are, where you feel comfortable. If you were an 
entrepreneur and you've done startups before, then you feel much more comfortable 
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with all of the unknowns around early-stage [investing]... You have to have a feel for it; 
you have to have been through this before. In the early stages, you take somebody 
who has been an entrepreneur and done startups. That's the skill set that is most 
important, because you know what the issues are. There are those who say you've 
got to be an engineer, you've got to know how to develop software. Or ideally, you 
were an entrepreneur in a software environment. But most of the founders are really 
smart people. And most of the founders can build the products. Whether it's built or 
not, or they have the great idea but don't know how to execute, you can compensate 
for that. You can build your team. But what the investor needs to understand is all of 
the dynamics: what the growth is going to look like, what our first sales guy is going to 
do, how to scale the sales organisation. So you have to have this general business 
knowledge. I think if you're going to be a hands-on working investor and you're going 
to grow those businesses, that's the skill set you need". 
With respect to the issue of why some investors would pursue an early-stage strategy, 
the participants provided uniform support for importance of building and maintaining 
key relationships, and the role that early-stage investing might therefore play. A 
Confident Leader said, in referring to early-stage syndication partners, "I worked with 
this guy before. So therefore syndicates tend to form around people who have already 
done things together. And also the VC community is pretty small anyway. Once you've 
been in it for a few years you do get to know, even in a non-business setting, you get 
to know everyone on the street... When I have looked at who will I bring to the table [in 
a syndicate], or who is getting together, I would say the number one [criterion] would 
be alignment of objectives. That's the biggest. And what I mean by that is `thinks in a 
similar fashion'". A Cautious Novice confirmed the role that early-stage Investing plays 
in developing relationships among new VC investors, relationships that would endure 
when they later moved away from the early-stage market, saying. "There's a lot more 
sharing going on than there used to be. You see the young VCs, they get together at 
the wine thing. Those guys talk a lot. The industry is promoting that sort of cross- 
discussion. So, as they move up, they see the new deals in groups". Another Cautious 
Novice explained "lt's a personal relationship business... We try to do business with 
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those funds, and that gets us into other deals... I've been on the Board of a company 
with the Managing Partner of a legendary Silicon Valley fund for three years, and 
we've built this relationship. And because he likes us, now we're seeing those deals". 
The Cautious but Experienced investor explained how early-stage Investing provided 
a basis or "currency" in maintaining relationships with other investors: "I'll take [the 
entrepreneur] to other people to decide if they want to put money in, because they 
owe me a favour, or I owe them a favour... people that you like, people that you've 
done deals with before". 
The experienced investors, whether Confident Leaders or Cautious but Experienced, 
agreed that early-stage investing had the benefit of locking up access to subsequent 
later-stage investments, saying, "[Early-stage] investing Is a means of helping nurture 
along an investment to make it ready for one of their larger funds... It's sort of like an 
angel investment to get it to the next level, where its a more attractive candidate". The 
Cautious but Experienced respondent further pointed out a strategy whereby some 
investors lock up subsequent financing rounds as a means of maintaining 
relationships with later-stage investors, saying: "[The early-stage investors] want 
control. They want 51% ownership... They go in early, wrest control, gussie it up, and 
then do a big round to their buddies and say, Well, we're a merchant bank. We know 
what we're doing. Look what we brought you. ' So, they have to move upstream 
because they just don't have the cash to do a late-stage company'. This comment 
seems to be suggesting that some investors are acting to maintain relationships with 
their friends in other investment firms, and that the best way they can bring value to 
these friends is to use their modest amount of investment capital to lock-up 
opportunities in early-stage markets and later bring these investment opportunities to 
their friends, almost as gifts (and presumably to the detriment of the entrepreneurs 
and the institutional investors that fund these early-stage VC investors). The Follower 
respondent confirmed this, but cast it more as a risk mitigation strategy when dealing 
with better-financed later-stage investors, saying "If you are putting money in and 
letting somebody take over after that, your ownership gets dwindled down so much. 
Because you may do a seed round on a good valuation, then the Series A [investor] 
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may come in and say 'yeah, we like it', but not at enough bump... Hopefully they look 
at you as a feeder fund and say'I'd better not crush this guy, or he's not going to show 
me anything in the future"'. 
The respondents provided wide support for the strategy of demonstrating skill In early- 
stage markets as a means of improving their dealfiow. A Confident Leader put it as, 
"Actions speak louder than words. You can say all of that, but the real test is going to 
come in 'how have you added value to these companies? ' I think that's the key to it. 
No matter how much you say, at the end of the day, it Is going to be how much did 
that person that you had in your shop, even if he or she may be operational, how did 
they go and bring about results... The actions will speak for themselves in due course. 
That can give you a basic differentiator. It's got an all-around benefit... Hopefully it will 
bring you an enhanced quality of dealflow. Because hopefully these entrepreneurs 
won't see it as a challenge, they'll see it as a help to them". A Cautious Novice further 
explained how an entrepreneur might interpret this signal of skill by thinking, "If you 
raise more money, that means you're a 'good' VC and you're going to start getting the 
dealflow. 'Such and such' a fund raised their next round of financing, they were 
supported by X number of LPs, all the [entrepreneurs] say'Oh, those guys got more 
money, and they're good. Maybe I should take my deal to them'. Certainly you'll attract 
more business plans. But there's a group of people out there for whom VCs are a last 
resort. They have a business plan, its a good business, and they can grow 
organically. They don't need venture capital. They're in no hurry to take VC money. So 
then they start to get confidence, [saying] 'This VC has attracted more money, they 
have depth, they have network connections. They know the LP is connected. Now 
we've got a couple layers of support. So maybe they will take their deal to the VC. 
Entrepreneurs so good that they don't even need VCs". These respondents were 
suggesting that entrepreneurs do notice the signals of early-stage Investor skill, and do 
use this information in deciding from whom they would seek future financing. This 
suggestion is the subject of the third study, reported in chapter 7. 
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Finally, the cautious investors commented on how early-stage Investing provides a 
method of avoiding competition. A Cautious Novice said, "If the more mature VCs are 
getting all the deals, then you'd start looking at earlier deals. There's too much 
competition in the later stage. You're not going to go up against a VC who has lots of 
money and connections... When you're new, you're trying to find a niche. So why 
would you go up against the guys that are well-established, right in their main market, 
who get to have a quality dealfiow, who are working [and] collaborating with all their 
other colleagues, who've got solid networks? ". The Follower respondent repeated this 
belief, saying "Some of the larger funds have the strategy of feeding a pipeline -a 
seed fund that feeds the main fund. I think it's a very good strategy, because that 
means that they can continue to fund and they don't have to necessarily give in to a 
third investor who is going to crush them. They can continue funding if they want, by 
themselves or with their other partners. It's what allows some of the smaller funds to 
play in venture capital. Some of the smaller funds can't play In the larger [investment 
rounds]. If you haven't got $500 million in the bank, you can't get into those [Series A 
or Series B] rounds. It's probably part of why we're In this [early] stage... its a space 
where the competition is not that great". But the Confident Leaders did not share this 
view, as they typically did not think much competition exists in the VC Investor 
industry. One remarked rather definitively, "I would say there is really very little 
competition. I've not seen it, other than in maybe one or two instances. Competition 
doesn't exist. [VCs] don't compete with each other for deals". 
Turning now to the issue of what specific behaviours VC investors can undertake to 
signal their specific skills, the VC respondents expressed uniformity of opinion that the 
primary signal of investor skill remains the overall return on investment for the portfolio. 
The Confident Leaders expressed views like, "The most Important benefit is, if you're 
adding value to your portfolio, you're going to see it in return". A Cautious Novice said 
about the marketing of VC investors to their principal Investors, 'They go out and 
market themselves. They have good investor relations with LPs, and can show them 
what they're doing. But as one fellow said to me, 'at some point in time we need to 
show [returns]'. It's all about returns to our shareholders... You have to show returns. 
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Even when you talk to really good [investors] that you know, with really good portfolios, 
they'll be the ones to say, 'So far we've acted on faith. But there comes a point in time 
where you have to be able to show returns'. That's what you need to show" and 
'When we go out fundraising, we are going to have to show that we have a proven 
track record of portfolio return. And it has to be a real track record; it can't be a one-hit 
wonder. It's got to be consistent returns. Ideally if you had multiple funds, you're 
showing consistency across funds. Clearly for us, at the end of the $100M fund that 
we've got, to convince [the LP] to do another fund - did we have a successful return 
on the $100M that we invested? Do we have a cohesive team who have stayed 
together throughout that time, that have proven they can work together, and have 
committed to stay for the next fund? ". And a Cautious but Experienced investor 
summarized it as, "There are three tiers of VCs. There's the upper tier [like] Sequoia 
Capital. Any time they ever want money, anyone will give it to them. So they have no 
trouble raising money. They don't even announce it. Word gets out on the street that 
they might be considering it, and people flock to them - because their rates of return 
are so high. So there's huge stratification [among VCs]. There's first tier, and then 
there's not. Like there's Harvard and then there's everybody else. The people [VC 
investors] are selling to are financial weenies. All they care about, they're just looking 
for their rate of return, so all they care about is beta and risk and rate of return. All they 
care about is risk-adjusted rate of return... If what you show me is that of the $100 
million that you had invested you had one big success that gave you a 55% portfolio 
rate of return, that's not as exciting to me as five homeruns that gave you 55% rate of 
return, because that lowers your risk. So, it's rate of return and risk, and that's all that it 
is". These comments seemed to suggest that portfolio ROl was the sole measure of 
VC investor performance. But later comments question this interpretation by 
identifying other signals too. 
Since portfolio concentration and the attendant level of portfolio risk are perceived by 
these investors as important measures for their principals, they therefore believe that 
the ability to accurately assess opportunities and picking the future winners is an 
important signal of their skill, one which should matter to their principals. One 
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Confident Leader explained this saying, "it really comes down to sound business 
judgement, and also people who are very resourceful, that can spend a lot of time 
doing a lot of research on the Internet and doing a lot due diligence to try to know as 
much as they can about a particular investment opportunity, knowing full well that ifs 
high risk and that with investment there's a likelihood that you'll lose everything. But 
the more you can do to minimize that risk and try to pick a winner... that's why I say 
'be selective''. 
Respondents also provided some further examples of super-rational reasons to signal 
their screening skill, which were not included in the previous quantitative studies. The 
Confident Leaders remarked on the role that early-stage investing play in a well- 
diversified portfolio strategy, even for investors who do not have particularly high 
degree of screening skill, saying, "For passive [investors], it really comes down to 
higher potential returns to reflect the higher risk profile. And some will do it as part of a 
diversified or balanced portfolio" and "An approach which could work, [is to] take a 
portfolio approach and say 'okay, I'm going to deploy an amount of capital. And it's 
going to be so much in this company, so much in that company. And you just hope 
that one of them takes off and will take care of all the other stuff. That could work. 
There's no reason why it cannot work 
When prompted, the respondents also provided more detailed examples of reasons 
why VC investors should try to demonstrate their abilities. These included securing 
commercial partners for their investees, securing future funding from principal 
investors, and being invited to join syndicates with peer investors. Some of their 
specific comments along these lines include: 
  'he higher profile and better known you are, especially if you've been associated 
with winners in the past, will bode well for future funding and commercial 
partners. " This suggests not only signalling to the institutional investors of the 
chapter 3 market model, but also another audience not reflected In that model: 
potential commercial partners of the entrepreneur (i. e., the legitimacy of the 
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successful VC investor improves the entrepreneur's ability to conduct business 
with other firms. 
  if you raise more money, that means you're a good VC, and you're going to start 
getting the dealflow" This reinforces the view that any signals of VC investor skill 
should influence entrepreneurs. 
  "You get to know everyone on the street. You could know that one VC, he's a 
decent guy, he's strong at this, he's got a reputation. " This suggests that signals of 
VC investor skill may influence the syndication decisions of other VC Investors. 
  "[A particular VC investor] has sector expertise in the semiconductor field. You 
want them there [in the syndicate]. And if they're not there, you're scared. " This 
indicates that the signal effect on potential syndication decisions may be quite 
strong. 
Despite this high level of agreement among the different types of VC Investors, the 
various respondents did not express uniform opinions about some of the findings of 
the previous studies. Some findings were supported only by a subset of respondents. 
For example, the Cautious Novices, being new entrants in the VC Industry, were 
stronger proponents of the importance of the signals inherent in the independence of 
their actions ('There was a time when you didn't share your deals, in general. When 
you found a good deal, you want to make a big splash. "), and of the strategy of using 
early-stage markets as a signal during the early phases of their investor careers, but 
moving out of it once their skill reputation was established ("They get a really good 
return. Probably had to work a lot harder. Now that their funds are more mature, they 
realize they can probably invest in later-stage stuff. "). They also had a stronger belief 
that they could find undiscovered opportunities in early-stage markets ('The big guys 
aren't looking at these deals, or they're going to turn them down. So there's going to 
be some good ones in there. "). 
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Beyond super-rationality 
Besides providing support for the conclusions of the previous two studies, Interview 
respondents provided insights into a number of other reasons for VC investor 
behaviours, such as investing in early-stage markets, signalling their skill, and 
participating in syndicates. Many of these additional insights reflect less super-rational 
objectives on their part, perhaps even non-rational reasons. To some extent they are 
indicative of agency risk, whereby the individual VC investor may be pursuing 
personal objectives that do no necessarily support the objectives of the VC firm or its 
principal investors. For example, there may be individual career benefits sought 
through particular VC investor behaviours. A Cautious Novice remarked on how early- 
stage investing can be driven by short-term career grandstanding objectives 
(Gompers 1996) to impress more-established VC investors, saying, "The old guys are 
saying you're `Flavour of the month'... When you find a good deal, you want to make a 
big splash. But now everybody says 'yeah, we saw that [successful] deal'. Everybody 
claims they've seen everything". The Follower respondent commented on the 
emotional validation of being recognized for making. good deals, saying "When you 
bring a Series A investor to the table, you're relatively excited just to get him to the 
table. There's a validation in having him there". The Cautious but Experienced 
respondent gave a longer-term career example, "[By making bad investments, ] you 
don't get burned so bad that you die; you just spend all your money. [Laughs] Then 
[you] go get another job", referring to VC investors who achieve poor portfolio results 
but still manage to use the investor experience to achieve positive personal career 
results - an agency risk perspective that suggests a further personal benefit to 
developing and maintaining good relationships when working as a VC investor. And 
several investors gave examples of the personal emotional benefit of early-stage 
investing, which may supersede portfolio risk/return objectives. One Investor 
remarked, "it can be an exciting time to get involved and help grow the company and 
help shape it and be involved in the day-to-day supervision and strategic decision- 
making", while another gave the example of an investor peer who "does it just 
because he has a passion for early-stage companies. They [already] made their 
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money. They're entrepreneurs; they [just] want to get involved in a company". These 
appear to be situations where the return to the individual VC investor is of a non- 
economic form. And finally, the Cautious but Experienced respondent gave several 
examples of VC investor behaviours designed to help friends working in other 
investment firms: "Conceivably I would say I'm going to lock you [the entrepreneur] up, 
and then take you to other [VC] people... because they owe me a favour or I owe them 
a favour", and "[VCs] do a big round to their buddies and say... 'look at what we 
brought you"'. These comments suggest that, in addition to the super-rational 
economic objectives of VC investing, individual investors find a variety of personally 
enjoyable and non-economic reasons for their specific behaviours, which begin to blur 
the distinction between angel investors on the one hand, and VC investors with 
agency risk on the other. 
Another example theme of VC investor beliefs and behaviours that appear non- 
rational is the profession of a lack of competition among VC investors, and their 
professed desire to avoid initiating competition. In a purely super-rational market, VC 
investors would compete aggressively with each other to obtain the right to finance the 
most attractive entrepreneurial opportunities. Abstaining from such competition would 
have detrimental economic impact on the VC investors; they might miss good 
opportunities, their share of realized gains from successful investments would be 
- diluted by excess syndication, and their capital deployment would be spread among 
more investments than optimal portfolio diversification would require, thereby 
increasing their costs and reducing their profits. Nevertheless, despite these risks, 
respondents remarked often on the apparent lack of competition among VC Investors 
- expressing approval for this arrangement in many ways: 
  "Competition among VCs? It doesn't exist... If you could do [the deal] yourself, 
then you would do it yourself. But as soon as another VC catches wind of it, then 
there still wouldn't be competition. They would gang up on the entrepreneur and 
drive the valuation down. [Laughs] They would not get into a bidding war with 
each other. " 
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  "In the venture capital world, I would say there Is really very little competition. I've 
not seen it, other than in maybe one or two instances... In mainstream venture 
capital type of stuff, people are wanting to cooperate for all the obvious reasons. " 
  'They are more collaborators than competitors... I wouldn't want to get into a 
situation where we're competing against another group and artificially jack up the 
price. " 
This apparent lack of competition among VCs might initially be seen as a challenge to 
the market assumptions underlying the model presented in chapter 3. Yet it may be 
defended on three bases. First, the classical marketplace assumption requires only 
that individual participants can be replaceable without affecting the equilibrium of the 
market, not that these participants believe themselves replaceable. Secondly, this "no 
competition" opinion is being expressed by established market-leader VCs, and has 
been balanced by comments from the newer VCs (quoted above) pertaining to the 
importance of signalling to make a big "splash". And finally, regardless whether the 
established VCs do not recognize their competitive environments, the entrepreneurs 
do - they are the ones choosing among the VCs (as will be explored in chapter 7). It is 
unclear whether this represents a lack of awareness of competition among established 
VC investors, or a lack of understanding among entrepreneurs as to how the early- 
stage capital markets work (i. e., a lack of competitive pressures). Since VCs have 
been found to be poor at introspection into their decision practices (Zacharakis and 
Meyer 1998; Shepherd 1999), they might also be poor at introspection Into their 
competitive behaviours. 
Only the Follower respondent explicitly recognized the competitive reality and the 
basis on which many VC investors compete with their non-VC competitors (competing 
on distribution, but not on price), saying "I'm not one, personally, to compete for a deal. 
The entrepreneur needs to make up their mind, do their due diligence and say `this is 
who I want', versus saying `this one gave me a 10% higher valuation'. If its just based 
on valuation and deal terms, I'm not sure how much I'd play In that competitive 
market... But for the companies we seem to focus on, often our competition Is angels. 
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And we're struggling with why that is. Maybe it's because a lot of the technologies we 
invest in are understandable. It's not complex telecom software. A new material that's 
lighter and cheaper? Simple. So we tend to be competing with angels, and their terms 
are an order of magnitude better than ours. [But] they are difficult to find. It's much 
easier to go after venture capital. The channels to venture capital are much more 
visible and acceptable". 
Conclusions 
This qualitative exploration, in addition to triangulating the findings of the previous 
chapters, has shed some light on a number of VC investor motivations and behaviours 
that extend beyond the super-rational boundaries quantitatively investigated in the 
previous two studies. These include agency risks, career concerns, and personal 
emotional rewards for individuals. 
The range of opinions voiced by the respondents, and the variability of these opinions 
among the different identified types, lends support to the primary finding of chapter 4 
that VC investors are not homogeneous and that one of the important ways in which 
they differ is in their willingness and ability to exploit screening skill in order to 
successfully invest in the early-stage markets. VC investors embody a wide range of 
beliefs towards screening skill and the effective operation in markets with high 
information asymmetries. And they recognize that this diversity in abilities acts to 
influence the adoption of various strategies among their peers. 
Further, they provided a range of support for the findings of chapter 5, by which VC 
investors do attempt to signal their abilities, and that investing in the early-stage 
markets is one way to do so. They recognize the utility for some VC investors to 
operate in early-stage markets in order to signal information to stakeholders. But they 
also believe that investing in early-stage markets has many benefits beyond the pure 
signal value to entrepreneurs: building and maintaining key relationships, Improving 
their dealflow, securing commercial partners for their investees, securing future 
funding from principal investors, diversifying portfolio holdings, being invited to join 
syndicates with peer investors, and enjoying individual private benefits (such as career 
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benefits and personal pleasure in advising early-stage firms). The cautious investors 
also believe that early-stage investing provides a method of avoiding competition until 
their VC firms had become sufficiently established to either compete effectively or to 
be asked to join with more established VC firms. 
Although the VC investors believe that the primary signal of skill is the overall return on 
investment they are able to achieve for a portfolio, they also recognize the signal 
inherent in the fact that VC investors with higher degrees of screening ability are more 
willing and able to participate in markets characterized by high information 
asymmetries (such as early-stage markets) because this higher degree of screening 
skill is related to broad business experience and the ability to add value to the investee 
firm. 
The primary finding of these qualitative interviews has been an enriched confirmation 
of many of the previous findings, as to why some VC investors choose to participate in 
highly asymmetric early-stage markets, and why and how they may choose to signal 
their skills to various constituencies. In the market model of chapter 3, the distinction 
between high and low-quality ESVCs is essentially behavioural - being based on the 
exhibited skill in screening behaviours. But the findings of this chapter provide an 
additional perspective on this distinction, by suggesting a number of attitudes and 
motivations that may underlie the willingness of some individual VC Investors to 
develop the ability to operate in early-stage markets. 
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The market interactions between venture capital (VC) investors and entrepreneurs 
reflected in the chapter 3 model are two-sided, in that the capacity and willingness of 
both parties is prerequisite for achieving any investment deal. Not only must VC 
investors find and successfully screen potential entrepreneur transaction partners, but 
entrepreneurs must also do the converse - find and screen potential VC Investors. 
However, research into the search operations within the market between 
entrepreneurs and VC investors has been primarily focused on the VC side of the 
market - how VC investors screen and select the entrepreneurial firms in which they 
wish to invest. In addition to the studies of the previous chapters, this existing research 
has included a diverse range of studies that have helped to develop a robust set of 
criteria used by VC investors to select their entrepreneurs (Bruno and Tyebjee 1983; 
Rea 1989; Cable and Shane 1997; Zacharakis 2002; Hsu 2004). 
In contrast to this well-developed research stream, comparatively little is known about 
how entrepreneurs select their financial sources - relatively little is known about the 
information flows from VC investor to entrepreneur. This is unfortunate, as 
entrepreneurs often do have choices. In particular, the most desirable entrepreneurs 
with the most attractive projects often have choice from among competing capital 
suppliers; Over 70% of entrepreneurs seeking VC financing have competitive bids to 
consider, and over 50% have three or more competitive sources (Smith 1999). Indeed 
entrepreneurs seek to bring about this situation by attempting to establish a market 
once they received their initial financing offer, by seeking out additional competitive 
bids. Even if they are unsuccessful in creating this market, or are precluded from doing 
so by contractual terms with a prospective VC investor, they can still apprehend a 
freedom to choose. If they reject the first "take it or leave it" term sheet from a VC 
investor, they expect to be able subsequently to solicit a competing term sheet from 
another VC investor 
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Given that entrepreneurs can face the same freedom of choice as VC investors, it Is 
important to develop an understanding of how this choice is made. Yet, compared to 
the literature of the selection criteria used by VC investors, the literature of 
entrepreneurial selection criteria is scarce. This is unfortunate since, as Venkataraman 
observed, the existence of a choice of different investor types in this market raises 
important questions about market stability (Venkataraman 1997). 
There appears to have been but a single study to-date that explicitly made empirical 
examination of the criteria used by entrepreneurs to select their source of venture 
capital (Smith 1999). This study asked 143 entrepreneurs in the USA, and primarily in 
high-technology industries, to rate the importance of 29 criteria in their selection of a 
VC investor, on a scale from 0 to 10. The sample was drawn from the Price 
Waterhouse National Venture Capital Survey, as being in the "start-up/seed" or "early" 
stage of development and as having received "initiaVseed" or "first stage" venture 
funding during the last three quarters of 1997 and the first quarter of 1998. The 
companies selected were limited by stage of development and type of investment to 
companies that were thought to be those most likely to have recently gone through the 
process of selecting a venture capitalist. 
The results showed that entrepreneurs invest significant effort in this selection 
process, devoting 100 hours or more, involving many different information sources, 
and involving other members of their teams. The study also found several differences 
between different types of entrepreneurs, with variations in criteria importance being 
related to geographic region, industry, and the age and experience of the 
entrepreneur. 
Subsequently, Leshchinskii attempted a theoretically based normative 
recommendation for appropriate criteria by which entrepreneurs may select a variety 
of different types of capital provider (Leshchinskii 2003). This study further argued that 
the screening abilities of active investors (such as VC investors) adds value to the 
entrepreneurial firm by resolving information asymmetries, a result later reiterated by 
studies that suggest that in an efficient market such investors are rewarded for this 
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value creation (Ippolito and Bertoni 2004), and by the results reported in chapter 5 
above. 
The value of this differential screening ability has been shown to act as a potential 
signal of VC investor quality, which may attract the more desirable entrepreneurs; 
high-quality entrepreneurs will seek out high-quality VC Investors (Kelly and Hay 2000; 
Berkovitch and Serban-Levy 2004). For example, one study found that entrepreneurs 
will pay a 10-15% price premium (in the form of reduced valuation) in order to be 
affiliated with VC investors of high reputational quality (Hsu 2004). More recently, 
investor experience in making successful investments in a particular industry has been 
shown to signal screening ability, and thereby act as an endorsement for firms with 
high uncertainties in the future prospects (Janney and Folta 2006). 
Collectively, these studies provide the basis for a rich set of potential selection criteria 
for further examination. This set can be somewhat simplified by aligning related 
definitions and concepts under a single construct. Examples of constructs having a 
multiplicity of operational measures in the existing literature include the services 
provided by a VC investor, the structure of a proposed investment deal, and the 
reputation of a VC investor. 
The modest extant research that examined the selection criteria used by 
entrepreneurs has assessed espoused importance only, a significant limitation. In-use 
criteria may turn out to be quite different than those espoused by the entrepreneurs. 
For example, research into the decision processes of VC investors has found that they 
are poor at introspection into their decision practices, and that their in-use criteria are 
different from the criteria they espouse (Zacharakis and Meyer 1998; Shepherd 1999). 
Such may also be the case with entrepreneurs, although it appears not to have been 
studied previously. Furthermore, it may be particularly likely with entrepreneurs, since 
entrepreneurs have been found to have high levels of overconfidence with regard to 
new ventures they found, particularly if possessed of voluminous data (Forbes 2005). 
Entrepreneurs engaged in marketing their firms and their detailed business plans to 
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VC investors may therefore be overconfident in their ability to introspect and determine 
their actual selection criteria (Zacharakis 2002; Forbes 2005). 
Research question 
Given the two-sided choice available in the market among entrepreneurs and VC 
investors, and the importance of an efficient matching process both to entrepreneurs 
and VC investors, an examination of the entrepreneurial side of the market is clearly 
overdue. Knowledge of the selection behaviours of entrepreneurs should be brought 
on par with the extent of knowledge of the selection behaviours of VC Investors. In 
particular, the current study of VC investment in early-stage markets was developed to 
examine the central questions: 
  How do entrepreneurs select their VC sources? 
  What criteria are considered? 
  What relative importance are these criteria given? 
  Is there correspondence been espoused and actual decision criteria? 
These questions are framed to allow for different types of entrepreneurs, who may 
place different importance on the various selection criteria, following Smith (1999), 
who, in the initial exploratory study on the topic, found differences with respect to the 
geographic region in which the entrepreneurial firm operates (Smith's study was 
limited to the USA), the industry in which the entrepreneurial firm operates, the level of 
experience the entrepreneur has in business generally and with VC investments 
specifically, and the age of the entrepreneur. 
The current study does not intend to explore entrepreneur choices for other types of 
investment (e. g., bank financing) or for later-stage firms, nor the decision rule that 
entrepreneurs use to evaluate the criteria data about potential VC Investments. As an 
initial position, it is assumed that the decision rule is some form of compensatory rule 
where poor scores on one criterion can be offset by very good scores on another. It 
doing so, entrepreneurs are making a trade-off in favour of decision-making 
optimization, and at the expense of decision-making simplicity and effort. Consumers 
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tend to make such a trade-off when the perceived costs of making suboptimal choice 
are high and the required information processing efforts are low (Wright 1975). The 
evidence provided by Smith, that entrepreneurs are willing to devote significant 
information processing efforts to the decision of selecting a capital provider, suggest 
that entrepreneurs do adopt such a compensatory optimizing decision rule (Smith 
1999). These situations are particularly amenable to analysis using conjoint 
techniques. 
Empirical Study 
This descriptive quantitative study was aimed at discovering the importance of various 
criteria in making the decision of which VC investor source to use, and at comparing 
espoused and in-use importance. 
Methodology 
Previous attempts to address the question "how do entrepreneurs choose their 
sources of VC financing" have either asked them directly, as with the Smith study 
(Smith 1999), or have indirectly inferred criteria from VC selection studies such as 
those summarized in table 3-3 above. Both of these approaches are somewhat 
unsatisfactory, in that the results have low discrimination (entrepreneurs may appear 
to have very many criteria, all of which are important to the decision process), the 
espoused importance might not match actual practice (entrepreneurs may say a 
particular criterion is important, but the criterion has low correlation with actual choices 
made), and the results ignore interaction effects and other trade-offs that occur with 
real-world attribute bundles (such as when the importance of criterion A depends on 
whether criterion B is below a particular threshold value). What is needed is a 
technique that identifies actual "in-use" criteria, measures their importance, and 
accounts for their simultaneous effects on real-world choices. This is the goal of 
conjoint analysis. 
Conjoint analysis is a research technique developed to identify and quantify the criteria 
used in making multidimensional judgements, such as when consumers select and 
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purchase a product that has several desirable attributes. It differs from other marketing 
research techniques in that it attempts to capture actual choice behaviours through 
simulated choice scenarios, and it captures preference information about several 
attributes simultaneously (potentially allowing for the identification of interaction 
effects). it works by presenting respondents with combinations of attributes that 
realistically mimic the kinds of products offered in the real-world marketplace. 
Respondents are then asked to evaluate these combinations, either by ranking them 
individually or by making choices among them. From this evaluation information, 
preferences and relatively utilities of the various attributes can be deduced (Luce and 
Tukey 1964; Green and Rao 1971; Curry 1996). As a research technique it therefore 
has the benefits of evaluating realistic bundles of attributes, requiring the consumers to 
make realistic tradeoffs among these attributes, and allowing the determination of 
relative attribute importance from real choices (rather than isolated rankings that are 
separated from the choice event). However, it assumes that consumers have sufficient 
accurate information about the attribute levels of offerings they are considering, and 
that they use a weighted additive (compensatory) function to determine the utility of 
each offering. 
Conjoint analysis has a long history of application in the domain of marketing 
research, for the purpose of uncovering and analyzing consumer preference 
information (Luce and Tukey 1964; Green and Rao 1971; Johnson 1974; Green and 
Srinivasan 1978; Louviere and Woodworth 1983). One reason is that, rather than 
providing rather abstract "utilities", conjoint analysis can provide concrete predictions 
of relative "market shares" of proposed combinations of attributes. This has significant 
practical application for marketing practitioners who are designing competitive product 
offerings. 
Conjoint analysis has been successfully applied in domains other than marketing 
(Bonner 1990; Hitt and Tyler 1991; Priem and Harrison 1994; Davis 1996a), but is a 
relatively new methodological approach for research into entrepreneurship. On a 
limited basis, this methodology has been applied to the study of decision-making by 
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venture capital investors, to improve the validity of prior research Into the relative 
importance of various investment criteria (Riquelme and Rickards 1992; Muzyka, 
Birley et al. 1996; Shepherd 1999a; Shepherd 1999b). 
Traditional conjoint analysis presents the respondent with profiles that contain values 
for all of the attributes under study. Respondents are asked to rank these profiles, 
often through implementation of some form of "card sort" exercise or series of pairwise 
choices. Compared with other approaches, this inclusion of all attributes has the 
benefit of more fully mimicking real-world evaluations. It also can be used with 
relatively small sample sizes. Factorial designs are often employed due to the many 
possible combinations of many attributes with many levels. However, for offerings that 
include very many attributes, the cognitive demands placed on respondents can be 
high, and can therefore lead respondents to adopt simplifying strategies that may 
introduce biases. One common heuristic developed in the domain of marketing 
studies recommends limiting this approach to situations with six or fewer choice 
attributes (Orme 2003). 
Adaptive conjoint analysis attempts to reduce the demands placed on respondents by 
presenting them with only a subset of possible attribute/level combinations. This 
subset is determined algorithmically (typically by a computer program), by asking the 
respondent to rank order levels within each attribute, and to rate the individual 
importance of attributes. Then the respondent is asked to select from a series of 
pairwise conjoint questions that show only a small number of attributes in each 
question. The selection of which attributes and levels to include in this questions Is 
designed to focus data collection on the attributes deemed most important by that 
respondent. This approach is very efficient in collecting much preference information 
in a short time, and for dealing with situations that involve very many attributes (as 
many as 30 have been suggested). However, this approach suffers from the 
independence of irrelevant alternatives property, in that importance may be biased 
upwards for any attributes that are not truly mutually independent (Johnson 2001). 
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Choice-based conjoint analysis extends traditional conjoint analysis by presenting 
respondents with a simultaneous choice among several competing offers with different 
attribute combinations. This is considered to be a choice task that better mimics real- 
world choices. Moreover, the data obtained can be easily pooled across respondents. 
This facilitates the estimation of interaction effects, which cannot be easily determined 
from other conjoint analysis approaches. However, it rests on an assumption of 
respondent homogeneity that should be validated (Chrzan and Orme 2000). 
Table 7-1 summarizes the relative merits of these three different approaches to 
conjoint analysis, as a guideline to choosing the approach to be adopted in any 
particular research study (Orme 2003). Based on this perspective, a traditional 
conjoint approach was adopted. 
Table 7.1: Capabilities of different conjoint approaches 
Traditional Adaptive Choice-based 
>6 attributes No Yes Yes 
Small sample size Yes Yes No 
Paper-based Yes No Yes 
The selected unit of analysis was individual entrepreneurs responsible for obtaining 
VC financing for their firms. Since the research question includes examining 
differences in how they choose versus how they espouse they make their choices, it 
did not matter whether the entrepreneurs ultimately completed a financing with capital 
suppliers, only that they had faced a choice of supplier to proceed with or to reject. 
The sample frame was simply that they apprehended a choice of financing sources 
from more than one competitive supplier (i. e., they would potentially have to walk 
away from somebody's money). 
Entrepreneurs from Canada, USA and UK were included in the sample frame. 
Potential participants were identified by referral from professional VC firms (such as 
members of the Canadian Venture Capital Association, National Venture Capital 
142 
Association, and British Venture Capital Association) and entrepreneurial associations 
(such as Entrepreneurs' Organization, United States Association for Small Business 
and Entrepreneurship, and Young Presidents Organization). Entrepreneurs were also 
identified by review of databases of recently completed VC Investment deals (e. g., 
www. vcreporter. com). Alternative recruitment and contact methods that were 
considered included advertisement in entrepreneurship magazines and reliance solely 
on direct targeted solicitations. Forming the list of potential entrepreneur respondents 
in the chosen manner offered certain advantages over these alternatives. Open 
advertisement, while possibly yielding a large number of potential respondents, would 
likely generate a higher proportion of unqualified respondents (having no experience in 
choosing VC investors), and thereby increase cost and administrative burden to obtain 
the same number of qualified respondents. Relying solely on direct solicitation, while 
minimizing responses from unqualified respondents, would have a greatly reduced 
scope and would lack the additional endorsement from the entrepreneurs 
professional association or from her current VC investor. On this basis, a combination 
of referred and direct contact was felt to offer an acceptable trade-off of reach, 
response rate, cost, and selection bias. 
The potential participants were contacted by email and invited to participate in the 
research by completing the interactive survey on a website. Alternative survey data 
collection methods that were considered included mailed paper-based surveys and 
self-contained software surveys on CD-ROM. Collecting respondent data In the 
chosen manner (interactive website) offered certain advantages over these 
alternatives. Paper-based surveys offer little advantage over web-based, and would 
be more costly to administer and would potentially appear more daunting to the 
respondent in the conjoint question section (leading to potentially lower response 
rates). Self-contained software would offer roughly equivalent benefit as web-based, 
but would add to the cost and potentially reduce the likelihood of obtaining a 
respondent in a particular VC firm in a case where the initially-contacted individual was 
inappropriate (that individual might be less likely to trouble themselves to forward a 
physical CD-ROM to their colleague than to simply forward an email with an 
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embedded link to a website). On this basis, web-based data collection was felt to offer 
an acceptable trade-off cost, administrative convenience, and response rate effects. 
A panel of experts was used to validate the content of the online instrument. This 
panel comprised two entrepreneurs with experience in obtaining venture capital 
investments and two venture capital investors. Their feedback was incorporated into 
the design of the survey instrument used in pilot testing. 
The instrument was tested by administering it to a pilot group of six entrepreneurs, 
whose feedback was used to further refine the instrument. These pilot participants 
were Canadian entrepreneurs with varying levels of experience in VC fund raising for 
their firms. All had previously faced choice scenarios among competitive VC Investors. 
It therefore appears that the pilot group is thus reasonably representative of the 
intended sample group for the purpose of instrument validation. 
Based on previous research and the results of these validation exercises, the following 
seven selection criteria were included: 
  Valuation 
  Terms and conditions 
  Value-added services 
  Reputation 
  Skill and independence 
  Overall personal compatibility 
  Ease of deal-making 
Participants were asked to rate the relative importance of each criterion on a 7-point 
scale (1 = not at all important, 7= very important). They were also asked to indicate 
any other criteria they use, but that were missing from the initial list of seven. These 
additional criteria are reported below, but were not included in the comparative 
analysis. 
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Respondents were then presented with a conjoint exercise that required them to 
evaluate bundles of criteria (attribute and level pairs that simulated potential financing 
offers) in the context of making a choice of a venture capital provider in a competitive 
situation. Each bundle contained the seven proposed selection criteria at different 
levels. Valuation occurred at three levels (33% higher than other VCs, same as other 
VCs, 33% lower than other VCs) and each of the other attributes occurred at two 
possible levels. The respondents were asked to imagine they were seeking venture 
capital for their firms, and to consider each bundle as a potential VC financing offer. 
They were asked to individually rate their likelihood of accepting each of these bundles 
on a 7-point Likert-type scale (1 = not at all likely, 7= very likely). This task was 
intended to simulate the choice of whether to accept similarly offered VC Investment 
deals in the real world. 
The orthogonal design of the conjoint bundles was achieved using Bretton-Clark 
Conjoint Designer software (version 3). From this, twelve bundles were defined as an 
orthogonal design set. One bundle, having the greatest number of attributes at the 
desirable level, was manually replaced with an optimum bundle having all seven 
attributes at the desirable level. This provided a validity-check mechanism, in that such 
a bundle should have the highest likelihood ratings for all participants. After making 
this substitution, the orthogonality of the conjoint was reconfirmed by inspection of the 
correlation matrix. No significant off-diagonal correlations were introduced by the 
substitution, indicating sufficient orthogonality in the design. 
The conjoint design of twelve bundles, each displaying seven attributes, was within the 
range that may be effectively evaluated by respondents examining full-profile bundles, 
rather than selective or adaptive bundles (where only a subset of criteria are shown In 
any given bundle) (Curry 1996; Chrzan and Orme 2000; Orme 2003). It also mitigates 
the risk of any attribute additivity threat to validity, in which a too large number of 
attributes with relatively minor importance can overwhelm the deduced Importance of 
a smaller number of extremely important attributes. 
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To help to reduce the risk of common rater consistency bias in these responses 
(where responses to the espoused-criteria questions may tend to act as anchors 
during the in-use conjoint simulations), a set of unrelated questions were Interposed 
between these two sections of the survey (Podsakoff, MacKenzie et at. 2003). These 
questions included estimates of items of general knowledge related to financing. 
These novel questions additionally served to reduce respondent fatigue and to thereby 
improve response rates (Yu and Cooper 1983; Podsakoff, MacKenzie et at. 2003). It Is 
expected that the cognitive shift induced by these questions has served to mitigate the 
potential for self-report and common rater bias (Podsakoff and Organ 1986; 
Podsakoff, MacKenzie et al. 2003). Conjoint bundles were also presented In random 
order to each participant to help mitigate potential common rater effects and item 
characteristic effects. 
As noted earlier, entrepreneurs frequently wish to use the expressions of interest of 
one VC investor to attempt to make a market for their firms. To prevent the formation 
of this competitive market, VC investors typically constrain entrepreneurs from doing 
so. They achieve this constraint by placing an expiry date on their financing offers 
("term sheets") and binding the entrepreneur to secrecy until after this expiry date. The 
effect of this practice is that entrepreneurs typically face "take it or leave it" decisions 
about an individual VC investment offer, without having the ability to make comparison 
to other possible investment offers from other VC investors. To replicate the "take it or 
leave it" staged nature of competition among VC investors, the respondents were 
asked to rate each proposed financing bundle individually in turn. They were not 
asked to make choices from among competing simultaneous offers. 
To assist with control and analysis of population subgroups, respondents were asked 
several demographic variables for their firms and their experience in raising venture 
capital financing: the lifecycle stage of the firm, sales and sales growth rate, number of 
completed VC rounds, total VC funds obtained, size of the most recent VC round, and 
whether they had ever been unsuccessful In obtaining venture capital. Respondent 
were also asked some personal demographic variables: their age and sex, amount of 
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business experience, self-assessed level of knowledge about VC financing, and the 
country and industry in which they have the most experience in raising VC financing. 
Analysis of results 
Two-hundred and seventy entrepreneurs were invited to participate in the research. 
Seventy-seven survey responses were obtained. Of the total responses, 18 were 
eliminated due to being materially incomplete or incorrectly completed, leaving 59 
responses and a final response rate of 22%. Of these responses, six were partially 
incomplete but usable 13. Respondents included entrepreneurs from a range of 
industries, firm sizes, growth rates, and firm age. All respondents were experienced in 
obtaining VC financing. Table 7-2 summarizes the firm characteristics of the sample. 
The entrepreneurs also exhibited a range of personal background and familiarity with 
VC financing. Table 7-3 summarizes characteristics of the respondent entrepreneurs. 
Table 7-2: Firm characteristics 
Lit ie stage 
Seed 34.0% 
Launch 35.8% 
Rapid growth 26.4% 
Expansion 3.8% 
Maturi 0.0% 
Sales revenues 
Less than $1 M 62.3% 
$1-10M 30.2% 
More than $1 OM 7.50 
Sales growth rate 
Less than 20% CAGR 35.8% 
- 20 -100% 
CAGR 37.7% 
More than 100% CAGR 26.4% 
N=53 
Table 7-3: Entrepreneur characteristics 
Age 
Younger than 20 0.0% 
20 - 29 15.1% 
30 - 39 17.0% 
40 - 49 43.4% 
50 or older 24.5% 
Sex 
Male 92.5% 
Female 7.5% 
Years of business e rience 
13 They provided espoused importance data, but not conjoint or demographic data 
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Less than 5 years 7.5% 
5 -10 years 15.1% 
More than 10 years 77.4% 
VC knowied eself-assessed 
Novice 5.7% 
Avera e 28.3% 
More than average 54.7% 
Expert 11.3% 
Country of VC e rience 
Canada 73.6% 
USA 22.6% 
UK 0.0% 
Other 3.8% 
Industry of VC experience 
Biotechlife sciences 11.3%, 
Information tecMelecom 67.9% 
Other technology 11.3% 
Manufacturin 3.8% 
Distribution 0.0% 
Retail 0.0% 
Services 1.9% 
Other non-tech 3.8% 
Total VC rounds 
None 11.3% 
One 32.1% 
Two or three 18.9% 
More than three 37.7% 
Total VC fundin 
Less than $1 M 26.4% 
$1-10M 47.2% 
More than $1 OM 26.4% 
Completed round within previous 12 months 
Yes 34.0% 
No 66.0% 
Size of most recent round 
Less than $1 M 45.3% 
$1-10M 47.2% 
More than $1 OM 7.5% 
Had ever failed to obtain VC fundin 
Yes 71.7%a 
No 28.3% 
N=53 
The substitution of an optimum bundle provided an additional validity check. For all but 
two respondents this bundle received the highest desirability ranking, suggesting little 
overall risk of item characteristic bias14. The two respondents who did not rate the 
optimum bundle highest rated it second highest, suggesting an interpretation 
dependent on exogenous factors, such as correlation of errors. 
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With respect to espoused importance of the seven criteria tested, modest levels of 
discrimination were found among the criteria. Entrepreneurs rate personal 
compatibility higher than other criteria (6.24 vs. 5.44 mean rating), and are more 
uniform in this rating (S. D. 0.95 vs. 1.41). They rate value-added services lower than 
other criteria (4.88 mean rating), but are less uniform in this rating (S. D. 1.68). Table 7- 
4 summarizes the espoused importance, as well as t tests for discrimination among 
these criteria. Overall, these results suggest that entrepreneurs generally value all of 
these criteria in making their choices. In addition to the seven criteria tested, some 
participants also suggested other criteria they considered important. Of 59 
respondents, 19 suggested additional criteria as important. Table 7-5 summarizes 
these additional suggestions. 
Table 7.4: Espoused Importance 
Criterion Mean S. D. ! -stistio 
personal cony tibif 6.24 0.95 . 4.838~" 
Terms and conditions 5.95 1.02 -3 042N 
Valuation 5.44 1.16 -0.014 
Ease of deal-making 5.32 1.44 0.685 
Skill and Independence 5.15 1.52 1.688 
Re ton 5.08 1.44 2.093" 
Value-added services 4.88 1.68 3.324"' 
Group Mean 5.44 
N= 59, Scale: 1= not at all important, 7= very important 
f-test for deviation of selected criterion from group mean 
' significant at p= . 05 
level 
significant at p =. 01 level 
""' significant at p= . 001 level 
" Such bias might include effects of the order In Mich scenarios are presented. 
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Table 7-5: Additional suggested criteria 
  Ability to provide follow-on investment (7 mentions) 
  Deep, relevant industry expertise (3 mentions) 
  Shared vision, common objectives (3 mentions) 
  Source of capital (i. e., who is investing in their fund) 
  Transaction costs (e. g., due diligence expenses) 
  Size of current investment round 
  References from other entrepreneurs 
  Commitment 
  Integrity 
  Tolerance of risk 
  Degree of managerial involvement 
Data obtained from the conjoint simulations were analyzed using Bretton-Clark 
Conjoint Analyzer software (version 3). Table 7-6 presents the deduced conjoint 
importance for the seven criteria tested. These importance figures indicate the relative 
weighting that entrepreneurs gave to each criterion, when presented with a proposed 
financing bundle. These results show marked importance given to valuation and 
personal compatibility, and relatively little importance given to skill and independence, 
and to value-added services. 
Table 7.6: Conjoint importance 
Criterion Importance S. E. 
Valuation 28.04 1.51 
Personal compatibility 20.87 1.39 
Terms and conditions 13.78 1.37 
Ease of deal-makin 10.91 1.00 
Re lion 10.71 1.24 
Skill and Independence 8.13 0.84 
Value-added services 7.56 0.75 
N= 53, average adj. R2 = 0.755 
Comparing these results to the previously presented espoused results yields some 
interesting insights. Table 7-7 shows the comparison between normalised importance 
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obtained by the two research methods; these are graphically represented in figure 7.1. 
This comparison further highlights the substantial difference in importance afforded to 
valuation and to personal compatibility; the conjoint results show these criteria to be 
markedly more important than other criteria, an insight that was not seen with the 
espoused results. It also demonstrates a relative decline in all other criteria. 
Table 7-7: Comparison of Importance 
Criterion Espoused 11659 Con oint N=53 Beta" 
Valuation 0.143 0.280 <0.001 
Terms and conditions 0.156 0.138 <0,001 
Value-added seMces 0.128 0.076 ý0,00t 
Re ton 0.132 0.107 <0.001 
Skill and independence 0.135 0.081 <0.001 
personal compatibility 0.164 0.209 <0.001 
Ease of deal-making 0.140 0.109 <0.001 
Importance values have been normalized to total 1.0 within each column. 
Figure 7-1: Relative importance 
0.3 
0.25 
0.2 
0.15 
0 Espoused 
  Conjoint 
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0 
Vain T&C Secs Rep Skill Pers Deal 
For ease of reference, variable names and descriptions are summarized in appendix 1. 
To test the specific hypothesis for between-group differences, the data obtained were 
analyzed using SPSS software (version 12.0). Anova analyses18 were performed to 
's Beta was determined using the online calculator provided by the UCLA Department of Statistics, at 
httpv/caiculators. statucia. edu/powercalct which is based on Mace, A. E. (1974). Saurote-size determination. 
Huntington NY, Robert E. Krieger Publishing Company. 
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test for differences in espoused criteria importance for a range of demographic 
subgroups. Table 7-8 summarizes these results. In practice, slow-growing firms place 
less importance on valuation than do other firms. The reputation of the VC investors 
matters more to IT and telecom firm than to other firms. Reputation also matters more 
to entrepreneurs with greater than average knowledge of VC financing, presumably 
indicating that increased experience with VC investors leads entrepreneurs to give 
greater consideration to the reputation of potential future investors. 
Table 7-8: Espoused differences between subgroups 
Criterion 
-subgroup Displaying Difference (size) Members Non-members 
Valuation 
Revenue growth < 20% rear 19 4.84 5.74'" 
Re "bon 
Indust = IT telecom (36) 5.44 429'" 
VC Knowled e= More than average (29) 5.48 4.58" 
personal compatibility 
VC Knowledge = Average (15) 5.53 6.42'" 
Deal ease & speed 
VC Knowledge = More than average (29) 5.55 4.75' 
N= 59, Scale: 1= not at all important, 7- very important 
* significant at p= . 05 level 
`" significant at p= . 01 level 
Discussion 
Consistent with Smith (1999), the espoused results and the suggested additional 
criteria indicate that the capital-sourcing decision is a complex one in which 
entrepreneurs attempt to assess and integrate information about many criteria. They 
believe it is important to consider a breadth of information and devote time and energy 
to obtaining such information. 
The conjoint methodology provides a novel perspective on the actual utilization and 
importance of this information. Comparing conjoint results to the espoused results 
yields some interesting discrepancies. First, the existence of several significant 
differences in the importance derived from espoused and conjoint methods suggests 
that entrepreneurs may be poor at introspection into their capital-sourcing decisions. 
1° Again using the SPSS adjustment to account for differences in group sizes, and with the corresponding 
caveats with respect to interpretation of observed differences. 
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As with many compensatory consumer decisions, entrepreneurs like to believe that 
they consider many criteria of relatively equal weight. But in practice, a few criteria 
tend to dominate their decision making, and in ways that are not readily apparent to 
the decision makers. 
Regarding the importance of individual criteria, the conjoint analysis reveals that in the 
simulated choice scenarios the entrepreneurs placed significantly higher importance 
upon valuation and a higher importance upon personal compatibility. Espoused views 
notwithstanding, it appears that entrepreneurs seeking financing are primarily price- 
shoppers. The significant difference in the importance of valuation, as derived by the 
two different methodologies, may be indicative of a substantial social desirability bias 
inherent in previous research using solely espoused measures. Entrepreneurs may 
not want to admit to others, or even to themselves, the extent to which questions of 
price dominate their capital sourcing decisions. The importance of valuation may be 
driven by several possible objectives on the part of entrepreneurs, including 
maximization of personal wealth (e. g., maximizing their retained equity share of the 
firm), the signalling value that obtaining a high valuation may have with other 
audiences of the entrepreneur (e. g., social prestige associated with having created 
something that is valued highly by others), and fears of loss of voting control over their 
firms (i. e., being diluted to below 50% ownership). 
The other criterion of notably high conjoint importance is personal compatibility. It 
appears that, in practice, entrepreneurs place high value on the quality of the 
relationship with their VC investor. Given their caution with respect to accepting 
external advice, this is understandable. It is likely that they view this relationship quality 
as a moderator of all other benefits that flow from the VC, such as value-added 
services for the present and follow-on investment for the future. 
The conjoint analysis also reveals that entrepreneurs place low Importance upon 
value-added services, and upon the skill and independence of prospective VC 
investors. This suggests that, in addition to being price shoppers, entrepreneurs are 
not looking for "smart money" - financial capital from an Investor capable of providing 
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a range of additional services to help the business thrive. Instead, they are simply 
seeking money at a good price, from someone they can work with. This may be 
indicating that entrepreneurs do not value these services very much, or that they are 
suspicious of what the VC investor Is likely to charge for providing these services (e. g., 
in terms of reduced valuations). 
The low importance given to skill and independence of the investor is somewhat 
surprising, as these behaviours on the part of VC investors has earlier been 
suggested as potential signals of VC investor quality, which should attract high-quality 
entrepreneurs and repel low-quality entrepreneurs. Venture capital investors 
displaying these attributes are better able to make accurate valuations of 
entrepreneurial businesses and therefore offer higher valuations for the best 
entrepreneurs. Yet the present results suggest that entrepreneurs in general place 
little importance on these signals. This may be due to a presumption on the part of 
high-quality entrepreneurs that such skills have already been factored into the initially 
offered valuations. Or, for a more typical entrepreneur, this may reflect their 
expectation that such skills will not translate into better valuations for their firms. 
The Anova comparisons of population subgroups suggest that capital-sourcing 
decision processes are not uniform for all entrepreneurs. Significant differences 
appear for subgroups. The espoused importance of valuation was found to be 
uniformly lower than conjoint importance, and appears particularly for companies with 
small growth rates. For these firms with low growth rates, this lower Importance may 
simply be reflecting more modest expectations of valuation by the entrepreneurs. 
The espoused importance of the VC's reputation was found to be particularly higher 
for the information technology and telecommunication industry and for entrepreneurs 
with self-assessed "above average" levels of VC financing expertise. This marked 
difference in the importance of reputation to entrepreneurs in the Information 
technology industry may be a lingering effect of the dot-com boom and bust of 1999- 
2001, during which inexperienced or opportunistic VC Investors preyed on firms In this 
industry to exploit unsustainable market conditions (Valliere and Peterson 2004). 
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The espoused importance of personal compatibility was found to be lower for 
entrepreneurs with self-assessed "average" levels of VC financing expertise, 
suggesting a u-shaped relationship. Novice entrepreneurs with little or no VC financing 
experience may rate personal compatibility more highly because they believe it may 
influence their chance of obtaining financing. On the other hand, entrepreneurs with 
greater than average VC financing experience may also rate personal compatibility 
more highly, but for different reasons. In their case, it is possible that prior experience 
with VC investors has taught them the practical importance of having and maintaining 
strong personal relationships with their investors. Given the herd behaviour espoused 
by the VC investors in chapter 6, this is may be a productive strategy for 
entrepreneurs. These combined influences may result in the appearance of 
entrepreneurs with moderate levels of VC financing experience placing relatively less 
importance upon personal compatibility. 
The espoused importance of deal-making ease and speed was found to be higher for 
entrepreneurs with self-assessed "above average" levels of VC financing expertise. 
These entrepreneurs may also have learned from prior experience that the VC 
financing process can be long and arduous. 
Limitations 
This study is subject to some limitations to overall validity. With respect to the sample 
of entrepreneurs, and despite efforts to enrol entrepreneurs from a wide range of 
businesses and with a wide range of experience, the sample is ultimately self-selected 
from the population that fell within the sample frame. As a result, extreme views may 
be overrepresented. The emulation of the "take it or leave it" decision process, as 
implemented in the conjoint survey instrument, may serve to reduce this bias 
somewhat. However, to the extent that the self-selection of respondents may have 
yielded a bi-modal "interest" bias, this can be desirable for research of an exploratory 
nature such as this. 
The sample frame also excluded entrepreneurs (both successful and not) who have 
deliberately avoided venture capital financial sources as part of their financing 
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strategies. And the study design did not assess the desirability of the respondent 
entrepreneurs, from the perspective of potential VC Investors. As such, it did not 
investigate whether the obtained results are specifically applicable to the most 
desirable entrepreneurs. 
The responses for espoused and conjoint criteria may also be vulnerable to some 
degree of self-report bias. Although attempts have been made to minimise this threat 
to validity, the obtained data have not been triangulated through multi-trait, multi- 
method approaches. Moreover, the conjoint research technique, while providing much 
improved insight into actual capital buying decisions of entrepreneurs compared to 
previous research methodologies, is still limited as a measure of intent rather than 
actual behaviour. In particular, it is likely that entrepreneurs completing the conjoint 
survey spent less time evaluating the cards than they would a real financing offer, and 
therefore may have employed a different simplification rule that they would in practice. 
The conjoint results should therefore be corroborated against measures of real 
financing deals completed by entrepreneurs. 
Overall, the statistical power of this dataset appears good, as illustrated by the ß 
values reported in table 7-6. Power exceeds 0.99 for all of the multi-method 
differences among the examined criteria. This provides substantial assurance that the 
conjoint methodology has identified all material differences in importance that exist in 
this dataset. The high power of the dataset may also help to mitigate any concerns 
about potential non-response bias in the self-selected set of participants. 
This study was an extension to Smith's work (1999) and not a replication, and as such 
did not attempt to investigate and confirm certain of his previous findings, such as the 
breadth of information sources that entrepreneurs draw on in making financial 
sourcing decisions, and the possible effects of entrepreneurial experience and 
learning on the relative importance of espoused decision criteria. 
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Conclusions 
This study has found that entrepreneurs are poor in their understanding of their own 
capital-sourcing decision processes; the criteria they actually use to make capital- 
source decisions are not what they espouse to use. An observed lack of discrimination 
among the espoused importance results, along with the breadth of suggested 
additional criteria, suggests that the capital-sourcing decision is a complex one In 
which entrepreneurs believe that they assess and integrate information about many 
criteria. And they believe it is important to consider a wide range of information and 
devote significant time and energy to obtaining and processing this information. 
But the results of the conjoint simulation research tell a different story. When faced 
with hypothetical financing choices of only seven criteria, and at only two or three 
levels for each criterion, entrepreneurs appear to already be making substantial 
simplifications in order to reduce the decision complexity. In practice, they simplify the 
decision to be substantively driven by valuation, with an additional consideration of 
personal compatibility. Other criteria that were of high espoused importance, such as 
ease of deal-making or VC skill level, became only minor considerations in practice. 
And, in particular, the signalling efforts of some VC investors, identified in chapters 4 
and 5, do not seem to be resonating with entrepreneurs when then make their capital 
sourcing decisions. 
Furthermore, differences among the reported espoused importances were also 
observed among various entrepreneurial subgroups. These subgroup differences 
stand in contrast to those found in Smith's initial study of entrepreneurial finance 
criteria (Smith 1999). That earlier study found that the industry affected the importance 
of some criteria. Biotech, information technology, and retail all rated value-added 
services higher. Biotech also rated reputation higher. But these results were not 
confirmed here. In the present study industry effects for the importance of value-added 
services were seen only for the services industry. And industry effects for reputation 
were observed for information technology and other high-tech industries, but not for 
biotech. Smith's earlier study also found that the entrepreneurs degree of business 
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experience affected the importance of some criteria. More-experienced entrepreneurs 
rated value-added services and reputation much lower than they were rated by other 
less-experienced entrepreneurs. These results were also not confirmed in the present 
study; no significant differences in importance were observed for experience-based 
subgroups. Finally, this study did not find support for Smith's conclusion that age 
matters but sex does not. Smith found no difference between male and female 
entrepreneurs, but did find that younger entrepreneurs place more importance on 
value-added services, while older entrepreneurs place more importance on reputation. 
The present study had opposite results, finding significant differences between male 
and female entrepreneurs regarding terms and conditions, but finding no significant 
differences due to age of the entrepreneur. 
Overall, the results suggest that attempts to understand how entrepreneurs make their 
capital sourcing decisions must be wary of the potential biases inherent in espoused 
approaches. Entrepreneurs do not choose according to how they say they choose. 
This study has found marked differences that are consistent with social desirability 
bias - entrepreneurs claim to choose based on a wide range of equally important 
criteria. But in practice, they decide based primarily on valuation and personal 
compatibility with the VC. Whether their espousals represent an attempt to look good 
to others, or a genuine lack of accurate introspection, remains a question for 
subsequent research. 
These results may have practical value for VC investors trying to more successfully 
attract desirable entrepreneurs and improve their dealf low. The espoused Importance 
results may give some perspective on factors to be considered In the Initial stages of 
evaluation - investor attributes that can initially interest and attract an entrepreneur. 
But the conjoint importance results give the insight on what really matters as 
negotiations progress - the entrepreneur's decision to accept or reject a term sheet 
will depend mostly on valuation and the quality of the personal relationship between 
the entrepreneur and the VC. Other factors will likely pale in importance. 
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These results may also have practical value for entrepreneurs seeking financing. The 
discrepancies identified in this multi-method study should alert entrepreneurs to the 
potential for inaccurate introspection, and enable them to make explicit adjustments in 
their decision processes so as to achieve the criteria weightings they consciously 
desire. 
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Each of the individual research studies reported in the earlier chapters has found 
results germane to the scope of research questions underlying this thesis. However, 
synthesis of the collective findings may help to shed additional light and provide a 
more comprehensive perspective. 
Discussion of Chapter 4 Results 
The research reported in chapter 4 aimed to examine heterogeneity of VC investors 
with respect to their beliefs and responses to high information asymmetries. In 
particular it examined the role that differential screening abilities might play in any 
observed differences in early-stage investing. Most important of the findings from this 
research, therefore, is that there is a positive correlation between the screening 
abilities of VC investors and their willingness to invest in markets with high information 
asymmetries. Venture capital investors do differ in their screening abilities, and these 
differences are important determinants of their behaviour in markets characterized by 
high information asymmetries. For example, some VC investors exploit their high 
screening abilities by operating in markets where the information asymmetries are so 
high that other, less-skilled investors cannot operate. This creates a competitive 
advantage for the good screeners. These good screeners are also more likely that 
- other investors to operate independently; they participate in syndicates less often, and 
they are more willing to invest in companies that had been rejected by other investors. 
Although these investors with high screening abilities might also be better able to 
therefore invest in foreign markets, it appears they do not do so. They, like other VC 
investors, prefer to invest close to home. 
An exploratory principal components analysis of the data revealed the existence of five 
factors that together explain almost 77% of the variance in the data. These factors 
comprise the general level of experience for the investor, the willingness to invest in 
asymmetric markets, the effort to broaden the investor's relevant knowledge base, the 
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level of VC-specific experience of the investor, and the propensity to lead syndicates. 
These factors form an initial basis for an emergent typology of VC investors. 
Discussion of Chapter 5 and 6 Results 
VC investors are not homogenous in their beliefs about how to demonstrate screening 
skill and about the potential reasons for investing in early-stage markets. The research 
of chapters 5 and 6 aimed to explore these differences and the potential signalling 
value of early-stage investment behaviour. Results of this research indicate that VC 
investors differ in their beliefs whether screening skill can be demonstrated by 
investing in early-stage markets, investing in companies overlooked or rejected by 
other VC investors, or leading syndicates. Some VC investors clearly believe such 
independent investing behaviours are valuable signals of screening skill, which can 
communicate information to their stakeholders. But this is not a universal belief among 
VC investors. Similarly, VC investors differ in their belief that screening skill can be 
demonstrated by earning high returns on their investment portfolio. These beliefs are 
highly correlated with the belief that early-stage investing is about building and 
maintaining key relationships. Among VC investors who actually invest in early-stage 
markets, there is greater belief in the importance of doing so to build relationships with 
stakeholders, and less in doing so to avoid competition or to earn high returns. This 
result further supports the suggestion that good screeners are investing in early-stage 
markets as a signal of their skill, to attract good entrepreneurs, professional peers, and 
principal investors. 
VC investors also differ in their belief that screening skill is closely associated with the 
ability to pick winners, and thereby to exhibit a greater proportion of successful 
companies in the portfolio. Venture capital investors who believe this may choose to 
signal their screening quality through the proportion of successful investments in their 
portfolios, rather than the overall portfolio return on investment. 
An exploratory principal components analysis of the data revealed the existence of 
three factors that together explain over 63% of the variance in the data. These factors 
comprise the belief that early-stage investing demonstrates skill to stakeholders and 
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thereby influences dealflow quality, the degree of independence of investor actions 
(including investing in deals with high information asymmetries), and the belief that skill 
can be demonstrated by picking winners in these asymmetric markets. 
These observed differences reflect the potential formation of multiple market equilibria, 
one of which incorporates the cost of signalling - the cost of generating, transmitting, 
recognizing, receiving, and interpreting the information content of the signals. In this 
equilibrium, prices have incorporated these costs to the participants and the respective 
benefits of the information transfer. 
The potential for multiple equilibria and the related potential for polychotomous or 
multidimensional measures of participant quality further complicate the available 
signalling regime. In the simplest case, it creates the potential for countersignalling by 
participants of the highest quality. In the case of VC investors, this may confound the 
signalling value of participation (or not) in early-stage Investment markets. Non- 
participation in this market can have several interpretations: the non-participating VC 
investor may simply be too unskilled in screening (they would lose money in early- 
stage markets), or the investor may be sufficiently skilled but pursuing later-stage 
investments at higher expected profits (they could operate in early-stage markets, but 
choose not to), or the investor may be very highly skilled but keeping their participation 
private to countersignal and differentiate themselves from more moderately skilled 
investors (they are very confident in their abilities to operate In any market, and see no 
need to specifically demonstrate their early-stage abilities). 
The qualitative extension of chapter 6 confirmed many of the findings of the 
quantitative study in chapter 5. The interview respondents supported the fundamental 
hypothesis that good screeners would be more willing and able to participate in early- 
stage markets. They agreed that demonstrating skill in early-stage markets should 
have the effect of improving dealf low, by signalling to good entrepreneurs that they are 
desirable investors and signalling to bad entrepreneurs that this fact will be uncovered 
by them. They further supported the importance of broad business experience, and of 
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using success in early-stage markets to build and maintain relationships with 
stakeholders. 
The qualitative research also suggested that the belief in the importance of signalling 
skill (by investing in early-stage markets) is strongest among newcomer VC investors. 
This raises a question regarding the direction of any potential causality, which has not 
been addressed by the present studies: do skilled screeners remain in early-stage 
markets where they have a competitive advantage, or do they stay there only long 
enough to create a signal of their skill and then move to later-stage markets to exploit 
the value of the skill in a less asymmetric market? 
Finally, the qualitative study highlighted the potential importance of a number of non- 
rational, non-economic, or emotional factors in the decision of whether a VC Investor 
will operate in early-stage markets. 
Synthesis of VC Results 
An integrated view of the heterogeneity of VC investors and their resulting range of 
approaches to managing the information asymmetries in early-stage markets can be 
obtained by synthesizing the perspectives of chapters 4 and S. A first stage of this 
integration can be achieved by examining the combined set of descriptive factors that 
have been determined. The trimmed set of five factors obtained in chapter 4 reflects a 
range of behaviours and attributes that characterize different types of VC investors. 
And the trimmed set of three factors obtained in chapter 5 reflects a corresponding 
range of beliefs and strategies they adopt with respect to early-stage investing. The 
correlations among these factors, shown in table 8-1, provide an initial integrated view 
of these investors. 
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Table 8.1: Correlation of VC factors 
relation Inde ickwin enex As m broad vcoxp load 
relation Pearson 1 Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
indep Pearson 
. 602** 602'" 1 Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 001 
pickwin Pearson 
. 014 -. 059 1 Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 943 . 761 
genexp Pearson 
. 080 -. 054 . 072 1 Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 680 . 782 . 709 
asym Pearson 
Correlation -. 200 -. 109 . 118 -. 147 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 299 . 573 . 543 . 448 
broad Pearson 
Correlation . 027 . 050 -. 299 -. 103 -. 526" 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) . 891 . 796 . 115 . 594 . 003 
vcexp Pearson 
Correlation . 100 -. 
045 -. 082 . 369* . 318 -. 249 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 607 . 817 . 672 . 049 . 093 . 194 
lead Pearson 
Correlation -. 
226 -. 179 . 009 -. 114 . 246 -. 432" . 273 
Sig. (2-tailed) . 238 . 354 . 965 . 555 . 198 . 019 . 152 
" Correlation is signmcant at the u. ui ievei t<-caned). 
" Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
For ease of reference, variable names and descriptions are summarized in appendix 1. 
Bringing together the results of these three research efforts leads to a number of 
general findings about VC investors: 
1) There is a high positive correlation between the belief that early-stage investing is 
a good way of building and maintaining the key stakeholder relationships that 
provide high-quality dealfiow, and the belief that this early-stage Investing Is an 
effective way of demonstrating skill, particularly when leading the investments or 
when investing in companies that have been overlooked by other investors. 
Investors who curry dealflow from stakeholders do so by demonstrating that they 
achieve results with the deals they receive, and may conversely believe that if 
they do not demonstrate such results then their sources of dealt low might dry up. 
2) There is a high negative correlation between the willingness to invest in markets 
of high information asymmetries (such as startups and firms with novel business 
models), and the efforts taken to broaden knowledge by involving others into a 
syndicate of investors. This supports the interpretation that the early-stage 
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markets are especially suited for VC investors with deep industry knowledge, who 
can invest without relying on the knowledge and expertise of others. 
3) There is an additional negative correlation between these efforts to broaden 
knowledge, and the willingness of the Investor to lead the syndicates that result. 
This suggests that investors form syndicates partly to access and benefit from 
necessary expertise of others. Investors who feel sufficiently confident to lead the 
syndicate are less likely to see this as a benefit, and therefore less likely to seek 
out a syndicate (although there are other reasons for forming syndicates, as 
discussed earlier). 
4) There is a moderate positive correlation between general business experience 
and the specific VC investor experience level, which suggests that this broad 
business experience benefits their ability to perform as VC investors. Specifically, 
it makes them better able to assess the management capabilities of prospective 
entrepreneurs. 
Of interest to note is the lack of significant correlations between the behavioural factors 
of chapter 4 and the belief factors of chapter 5. This suggests that the behavioural and 
experiential attributes alone will have little power in predicting the beliefs that a 
particular VC investor will hold regarding rationales for early-stage investing. Therefore 
a broader typology is required. 
proposed VC typology 
The synthesis of results from the two quantitative studies of chapters 4 and 5, and the 
qualitative insights of chapter 6 support a typology of VC investors, based on their 
beliefs and behaviours regarding investing in early-stage markets. This typology 
reveals four categories of VC investors, characterized by heterogeneous beliefs and 
actions. 
Confident Leaders are those VC investors who are highly skilled and experienced, 
and use this background to act with great independence and confidence in markets 
with high information asymmetries. They are characterized by. 
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  Higher tolerance for investing asymmetric markets, higher propensity to lead 
whatever syndicates they belong to, greater VC investment experience, stronger 
belief that early investing provides a means of avoiding competition. 
  Making fewer efforts to broaden their knowledge base by involving others (e. g., 
less likely to form syndicates). 
  Able to invest in early-stage markets, since they are recognized as good 
screeners. 
  If they exploit this ability to invest in early-stage markets, they are likely doing so to 
exploit their screening skill and thereby avoid competition, or to secure rights to 
follow-on investments, or to signal their quality to various stakeholders (and 
thereby to get funding or improve the quality of their dealf low). 
Cautious but Experienced are those VC investors who are skilled and experienced, 
but do not use this background to operate in markets with high information 
asymmetries, preferring instead to operate in less risky markets. They are 
characterized by. 
  Greater industry experience and more post-secondary education. 
  Lower tolerance for investing in asymmetric markets. 
  More likely to invest in overlooked companies (i. e., companies that were 
previously rejected by other VC investors), a form of information asymmetry that 
their greater industry experience may mitigate. 
  Less likely to participate in syndicates. 
  Able to invest in early-stage markets, since they are good screeners (due to their 
greater industry experience), yet they are unlikely to do so. 
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Cautious Novices are those VC investors who have little experience or proven skills, 
and therefore act cautiously and avoid markets with high information asymmetries 
where possible. They are characterized by. 
  Making greater efforts to broaden their narrow knowledge base by Involving 
others (e. g., participating in syndicates). 
  Less VC investment experience, less industry experience and post-secondary 
education, lower tolerance for investing in asymmetric markets, weaker beliefs 
that early investing is a means of avoiding competition. 
  If they invest in early-stage markets, then they are there only as a signal (e. g., 
trying to -prove themselves to their various stakeholders). They will likely move 
upmarket as soon as they gain more experience and reputation. 
Followers are those VC investors who do not exhibit high screening skills, and 
therefore rely extensively on other VC investors to manage the risks of information 
asymmetries. They are characterized by. 
  Lower propensity for syndicate leadership. 
  Unlikely to invest in early-stage markets, since they are not particularly good 
screeners. 
Discussion of Chapter 7 Results 
it appears that entrepreneurs may not be fully aware of how they select their VC 
investors, and therefore what role may be played by the various signalling 
mechanisms that VC investors may choose to adopt. The difference in results 
reported for espoused importance and conjoint importance mirrors the findings of 
earlier research on VC investors. First, espoused criteria do not match actual In-use 
criteria, suggesting that entrepreneurs are equally poor at introspecting into their own 
decision processes as are their VC investor counterparts. Secondly, the promising line 
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of attribute-based decision research developed for the VC Investor side of the market 
might be similarly developed for the entrepreneur side of the market. 
The capital-sourcing decision is a complex one in which entrepreneurs desire to 
assess and integrate information about many criteria. As with many compensatory 
consumer decisions, entrepreneurs like to believe that they consider many criteria of 
relatively equal weight. Based on the espoused importance reported by 
entrepreneurs, it appears that they attempt to utilize a form of compensatory decision 
rule in which criteria are weighted equally (AVG. ), although espoused importance of 
valuation was particularly lower for entrepreneurs with self-assessed "expert" level of 
knowledge about VC financing. For these "expert" entrepreneurs, this lower 
importance may indicate recognition of the relatively increased importance of the other 
criteria, gained through practical experience with previous VC investment deals. 
But in practice, a few criteria tend to dominate their decision making, and In ways that 
are not readily apparent to the entrepreneur decision-makers themselves. Espoused 
views notwithstanding, it appears that entrepreneurs seeking financing are primarily 
price-shoppers. Secondarily they seek VC investors with whom they have good 
personal compatibility. It is likely that they view this relationship quality as a moderator 
of all other benefits that flow from the VC, such as value-added services for the 
present and follow-on investment for the future. 
The conjoint analysis also reveals that entrepreneurs place low importance upon 
value-added services, and upon the skill and independence of prospective VC 
investors. This suggests that, in addition to being price shoppers, entrepreneurs are 
not much looking for "smart money", despite apparent efforts by VC investors to 
market themselves this way, and despite efforts by professionals who advise 
entrepreneurs to seek funding that is augmented extensively with value-added 
services. Instead, entrepreneurs are simply seeking money at a good price, from 
someone they can work with effectively. 
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These results may have practical value for VC Investors trying to more successfully 
attract desirable entrepreneurs and improve their dealflow. The espoused Importance 
results may give some perspective on factors to be considered in the Initial stages of 
evaluation - investor attributes that can initially Interest and attract an entrepreneur. 
But the conjoint importance results give the insight on what really matters as 
negotiations progress - the entrepreneur's decision to accept or reject a term sheet 
will depend mostly on valuation and the quality of the personal relationship between 
the entrepreneur and the VC. Other factors will likely pale in importance. 
These results may also have practical value for entrepreneurs seeking financing, and 
for VC investors seeking to provide finance. The discrepancies identified in this multi. 
method study should alert entrepreneurs to the potential for inaccurate introspection, 
and enable them to make explicit adjustments in their decision processes so as to 
achieve the criteria weightings they consciously desire. 
Synthesis of Perspectives 
The use of conjoint methods to uncover in-use decision criteria by entrepreneurs 
provides a novel perspective on the potential risk of adverse selection due to VC 
investor screening behaviours. Since the speed and ease of deal-making have been 
found to be less important to entrepreneurs, they can be assumed to contribute little to 
adverse selection risk. Conversely, personal compatibility has been found to be very 
important to entrepreneurs, and can there be assumed to play a large role in the risk 
of adverse selection during the screening process. 
The low importance given to skill and independence of the investor Is somewhat 
surprising, as these behaviours, being potential signals of VC Investor quality, should 
attract high-quality entrepreneurs and repel low-quality entrepreneurs. They should 
matter to entrepreneurs. Venture capital investors displaying these attributes are better 
able to make accurate valuations of entrepreneurial businesses and therefore offer 
higher valuations for the best entrepreneurs. Yet the present results suggest that 
entrepreneurs in general place little importance on these signals. There are many 
possible reasons for this. The signal may be unnoticed or unrecognized by 
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entrepreneurs. Or it may be considered to be too noisy to have much value. Or it may 
be due to a presumption on the part of high-quality entrepreneurs that such skills have 
already been factored into the initially offered valuations. Or, for a more typical 
entrepreneur, this may reflect their expectation that such skills will not translate Into 
better valuations for their firms. Finally, it may be that entrepreneurs are overconfident 
in their ability to negotiate attractive terms with any VC investor, and so high-quality 
entrepreneurs believe that they can persuade all VC Investors to offer high valuations, 
and low-quality entrepreneurs believe that they can convince investors that they are 
high-quality. 
This view highlights an interesting difference in the ways that entrepreneurs and VC 
investors view signalling to the other. Entrepreneurs are confident in their own abilities 
and typically believe they need little help from anyone else. As a result, they are not 
continuously engaged in signalling to impress others. And when the need for 
investment capital arises, they are therefore interested more In obtaining the cash than 
in access to services that they do not think they need. So, at that time, they engage in 
an episodic "salesmanship". They attempt to sell the VC Investor on the future 
potential of the firm, representing it as an excellent investment opportunity regardless 
whether it is actually. They know that the VC investor will understand and value such 
messages. 
In contrast, VC investors operate in the market in a more or less continuous process of 
attracting and managing dealflow, with an occasional stop to negotiate an Individual 
financing contract. Their participation in the market is ongoing, not episodic. And VC 
investors cannot assume that entrepreneurs are continuously watching for, and 
correctly interpreting, their signals. VC investors frequently attempt to convince 
entrepreneurs to pay less attention to valuations offered, and more attention to value. 
added services that the VC investor can provide (so called "smart money) -a 
strategy that allows the VC investors to compete on attributes where they can 
differentiate themselves. 
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So the approach of VC investors is one of continuous signalling of competence and 
skill, in a manner observable to all. And the approach of entrepreneurs is one of 
delivering a sales pitch to a specifically targeted audience, at only selected times. 
A still deeper synthesis of the different market participant perspectives may be 
obtained by examining the situation of the VC investors who are most active in 
markets with high information asymmetries, the Confident Leaders. This perspective 
affords clearer views into the fundamental questions around these market behaviours: 
Who invests In early-stage markets? Early-stage investing Is a viable strategy for 
Confident Leaders who have a higher tolerance for information asymmetries of all 
types, lower likelihood of participating in syndicates but higher propensity to lead 
whatever syndicates they belong to, greater VC investment experience, and stronger 
belief that early-stage investing provides a means of avoiding competition. Only 
investors with these characteristics are able to operate sustainably in this market. 
Other investors can operate here for short periods, while losing money, if they 
perceive it to be a necessary precursor towards moving into a later-stage, lower-risk 
market. 
Why do they do so? They are likely doing so to exploit their exceptional screening 
skill, to make profitable investments despite the information asymmetries. This activity 
allows them to signal their quality to various stakeholders and thereby to get funding 
from principal investors or improve the quality of their dealflow (by attracting desirable 
entrepreneurs directly, by encouraging intermediaries to refer attractive opportunities 
to them, or by attracting other desirable VC investors for syndicated deals). For some, 
it also allows them to secure rights to follow-on investments, and provides them a 
means to avoid competition from more established, later-stage VC firms. But the 
significant benefit is the Information it conveys to their stakeholders. 
What do they do to achieve these objectives? In addition to actively operating in 
early-stage markets, these investors signal their skill in a variety of other ways. They 
behave in ways that communicate their confidence in their own abilities, such as 
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funding firms with particularly high information asymmetries (startups, novel business 
models, unproven entrepreneurs, and firms that have been rejected by other VC 
investors), and investing without the support of syndicate partners. They also act to 
communicate the confidence that others place in their abilities, such as being asked to 
lead those (few) syndicates in which they participate. 
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Having summarized and synthesized the findings of the individual research studies In 
the preceding chapters, an attempt can finally now be made to address the research 
questions posed in chapter 2 towards the overall thesis of this research. 
Research questions 
1) What role does screening play in mitigating information asymmetry In early-stage 
markets? 
Screening helps VC investors mitigate their Information asymmetries by forcing an 
exchange of private information. It allows them to avoid the costs of doing poor deals. 
But in so doing, it creates the potential for adverse selection to occur, since more 
thorough screening processes may negatively impact the entrepreneur's assessment 
of deal-making ease and speed, and personal compatibility. However, this risk could 
be itself mitigated by the signalling value of good screening, were entrepreneurs to 
recognize and correctly interpret these signals. 
The present theoretical and empirical investigation suggests that VC investors are not 
homogeneous in their use of screening. They are heterogeneous with respect to eight 
newly identified factors: level of general business experience, tolerance of information 
asymmetries, desire to broaden their knowledge base, level of VC Investment 
experience, propensity to lead syndicates, willingness to act independently of other VC 
investors, belief that skill demonstration acts to build/maintain stakeholder 
relationships, and belief that skill is demonstrated by the fraction of portfolio 
investments that are successful. 
Asymmetry-mitigation strategies are dependent on the screening skill of the individual 
VC investor. Poor screeners tend to avoid operating in asymmetric markets, as do 
some good screeners. But many good screeners exploit their skill to mitigate the 
information asymmetries of these markets, and thereby operate successfully In them. 
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Generally, screening skill correlates with willingness to accept asymmetries and 
operate in markets characterized by high Information asymmetries. But this correlation 
does not apply uniformly for all of the hypothesized measures of market Information 
asymmetry, nor for all types of VC investors. Empirical support was found In the case 
of information asymmetries due to unknown and unreferred entrepreneurs, startup 
firms, firms with novel or unproven business models, and firms that have been 
overlooked or rejected by other VC Investors. But no empirical support was found for 
information asymmetries due to business expansions, Investments In foreign 
jurisdictions, and unsyndicated investments. 
2) Do VC investors use screening ability as a signal of quality for their various 
stakeholders? Does differential screening skill meet the requirements of an 
effective signal? What information value would such a signal convey? 
Some VC investors with high screening ability use early-stage Investing as a signal of 
their quality. This is an appropriate choice, as it meets the requirements of a potentially 
effective signal: it is easily observable, it conveys information about screening skill, the 
benefits of signalling exceed the costs for high-quality investors, and it is hard for low- 
quality investors to sustainably mimic. 
Some VC investors do use their superior screening as a signal to stakeholders, with 
the objective to improve dealflow quality. In the case of entrepreneur stakeholders, 
investors expect it will attract high-quality entrepreneurs and repel poorer quality ones. 
In the case of professional advisors, they expect it will influence them to refer only 
high-quality entrepreneurs. 
For high-quality VC investors (where "quality" assessment is in the eye of the market 
counterpart), the value of generating and transmitting this signal has been calculated 
from theory to lie in the replacement of bad projects with good, and thereby to depend 
on the expected future value of the good projects. For high-quality entrepreneurs, the 
value of receiving and interpreting this signal lies in the increased valuation they 
receive through an accurate screening evaluation by a high-quality VC Investor. This 
174 
depends on the range of project values available from all entrepreneurs in the market 
(i. e., how much better the good entrepreneurs are), and on the differential screening 
accuracy of VC investors (i. e., how much more accurate the good VC Investors are). 
Empirical evidence suggests that some VC investors do attempt to signal by Investing 
in early-stage markets. The ones who do so (the "Confident Leaders") are 
characterized by a level of screening skill that allows them to operate without 
syndicate partners, but makes them desirable syndicate members and leaders in the 
eyes of other VC investors. Further, not all investors of this type choose to operate in 
early-stage markets; they enjoy a choice of viable strategies. On the other hand, the 
investors who do not share this skill level tend not attempt to convey these same 
signals - some choose not to (the cost of signalling may be prohibitive), and some 
simply are unable to manifest the signal. 
Other signals of VC investor quality include obtaining high overall portfolio returns, 
acting independently (investing without syndication, and investing in firms overlooked 
or rejected by others), and having a great proportion of successful Investments in their 
portfolios. 
Other reasons for investing early include building and maintaining stakeholder 
relationships, avoiding competitors who are insufficiently skilled to operate sustainably 
in these markets, and securing a right of first refusal for later, more lucrative 
investment rounds for the successful firms originating in these markets. 
3) Do entrepreneurs pay attention to the signal value of differential screening skill 
when seeking and evaluating potential VC Investors? How important Is this 
potential signal, relative to other selection criteria used by entrepreneurs? 
Entrepreneurs apparently do not value this signal much, and do not use it to mitigate 
their own information asymmetries when choosing a VC Investor. The demonstration 
of high screening skill on the part of prospective VC investors is one of the least- 
valued criteria entrepreneurs assess in choosing their sources of financing. 
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The empirical results suggest that entrepreneurs believe that they use many selection 
criteria, and that these criteria are valued about equally. Signals of investor skill and 
independence are included among these many criteria. But conjoint analysis of 
empirical data indicates that, in practice, entrepreneurs primarily rely on just two 
criteria, the valuation placed on their firms and the degree of personal compatibility 
they feel with the VC investor (which itself may be proxy for trust). The other criteria 
figure much less prominently in their choices. In particular, they place very little 
importance on the value-added services that the VC investor offers and on the level of 
skill and independence the VC investor demonstrates. Entrepreneurs do not value 
these signals of screening skill. They apparently do not seek "smart money". 
Since entrepreneurs give little weight to the signals that VC investors provide about 
screening skill, these signals have little influence on the quality of direct dealflow that 
VC investors see. This lack of influence must therefore be compensated by Increased 
efforts in screening and due diligence by the VC investor, to ensure that low-quality 
entrepreneurs are not inadvertently funded. Paradoxically this Increased screening 
effort might be seen to increase the risk adverse selection, by making the deal-making 
experience less attractive for entrepreneurs. Fortunately, this research has shown that 
entrepreneurs also place a reduced importance on deal-making attributes as a 
selection criterion, and therefore that this risk Is attenuated. 
Is summary, screening can be used to mitigate information asymmetries that exist due 
to the failure of the signalling regime. And this screening carries only minimal risk of 
increased adverse selection. Screening therefore is important, necessary, and 
beneficial for market participants. It can be criticized only for being less efficient than 
would be a workable signalling regime. Screening is costly (financially and temporally) 
for both the VC investor and the entrepreneur. And it does lead to some elevated risk 
of adverse selection. If entrepreneurs paid greater attention to quality signals from VC 
investors, and if they used the information in these signals to select a VC Investor that 
was an appropriate match (i. e., only high-quality entrepreneurs would seek financing 
from highly-skilled investors), then screening efforts could be significantly reduced. 
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High-quality investors would know their dealf low was of high quality, and could trust In 
reduced screening. And low-quality investors would know their dealflow was of lower 
quality, and could raise their prices (offer reduced valuations) to compensate for the 
increased level of due diligence efforts these poorer deals would require. 
Market model propositions 
At the end of chapter 3, six moderation effects were proposed to occur as a result of a 
VC issuing a signal of "High" quality. These proposed effects are repeated here: 
1) Professionals will increase their referrals to the signalling investor. 
2) Professionals will decrease their referrals to the non-signalling investors. 
3) Institutional investors will increase their capital supply to the signalling Investor. 
4) Institutional investors will decrease their capital supply to the non-signalling 
investors. 
5) High-quality entrepreneurs will increase their attempts to obtain capital from the 
signalling investor. 
6) Low-quality entrepreneurs will decrease their attempts to obtain capital from the 
signalling investor. 
Of these proposed effects, only numbers 5 and 6 have been explored in the present 
research on entrepreneurs and VC investors. With respect to the VC Investors, 
empirical evidence from the above studies suggests that many VC Investors believe 
these moderation effects to be operational. These investors attempt to generate 
signals of high quality in order to benefit from these expected moderations - bringing 
more dealf low from professionals, easier access to capital from institutional Investors, 
and better quality of entrepreneurs in their dealf low. 
In contrast, the empirical evidence from entrepreneurs, which was expected to support 
effects 5 and 6, did not provide support. Entrepreneurs generally do not adapt their 
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capital sourcing behaviours in response to quality Information signalled by VC 
investors. As a result, the quality of dealflow experienced by a VC Investor is likely to 
be little affected by any attempts to signal their screening abilities. 
Research Contributions 
This research contributes to the extension of previous theoretical models of VC 
investor operations and screening by incorporating heterogeneity in screening skill and 
by concluding a range of strategic alternatives that skilled investors can pursue, which 
are not evident in previous models. In this area, specific novel contributions include: 
1. Development of a theoretical model of screening in early-stage capital markets, 
which incorporates information asymmetries and signalling behaviours. 
2. Confirmation that VC investors are not homogeneous with respect to screening 
skill, contrary to the assumptions of previous research. 
3. Discovery of a range of investor rationales for participation in early-stage markets, 
including temporary strategies designed to afford subsequent migration to later- 
stage markets. 
4. Determination of a range of strategic options that good screeners can adopt to 
exploit their skill. 
5. Development of a typology of VC investors that reflects differential abilities and 
individual beliefs. 
6. Expansion of the previous expectation-value model of VC Investments to 
incorporate differential screening skills. 
7. Suggestion that the previous expectation-value model of VC Investments requires 
further expansion to account for investor costs and detection functions that vary 
with the quality of the entrepreneurial firm. 
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8. Support for the hypotheses that VC Investors with high screening abilities are 
more likely than other VC Investors to make investment deals with unknown or 
unreferred entrepreneurs, and in start-up companies, companies having unproven 
business models, or companies of other VC investors to have many prior 
rejections by other investors. 
9. Evidence that superior screening skill is insufficient to overcome home bias and 
thereby encourage VC investors to invest in foreign jurisdictions. 
10. Evidence that agency risk between principal investors and VC agents is manifest 
as non-economic objectives for the VC investors. 
This research also contributes to an enhanced understanding of the role of signalling 
in financial markets with high information asymmetries, by developing a theoretical 
justification for the emergence of such signals, and by demonstrating their formation in 
early-stage capital markets. In this area, specific novel contributions include: 
1. Discovery that investing in early-stage markets can function as a signal of investor 
screening skill, and that this signal is intentionally manifested by some VC 
investors. 
2. Determination of an upper bound on the value of the signal, both to the VC 
investors and to entrepreneurs. 
3. Identification of other potential signals of investor screening skill. 
4. Evidence that the intention to demonstrate skill on the part of VC Investors Is 
unidimensional with respect to different stakeholders. VC Investors do not decide 
to demonstrate skill to their institutional investors separately from their decision to 
demonstrate skill to their peers and to their other stakeholders. They Intend to 
demonstrate to all or to none. 
Finally, this research contributes to a novel perspective on how early-stage 
entrepreneurs, when viewed as consumers of financing, evaluate potential suppliers of 
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VC investment, and insight into the degree to which their own understanding of this Is 
marred by poor introspection. In this area, specific novel contributions include: 
1. Discovery that entrepreneurs are poor at introspecting into their Investor choice 
decisions. 
2. Determination of specific in-use criteria importance, and the relative weighting of 
the different criteria used by entrepreneurs when faced with VC financing choices. 
3. Discovery that entrepreneurs are generally unaware of the Information signalled 
by successful early-stage investing by VC investors. 
4. Suggestion that, while many of the entrepreneurs who avoid VC financing may do 
so due to lack of need for large amounts of growth capital, some entrepreneurs 
with a need for capital might avoid VC financing due to inadvertent negative 
signals sent by VC investors. 
Implications for future research 
This research has resulted in a number of observations, the consequences of which 
produce inefficiencies in the early-stage capital markets: 
  Entrepreneurs waste time and effort seeking capital from inappropriate sources. 
  The clutter in the market due to poorly targeted entrepreneurs further wastes time 
and effort of investors seeking appropriate entrepreneurs. 
  These inefficiencies exacerbate type II errors, in which bad projects are funded. 
This causes resources to be directed to low-value or unprofitable uses. This 
misallocation of resources represents a loss to society. 
  These inefficiencies also exacerbate type I errors, in which good projects are not 
funded or are under funded. This causes opportunities for growth and value- 
creation to be missed - an additional social loss. 
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These problems suggest the need for better education of entrepreneurs and VC 
investors regarding the efficient allocation of capital to deserving projects. Establishing 
links from these observations to specific educational goals and strategies will require 
further research efforts. 
The quantitative results presented in chapter 4 and supported by interpretation of the 
qualitative results of chapter 6, while together supportive of the theorized relationships 
regarding early-stage investing, can be improved and extended In several directions. 
First, a more extensive empirical study of more VC Investors would provide a firmer 
basis for confirming the practice of the Identified strategies, for testing the related 
hypotheses at higher significance levels, and for achieving redundancy In the 
qualitative interpretations and the exploration of meaning among VC Investors. Next, 
the self-report challenges can be addressed through deeper analysis of Individual VC 
portfolios using tighter definitions and more objective characterization of deal 
parameters. Also, the operationalization of screening ability may be further Improved 
by including a rating of screening ability by peers within a local community of VC 
investors. This would provide an external assessment of the beliefs these other 
investors hold regarding the screening abilities of each respondent. Additionally, a 
replicative study with more data would facilitate the use of structural modeling to 
confirm the implied latent constructs for screening ability and asymmetry tolerance. 
Such an approach could also validate a measurement model that is based on the 
operational indicators used here. And the interpretative elements of this could be 
usefully supplemented by research more directed at the social constructionist 
dimensions: how VC investors conceptualize themselves, how they enact 
differentiated role identities, and whether/how these constructed identities correspond 
to the differences identified through the positivist perspective. Such a constructionist 
approach may also serve to provide a better understanding of the range of opinions 
these respondents exhibited with regard to competition among VC Investors. Clearly, 
important social norms govern the compete/collaborate dynamic among VC investors 
and the mechanisms by which inexperienced VC investors enter the market, prove 
themselves, and become part of the "club" of collaborating/syndicating VC investors. 
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Further research on the emergence and structuration of these social dynamics could 
shed important new light on these questions. 
In addition to these general validity improvements, the finding that VC Investors move 
up-market and away from early-stage Investing as they gain more experience raises 
several interesting follow-up questions about the value of such Investing early In their 
careers. One such question worthy of investigation is whether this behaviour has 
some additional signalling value in the VC market, particularly among competitive 
peers and later-stage VC firms. Another, supported particularly from the qualitative 
interview data, is the extent to which career concerns and other forms of agency risk 
are present in the behaviour of individual VC Investors and In the decision-making of 
VC firms. 
Given the demonstrated importance of investor screening skill in supporting differential 
strategies and in communicating information that can resolve market asymmetries, a 
more substantive explication of the screening skill construct is perhaps warranted. And 
with this explication, an examination of the antecedents of screening skill could 
support the development of theory to explain why are some VC investors are such 
better screeners than are others. This research could provide a theoretical explanation 
and basis for the findings of previous empirical research into screening criteria and the 
relative effectiveness of attribute-based and boot-strapped models of screening. 
These specific proposals are suggested as potentially fruitful next steps In further 
exploring differential VC investor screening abilities and their impact on VC Investor 
strategies. It is hoped that such a finer and more granular understanding of the 
abilities, motivations and resulting strategies of VC investors will lead to more robust 
and comprehensive theory of early-stage capital markets. 
The research of chapter 7, as a follow up to Smith's initial foray into this area (Smith 
1999), represents a modest start to improving our understanding of the entrepreneurs 
side of the venture capital market. The best entrepreneurs have choices from where 
they will source any capital they may require. Developing a rich understanding of how 
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these choices are made has valuable implications both for practitioners (VC Investors, 
entrepreneurs and the like) and for market theorists. As a first step, the present 
research necessarily leaves many questions remaining. One important question is the 
degree to which these improved conjoint importance figures more accurately reflect 
real-world financing decisions. With real-world financing decisions, the stakes for the 
entrepreneur are high and the pressures to maximize deal utility while minimizing deal- 
making costs are felt more acutely. It is unknown the degree to which these competing 
pressures may differentiate actual in-use importance from conjoint importance. 
Another question worthy of further exploration is the kind of decision rule used to 
process the diverse criteria data that entrepreneurs obtain. The present study has 
assumed a simple compensatory approach, but the reality may be considerably more 
complex or subtle, especially for cases where entrepreneurs require some minimum 
threshold value for certain criteria. Moreover, psychological and cognitive factors of 
individual entrepreneurs may take on increased importance in the decision process as 
the level of uncertainty or ambiguity in criterion values increases (Kahn and Sarin 
1988). A robust and multi-level model of entrepreneurial capital sourcing should 
integrate these individual dimensions with overall market characteristics. 
The observation that signalling by the early-stage operations of VC Investors has little 
effect on choice behaviour of entrepreneurs prompts additional questions of other 
potential signals of VC investor skill, and other actions that entrepreneurs may take to 
mitigate the information asymmetries that they face. 
The results have also suggested a possible role for personal compatibility as a 
potential moderator of the flow of benefits between VC Investor and entrepreneur. 
From the perspective of the entrepreneur, the compatibility of the relationship may 
moderate the extent to which the discretionary services and skills of the VC investor 
are made available. And from the perspective of the VC investor, this same 
compatibility may moderate the flow of private information about the firm, and thereby 
mitigate moral hazard. This further suggests that personal compatibility may be a 
proxy for trust in the relationship, which would benefit from confirmatory research. 
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The joint results of chapters 5 and 7, suggesting that the potential signalling 
mechanism of skilful early-stage screening is not being exploited, Indicate a further line 
of follow-up research directed at understanding the relative advantages and 
deficiencies of various signalling regimes in the market. If the examined signalling 
mechanism is not being used, it may be due to constraints with the sender (the VC 
investor), constraints with the receiver (the entrepreneur), or constraints with the 
channel (e. g., limited capacity or excess noise). Alternatively, the need for this signal 
may be simply obviated by the use of another more effective or less costly signalling 
regime that has not yet been identified. 
These joint results also suggest a potential line of research examining how the 
presence of information asymmetries influences the negotiation and design of 
investment contracts. Knowing that entrepreneurs place most importance on valuation 
and personal compatibility, theorizing will be needed to identify the optimal strategy for 
an investor to adequately resolve information asymmetries and maximize expected 
returns, without materially increasing the risk of adverse selection within the target 
population of entrepreneurs. Similarly, optimal negotiation and contracting strategies 
for entrepreneurs could be developed. 
Finally, this research has investigated only a small subset of the information 
exchanges within the full market model of figure 3-9. Expansion or continuation of this 
line of research may be warranted in three dimensions: an Investigation of other 
possible VC quality signals designed to influence entrepreneurs and dealt low, an 
investigation of other proposed effects of VC quality signals on other (non- 
entrepreneur) market participants, and an investigation of signals provided by other 
(non-VC) market participants. As an example, relatively little is known about the 
relationships, signals, and information exchange mechanisms between early-stage VC 
investors and later-stage VC investors. 
Implications for practitioners 
In addition to addressing the basic research questions, and posing a number of 
implications for future research directions, this research has yielded some insights of 
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potential value to practitioners operating in early-stage markets. A number of those 
insights are directed to current or potential VC Investors. 
First is the observation that since the access to VC financing is a high-risk, low- 
frequency purchase decision for most entrepreneurs, and since entrepreneurs may 
exhibit a number of path-dependent cognitive biases, there are a number of 
advantages for first mover VC investors (whether they be first in a particular market 
niche or first to offer early-stage financing in a newly emergent industry). First-mover 
investors can act to establish the reference standard by which entrepreneurs evaluate 
competitive financing sources; these VC investors have the opportunity to Influence 
the criteria by which entrepreneurs will choose their Investors in such a way as to 
beneficially influence the quality of their dealflow and to gain competitive advantage 
over other investors. 
Second is the strategic advantage that can be gained by knowledge of the actual in- 
use criteria of entrepreneurs, and how these differ from the perceptions that 
entrepreneurs hold of themselves. In highly practical terms, this knowledge might 
suggest that, in early interactions with entrepreneurs, VC Investors should aim to 
score acceptably on all espoused criteria. But as negotiations with these 
entrepreneurs progress, VC investors should evolve their focus towards enhancing 
their attractiveness on the two key criteria (valuation and personal compatibility) at the 
expense of their score on the others. "Give a good price, and be nice" can be a useful 
heuristic in keeping a desired entrepreneur at the negotiating table. And while she is 
kept there, the VC investor can be quite aggressive in structuring other aspects of 
transaction in the most favourable way. exceedingly thorough due diligence 
investigations, highly advantageous term sheet clauses (e. g., anti-dilution ratchets, 
liquidation preferences, work fees, performance-based vesting, double dips), and the 
limited provision of costly services only towards maximizing firm value (i. e., not 
towards private benefits for the entrepreneur). 
Third is the recommendation that highly-skilled screeners should demand 
compensation for their value-added ability. This compensation can take two forms. In 
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the simplest case, these VC investors should invest independently to not dilute their 
returns across a syndicate. Alternatively, they can form syndicates to reap certain 
benefits (e. g., to establish deep pockets to fund later investment rounds), but should 
always lead these syndicates and should demand adequate compensation from the 
other syndicate members for so doing. Moreover, this recommendation holds equally 
whether a highly-skilled screener elects to use their skill to invest in markets with high 
information asymmetries (such as early-stage markets) or to invest In later-stage 
markets (at lower costs relative to other, less-skilled investors). 
Fourth is the observation that investors who are highly-skilled screeners, and who 
wish to signal this ability to their many stakeholders (e. g., principal investors, 
professional advisors, entrepreneurs, potential syndicate partners, later-stage 
investors, prospective commercial partners), have a variety of signalling regimes to 
consider. Superior screening skill can be indicated by independence of investment 
actions, by the "hit ratio" proportion of successful investments in a portfolio, or by the 
overall portfolio return. 
There are also a number of insights of practical value that are directed to 
entrepreneurs seeking capital. Primary of these is the guidance to seek capital from 
investors of corresponding screening skill. Entrepreneurs with extraordinarily good 
projects should seek out VC investors with extraordinarily good screening skill, so that 
the true value of these projects can be recognized and reflected in the offered 
valuation. Entrepreneurs with more typical or even somewhat poorer projects should 
seek out more average VC investors, so that they maintain the potential to have their 
projects initially overvalued. This recommendation must, of course, be tempered with 
the requirement that entrepreneurs balance these benefits with the corresponding 
search costs. 
Those entrepreneurs seeking VC investors with high screening skills should therefore 
look for signals of this ability. But this search should be tempered with the knowledge 
that such signals can be very noisy, and that triangulation with multiple indicators can 
therefore be important. With respect to an investor's history, an entrepreneur should 
186 
look for a long and sustainable presence in markets with high information 
asymmetries, such as continuous investment in early-stage firms or firms with novel 
and unproven business models. With respect to an investor's past portfolio results, 
entrepreneurs should look for high overall returns and a high number of "home runs" 
(being more than the typical 1-in-10 proportion). With respect to an investors current 
investments, entrepreneurs should look for independence and self confidence (e. g., 
investing without syndicate partners, and investing in companies that were rejected by 
other VC investors), and for the well-placed confidence of other VC investors (i. e., 
leading the syndicates they join). 
Finally, entrepreneurs who have attractive projects but have been rejected by other 
investors should specifically seek out VC investors with substantial experience in a 
related industry. The challenge for these entrepreneurs is to find a VC Investor with 
enough relevant experience to trust their own independent judgement, but still having 
enough distance to avoid group-think and to see the entrepreneur and her project 
through fresh eyes. 
LjMft ions of the Research 
This research has been subject to many limitations, both theoretical and in the 
practical design and implementation. Some of these limitations are common and apply 
to all of the individual studies reported in the previous chapters. 
For example, many of the item variables used in these studies represent latent 
psychological states of respondents, such as beliefs and attitudes. As such, they are 
subject to the limitations of self-reports (Podsakoff and Organ 1986). In particular, this 
raises the risk of artifactual covariance that is not mitigated by the validity checks 
conducted. This risk arises from the various common method biases that are inherent 
in using the same respondents to report on several variables (Podsakoff, MacKenzie 
et al. 2003). Although attempts have been made to minimize this threat to validity, the 
resulting data have not been triangulated through multi-trait, multi-method approaches. 
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Chapter 3 model 
Although the model developed in this chapter represents an Improvement over 
previous highly stylized and simplified models of early-stage capital markets, it still 
suffers from many limitations, constraints and simplifying assumptions of its own. 
Some of the more significant limitations include: 
  Assumption of an undefined yet unidimensional and binary "quality" of early-stage 
VC investors and entrepreneurs. 
  Assumption that the choices among market participants, based on quality 
assessments, are simple conjunctive consumer choices - there are no threshold 
values, interaction effects or other nonlinearities among the criteria used to assess 
quality - and that the conjunctive process is rational (despite the findings of 
chapter 6). 
  Omission of noise and other competing signals in the information exchanges 
among participants. 
  Omission of substitute sources of capital (e. g., "love" money, angel investors, 
bank debt) and their interactions with various model participants. 
  Lack of time dimension or the process by which the information exchanges unfold 
in sequence, and any interactions or dependencies between elements of these 
processes or sequences of actions within the model framework. 
Chapter 4 study 
The empirical findings of this study are clearly limited in statistical significance due to 
the small sample size. The sample size has severely constrained the range of 
statistical analyses that may be appropriately applied, and has particularly precluded 
any hypothesis testing based on regression models. However, within those 
constraints, the sample appears to have reasonably good external validity and 
generalizability to the larger VC investor population. 
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This study has relied upon VC investors to self-assess the nature of their Investment 
portfolios, making judgements on the extent to which they are "early-stage", with 
"novel, unproven" business models and with unproven entrepreneurs. The ability of 
VC investors to accurately make such assessments can be questioned. Ono study of 
the specific criteria VC investors use to screen investments found VC investors to be 
relatively poor at introspection; this deficiency may also cloud their judgement of the 
nature of the companies and entrepreneurs in their portfolios. Moreover, some VC 
investors may have incentive to mischaracterize the nature of the deals they do, either 
overstating the risks they manage in order to enhance a reputation for skilful 
monitoring of investments, or understating the risks in order to enhance a reputation 
for prudence; this incentive may also introduce social desirability bias Into the self- 
assessed data these VC investors provide. 
Even if VC investors in this sample were accurate in introspection and free of social 
desirability bias, the potential exists for common rater bias in these results. However, a 
Harman's test of the exploratory factor analysis did not yield a single dominating factor 
in the unrotated solution, which provides support for the conclusion that common-rater 
bias is not a significant threat here. 
Although this study demonstrated a connection between VC screening ability and the 
willingness of VC investors to participate in early-stage markets, it may be that this 
relationship is significant only to some individual components of a generic screening 
ability; screening ability may be a composite, multivariate construct. These 
"components" might include the evaluation of new investment opportunities and the 
initial decision to offer a term sheet, the creation of a syndicate to form the required 
amount of investment capital, and the investigation of subsequent information and the 
decision to complete the investment deal. Success in early-stage markets, or In other 
markets with high information asymmetries, might therefore be specifically due to skill 
at only one or a small subset of these components. Further research In this area 
should adopt additional independent measures, such as peer ratings of screening skill. 
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Variables omitted from the model may also have significant predictive value. In 
particular, it may be suggested that regional differences among VC investment 
practices may influence willingness to invest in asymmetric markets. Similarly, cyclical 
effects on asymmetric investing may exist and might only be uncovered through a 
longitudinal empirical approach. 
One possible alternative explanation for the observed relationships was that the 
apparently good screeners are simply more risk-averse than other VC Investors, and 
that this aversion accounts for their successful avoidance of bad investments. 
However, this alternative explanation appears somewhat unconvincing. Risk aversion 
in investors would be characterized by a reduction in false positives (making fewer 
investments that ex post prove unprofitable), but at the expense of increasing false 
negatives (also making fewer investments that ex post prove highly profitable). 
Therefore risk-averse investors are likely to make fewer investments overall and 
particularly fewer where they believe the information asymmetries are unfavourable 
and large. This is not the case with good screeners, where in contrast, they have the 
ability to reduce both false positives and false negatives, and thereby make more 
investments under conditions of apparent information asymmetry. 
Chapter 5 study 
The empirical findings of this study are clearly limited in statistical significance due to 
the small sample size. The sample size has severely constrained the range of 
statistical analyses that may be appropriately applied, and has particularly precluded 
any hypothesis testing based on regression models. However, within those 
constraints, the sample appears to have reasonably good external validity and 
generalizability to the larger VC investor population. 
This study relied upon VC investors to self-report their beliefs regarding demonstration 
of ability and rationales for early-stage investments. This represents a threat to internal 
validity as self-reported data can be subject to common rater effects of a consistency 
motif or social desirability bias. The anonymity of the survey and the general absence 
of widespread lay theories of VC signalling may have served to mitigate this risk of 
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bias. Also, the data were obtained from a single source for all variables, which raises 
the potential for common method bias. The data were therefore examined via Harmon 
single-factor test, which did not yield a factor indicative of common method bias. 
Chapter 6 study 
Despite the grounded purposive sampling strategy employed, the empirical findings of 
this study are clearly limited due to the very small sample size. There Is little 
assurance with such a small sample that redundancy in the expression of themes was 
achieved; other VC investors may have additional or contradictory beliefs about 
investing in early-stage markets, beliefs that have not been discovered In this 
research. External generalizability of the results is therefore limited by the 
representativeness of the respondents. 
The non-anonymous nature of the face-to-face data collection process further 
exacerbates the risk of social desirability bias. Venture capital investors asked to 
interpret market behaviours may also be more prone to consistency bias and 
application of lay theories to ex post rationalize the observed actions of themselves 
and their peers. 
Chapter 7 study 
The empirical findings of this study are clearly limited in statistical significance due to 
the sample size. The sample size has severely constrained the range of statistical 
analyses that may be appropriately applied, and has particularly precluded any 
hypothesis testing based on regression models. However, within those constraints, the 
sample appears to have reasonably good external validity and generalizability to the 
larger population of capital-seeking entrepreneurs. 
With respect to the sample of entrepreneurs, and despite efforts to enrol 
entrepreneurs from a wide range of businesses and with a wide range of experience, 
the sample is ultimately self-selected from the population that fell within the sample 
frame. As a result, extreme views may be overrepresented. The sample frame also 
excluded entrepreneurs (both successful and not) who have deliberately avoided 
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venture capital financial sources as part of their financing strategies. And the study 
design did not assess the "desirability" of the respondent entrepreneurs, from the 
perspective of potential VC investors. As such, it did not Investigate whether the 
obtained results are specifically applicable to the most desirable entrepreneurs or are 
indicative of average tendencies among entrepreneurs of all qualities. It may yet be 
that only certain types of entrepreneurs do notice and value signals of VC Investor 
quality, and that other types of entrepreneurs do not. 
Moreover, the conjoint research technique, while providing much improved Insight into 
actual capital buying decisions of entrepreneurs compared to previous research, is still 
limited as a measure of intent rather than actual behaviour. The reported "in-use" 
results should be corroborated against measures of real financing deals completed by 
entrepreneurs. 
Overall limitations 
An objective of this thesis has been to examine the role of screening by VC Investors 
and its effects on the exchange on information in early-stage investment markets. And 
while some contributions towards this goal may have been achieved, the overall 
design of this project has introduced some limitations that should be addressed In 
future attempts to extend knowledge in this area. 
First, of the six effects arising from a signal of VC Investor quality in this market, 
proposed in chapter 3, only two were examined in any depth with this research - 
those pertaining to the entrepreneurial choice of capital sources. The effects of the 
signal on other market participants (professionals and institutional investors) remain 
unexamined in this research. More broadly, this focus also suggests the need to 
conduct similar research into the effects of other signals in the VC Investor and 
entrepreneur dyad, and indeed the effects of signals in other dyads within the overall 
market model. 
Within this narrow focus on one signal in the VC investor and entrepreneur dyad, this 
research is also limited by its static perspective. Much of the information exchange 
192 
within this market may occur over a time duration and through a process of evolution 
and change. For example, VC screening and entrepreneurial choice criteria are likely 
not simple static constructs, but rather evolve and change in response to actions of 
various market participants, to the interpretation of signals and the discovery of new 
information, and to actions taken in other market dyads. One potential illustration of 
this limitation might be the effect of the "certification" role played by professionals 
acting as intermediaries between entrepreneurs and VC investors. The signal value of 
this referral comes into effect before the VC Investor begins to screen the 
entrepreneur (the professional in effect "pre-screens" the entrepreneur), and before 
the entrepreneur begins to choose the VC investor (the professional is also "referring" 
the VC investor to the entrepreneur). Clearly, there is an important and little- 
understood sequential process with interaction effects occurring within this area of the 
market model, and within the initial introduction between the VC Investor and the 
entrepreneur. 
The overall research design for this investigation featured the development of a 
theoretical model, extensions to related theories in the literature, quantitative empirical 
investigation of a small set of implications of these theory extensions, and qualitative 
confirmation of the interpretation of some results of these investigations. This design 
has the benefit of triangulating the phenomena from the perspectives of different 
market participants, and using different analytic methodologies. But it is far from an 
exhaustive or definitive examination of the topic. The proposed factor structures 
underlying the information exchanges should be confirmed with larger and more 
powerful datasets. The implicit causality of observed associations should be examined 
through quasi-experimental designs that investigate causality. The information 
economics underlying the- examined signalling regime should be quantitatively 
explored and linked to the theoretical upper limits established in chapter 5. And, most 
importantly, the reasons for the failure of the proposed signalling regime should be 
explored further - some VC investors are using the early-stage markets to signal their 
screening skill and thereby influence entrepreneurial deafflow quality, but 
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entrepreneurs are not being influenced by this information. This disconnect represents 
a market inefficiency that has not been adequately explored in the present research. 
Closing Remarks 
As argued earlier, the effective operation of early-stage venture capital markets is an 
essential precursor to the development of many successful new firms and the various 
social benefits associated with their launch and growth: economic growth, job creation, 
regional development, efficient deployment of resources, exploitation of technological 
innovation, provision of new products and services, and funding of future research. 
When early-stage markets operate effectively, capital is directed to firms with the 
greatest potential for growth and the creation of these benefits. No other facet of 
capital markets has the same potential to provide positive leverage for the 
development of firms that enable benefits for society. Consequently, it is important to 
understand the unique challenges in these markets, and to gain insight into how 
market effectiveness can be enhanced. 
But research into the operation of early-stage markets continues to lag that of other 
financial markets. To a large extent, this may be due to the practical diff iculties 
associated with obtaining reliable data about early-stage investors and early-stage 
entrepreneurs. Unlike the case with later, more mature markets, with early-stage 
markets few large datasets exist and relatively little archival data can be tapped. 
Moreover, the collection of new primary data is difficult because the market 
participants are often challenged by liabilities of newness and the lack of internal 
capabilities to collect, analyze and report data on their own operations. This typically 
leads to the kinds of low response rates seen in the present research. As a result of 
this data scarcity, findings from new research into this market take on an added 
importance. 
Through the present research, some small but meaningful steps have been achieved 
towards a more complete and robust understanding of the operations of this market. 
Primary of these is the finding that the market participants are not homogeneous, and 
therefore - theories that assume homogeneity are significantly limited in their 
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explanatory power and generalizability. For example, contrary to earlier theoretical 
assumptions, VC investors have a wide range of abilities and attitudes towards this 
market, and that these lead to a range of differing strategies. Some VC investors 
deliberately avoid early-stage markets, or operate there only long enough to establish 
the credibility and network relationships needed to move Into later markets. But other 
VC investors deliberately seek early-stage markets as a competitive strategy. This 
range of beliefs, strategies, and behaviours with respect to addressing the problem of 
information asymmetry has not been adequately reflected into current market theories. 
Future research into this area must continue to bear these differences in mind. 
And, if the development of knowledge about investors in early-stage markets has 
lagged that of other financial markets, the situation with respect to knowledge about 
entrepreneurs is even worse. Very little is known about how early-stage entrepreneurs 
engage capital markets. The present research indicates that the process by which 
entrepreneurs select VC investors is very important to any complete understanding of 
how early-stage capital markets operate, and how attractive projects can be effectively 
matched to available funding. This research has confirmed a number of criteria that 
these entrepreneurs use when selecting funding sources, and has demonstrated that 
one proposed signalling regime is not very effective in conveying information from VC 
investor to entrepreneur. As a result, the information transfer mechanisms by which 
entrepreneur access and process information about VC investors is still relatively 
unknown. Much more research in this area is needed, particularly with the motivation 
to ensure that entrepreneurs with high-growth projects that are economically attractive 
and socially beneficial are able to access capital in and effective and efficient manner. 
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Appendix 1: Description of Key Variables 
Measures of screening skill: 
  YPSE - Number of years of post-secondary education for the respondent. 
  YIET - Number of years of Industry experience in total, in any role and any 
industry. 
  YFPI - Number of years of experience in the current Investment fund's primary 
target industries. 
  YEET - Number of years experience as an entrepreneur in total, in any industry. 
  YEPI - Number of years of entrepreneurial experiences in the primary target 
Industries of the current investment fund. 
  YVC - Number of years of experience as a venture capital investor. 
  YOl - Number of years of experience as some other type of Investor (banker, 
angel investor, etc). 
  PLEAD - Percentage of investments In the current portfolio, for which the 
respondent acted as the leader of a syndicate. 
  NARSECT - Breadth or narrowness of sectoral focus for the current investment 
fund. Calculated as a percentage of the following sectors in which the respondent 
actively invests: IT software, IT hardware, Biotechnology, Nanotechnology, 
Advanced energy technology, Other advanced technology, and non advanced. 
technology based. 
  NARSTAGE - Breadth or narrowness of company-stage focus for the current 
investment fund. Calculated as a percentage of the following growth stages in 
which the respondent actively invests: Seed, A-round (start-up), B-round (high- 
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growth), C-round (expansion, pre-IPO), Public companies, Management buy-outs, 
Acquisitions, Turnarounds. 
Measures of tolerance of information asymmetry. 
  PUNK - Percentage of investments in the current portfolio where the 
entrepreneur was completely unknown to the respondent before the Investment. 
  PSTAR - Percentage of investments in the current portfolio that were start-up 
companies. 
  PEXPD - Percentage of investments in the current portfolio that were expansion 
financings. 
  PNOV - Percentage of investments in the current portfolio that had novel and 
unproven business models. 
  PFOR - Percentage of investments in the current portfolio that were companies In 
a foreign jurisdiction. 
  PSYN - Percentage of investments in the current portfolio that were syndicated 
with other investors. 
  NREJ - Average number of prior rejections (by other investors) received by 
successful companies in the respondent's current portfolio. 
Potential signals of VC screening skill: 
  ROl - Overall portfolio return on investment. 
  OVER - Investing in companies that have been overlooked by other VC 
investors. 
  EARLY - Investing successfully in early-stage companies. 
  LEAD - Acting as the leader of syndicates with other VC investors. 
  HITS - Percentage of firms in the portfolio that were successful "hits" or 
"homeruns° 
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Potential reasons for investing in early-stage markets: 
  HIRET - Expectation of earning high returns on these investments. 
  COMP - Less competition from other VC investors. 
  SCRN - Having a unique ability to screen/assess early-stage companies. 
  ROFR - Securing a right of first refusal for subsequent Investment rounds. 
  ABENT - Demonstrating VC investor abilities to other entrepreneurs. 
  ABINV - Demonstrating VC investor abilities to current/future Investors In the 
fund(s). 
  ABPRO - Demonstrating VC investor abilities to others (professionals, other VC 
investors, etc). 
  FLOW - Maintaining relationships with sources of dealflow. 
Selection criteria used by entrepreneurs in choosing VC investors: 
  VALN - Valuation: what value the VC is placing on a company, to determine what 
portion of equity shares they would want in exchange for their money 
  T&C - Restrictiveness of terms and conditions: how many other restrictions or 
limitations the VC would place on the company and its future financing rounds 
  SVCS - Value-added services: advice, management services, network contacts 
and other helpful services the VC can provide 
  REP - Reputation: how respected the VC fund is by outsiders 
  SKILL - Skill and independence: demonstrated by sometimes investing in firms 
that are early-stage, or that have been rejected by other VCs 
  PERS - Overall personal compatibility: whether the individual VC is compatible 
with you in a productive working relationship 
  DEAL - Ease of deal-making: how quickly the VC makes decisions, and the effort 
that would be required to complete the deal 
Factors identified through principal components analysis: 
  GENEXP - general experience measurements of the screening variables 
  ASYM - willingness of the investor to participate in markets characterized by high 
information asymmetries 
  BROAD - effort by the investor to broaden their knowledge base by involving 
others in the evaluation 
  VCEXP - specific VC investment experience level, including dealing with new 
entrepreneurs 
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  LEAD - syndicate leadership propensity, and the resulting unwillingness to Invest 
in distant companies in foreign jurisdictions 
  OTHEXP - experience as some other type of investor 
  RELATION - belief that building and maintaining relationships and their 
associated future business opportunities is a good reason for early-stage Investing 
  INDEP - belief that skill can be demonstrated by the degree of independent action 
the VC investor displays, by investing early in companies overlooked by others, 
and by leading when involved in syndicated deals 
  PICKWIN - belief that having high screening ability is a good reason for early- 
stage investing, and that such VC investors demonstrate this skill by having a high 
proportion of "hits" in their portfolio 
  AVOID - belief that early investing is a means of avoiding competition, rather than 
a means of earning high returns 
  RETURN - belief that skill can be demonstrated by portfolio return on Investment 
Appendix 2: Surrey Instrument for Chapters 4 and 5 
Primary Industry Sector(s) - check all that apply 
" IT software 
" IT hardware 
" Biotechnology 
" Nanotechnology 
" Advanced energy technology 
" Other advanced technology 
" Not advanced technology based 
Primary Investment Stage(s) - check all that apply 
" Seed 
A-round (start-up) 
B-rounds (high-growth) 
C-rounds (expansion, pre-IPO) 
Public companies 
Management buy-outs 
Acquisitions 
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0 Turnarounds 
ABOUT YOU 
The following questions are intended to quantify some of the background experience 
you bring to your current role as a VC. Please respond with information about yourself. 
1. Years of post-secondary education _ 
2. Years of industry experience (in any role): 
" Total - 
" In your fund's primary industry sector(s) _ 
3. Years of experience as an entrepreneur. 
0 Total - 
0 In your fund's primary industry sector(s) - 
4. Years of experience as an investor. 
9 AsaVC__ 
0 As another form of investor (e. g., banker) _ 
5. Do you participate in syndicated deals? YES / NO 
0 If yes, what % of these deals did you lead? 
6. Of the following factors, please indicate (on a1 to 5 scale) how effective you think 
each is in demonstrating/proving the skill a VC has in screening opportunities/deals. 
(1 = not at all effective, 5= very effective) 
" Overall portfolio ROI: _ 
0 Investing in companies that other VCs overlook: 
0 Investing successfully in early-stage companies: _ 
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9 Acting as lead in syndicates with other VCs: - 
0 Hit ratio (% firms in portfolio that are very successful): - 
7. Of the following factors, please indicate (on a1 to 5 scale) how important you think 
each is as a reason for a VC to make investments in early-stage companies. 
(1 = not at all important, 5= very important) 
" High expected returns from the investments: - 
" Less competition from other VCs: .. _ 
" VC has unique ability to screen/assess in the sector: _ 
" Securing rights to future financing rounds: - 
" Demonstrates VC abilities to other entrepreneurs: _ 
" Demonstrates VC abilities to current/future investors in the fund(s): 
" Demonstrates VC abilities to others (professionals, other VCs, etc. ): _ 
" Maintaining relationships with sources of dealflow: _ 
ABOUT YOUR PORTFOLIO / INVESTEES 
The following questions are intended to characterize the extent to which you invest in 
early-stage deals (with very high initial uncertainties or unknowns). Please limit your 
response to those firms in which you had personal involvement in screening the firm, 
structuring the deal, or managing and monitoring the investment performance. Please 
respond with your estimates for the all the portfolio of firms you have been involved 
with (e. g., include the firms in multiple funds if you are involved with multiple funds). 
8. Regarding the entrepreneurs/founders of your investee companies, please provide 
the following % breakdown (should sum to 100% total): 
0% previously known to you (prior to making the current deal) _. 
% 
0% unknown to you, but were referred by trusted advisors 
"% unknown to you and not referred by a trusted advisor _% 
9. Regarding your investee companies: 
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"% that were startup investments (seed or A"round funding) 
" Do you expect this % to rise, fall or remain constant over the next 5 yrs? 
"% that were expansion investments 
" Do you expect this % to rise, fall or remain constant over the next 5 yrs? _ 
"% that had novel or unproven business models (at time of funding) 
" Do you expect this % to rise, fall or remain constant over the next 5 yrs? , _.. 
"% that are based in a foreign country 
0 Do you expect this % to rise, fall or remain constant over the next 5 yrs? _ 
0% that were syndicated with other investors -216 
" Do you expect this % to rise, fall or remain constant over the next 5 yrs? _ 
10. Regarding your most successful investees (proven "home-runs" or having very 
high prospects for the future): 
0 Average number of prior rejections these firms received from other VCs, 
before successfully concluding a deal with you _ 
Appendix 3: Survey Instrument for Chapter 7 
Who should complete this survey? 
You should be a senior finance executive (CEO, President, CFO, VP Finance) of a 
privately held company. You should have experience obtaining financing from venture 
capitalists. 
For this survey, "venture capital" includes seed/angel equity Investment, private equity 
(common or preferred shares), and debt that is convertible into equity at the option of 
the investor. It does not include financing obtained through a public stock market, nor 
non-convertible debt (such as bank credit). 
If you do not fit the requirements of this survey, please feel free to pass it along to 
anyone else you may know (in your company, or in another company) who would fit 
these requirements. Thank you! 
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CONTEST: At the end of this survey you will have the opportunity to provide your 
email address and be entered into a draw for a Sierra Wireless Voq phone with 
professional accessories kit! Entering is optional and up to you. The prize will be 
awarded by random draw from the email addresses provided by survey participants. 
VC FINANCING 
First, we'd like to get your opinions about obtaining venture capital financing. 
When making a choice among Venture Capital suppliers, how important are the 
following criteria in deciding which VC to get financing from? 
Please rate each of these VC criteria: 
The valuation they place on your firm. 
Not at all important 1234567 Very important 
The restrictiveness of terms and conditions they require. 
Not at all important 1234567 Very important 
The value-added services they provide, such as sitting on the Board, giving advice, 
management assistance, access to networks and contacts. 
Not at all important 1234567 Very important 
The reputation the VC firm has for knowledge and successful investing. 
Not at all important 1234567 Very important 
Their skill and independence in assessing the future potential of firms. For example, 
sometimes they invest in firms that are very early-stage, or that have been rejected by 
other VCs. 
Not at all important 1234567 Very important 
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The overall personal compatibility between you and the Individual VC Investor. This 
includes whether you could have a productive working relationship. 
Not at all important 1234567 Very important 
The ease of deal-making with them. This includes the speed with which they make 
decisions, and the effort required by you to reach a deal. 
Not at all important 1234567 Very important 
Please describe any other criteria that are important to you when you choose among 
vcs. 
How many venture capital firms do you think are currently active in your country? 
0 Less than 100 
9 100-499 
" 500-1000 
. More than 1000 
What do you think VCs look for most when deciding whether to invest? 
VC SCENARIOS 
Now we'd like to show you some VC financing scenarios to get your opinions about 
them. Imagine you are currently seeking VC financing for your firm. For each scenario 
that we show you, please tell us how likely you would be to accept the deal being 
offered. 
Each scenario will be described with seven characteristics: 
" Valuation - what value the VC is placing on your company, to determine what 
portion of equity shares they would want in exchange for their money. 
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0 Restrictiveness of terms and conditions - how many other restrictions or 
limitations the VC would place on the company and its future financing 
rounds. 
" Value-added services - the advice, management services, network contacts 
and other helpful services the VC can provide to you. 
" Reputation - how respected the VC fund is by outsiders. 
" Skill and independence - as demonstrated by sometimes investing in firms 
that are early-stage, or that have been rejected by other VCs. 
" Overall personal compatibility - whether the individual VC is compatible with 
you in a productive working relationship. 
" Ease of deal-making - how quickly the VC makes decisions, and the effort 
that would be required from you to complete the deal. 
For these scenarios imagine that you have had a series of detailed discussions with a 
specific VC, they have completed their relatively extensive preliminary due diligence 
and you have negotiated back and forth over several weeks to finalize a term sheet 
that you must now either sign or not. Your company can certainly use the cash, but it 
is not desperate and you think there is a reasonable chance that you may be able to 
get an alternative VC to the table, although you have no idea if their terms will be any 
better than the one you currently have on the table. You've also had a chance to do 
some of your own due diligence on this VC to learn more about their reputation, and 
whether you think the valuation they have offered is above or below what you might 
expect from others. 
VC Scenarios 
Below are some scenarios describing potential VC financing offers. Please tell us how 
likely you would be to accept these offers. There are 12 scenarios to consider. 
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How likely would you be to accept this offer. 
" Valuation: 33% lower than other VCs 
" Terms and conditions: Very restrictive 
" Value-added services: Many 
" Reputation: Poor 
" Skill and independence: Very low. 
" Overall personal compatibility: Highly compatible 
" Ease of deal-making: Very difficult 
Not at all likely 1234567 Very likely 
How likely would you be to accept this offer. 
" Valuation: 33% lower than other VCs 
9 Terms and conditions: Very open 
" Value-added services: Few 
" Reputation: Excellent 
" Skill and independence: Very high 
" Overall personal compatibility: Highly compatible 
" Ease of deal-making: Very difficult 
Not at all likely 1234567 Very likely 
How likely would you be to accept this offer. 
" Valuation: 33% lower than other VCs 
9 Terms and conditions: Very open 
" Value-added services: Many 
" Reputation: Excellent 
" Skill and independence: Very low 
" Overall personal compatibility: Poor compatibility 
" Ease of deal-making: Easy 
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Not at all likely 1234567 Very likely 
How likely would you be to accept this offer. 
" Valuation: 33% lower than other VCs 
" Terms and conditions: Very restrictive 
" Value-added services: Few 
" Reputation: Poor 
" Skill and independence: Very high 
" Overall personal compatibility. Poor compatibility 
" Ease of deal-making: Easy 
Not at all likely 1234567 Very likely 
How likely would you be to accept this offer. 
" Valuation: Same as other VCs 
" Terms and conditions: Very open 
" Value-added services: Few 
" Reputation: Poor 
" Skill and independence: Very low 
" Overall personal compatibility: Poor compatibility 
" Ease of deal-making: Very difficult 
Not at all likely 1234567 Very likely 
How likely would you be to accept this offer. 
" Valuation: Same as other VCs 
" Terms and conditions: Very restrictive 
" Value-added services: Many 
" Reputation: Excellent 
" Skill and independence: Very high 
" Overall personal compatibility: Poor compatibility 
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Ease of deal-making: Very difficult 
Not at all likely 1234567 Very likely 
How likely would you be to accept this offer. 
" Valuation: Same as other VCs 
e Terms and conditions: Very restrictive 
Value-added services: Few 
" Reputation: Excellent 
" Skill and independence: Very low 
" Overall personal compatibility: Highly compatible 
a Ease of deal-making: Easy 
Not at all likely 1234567 Very likely 
How likely would you be to accept this offer. 
" Valuation: Same as other VCs 
" Terms and conditions: Very open 
" Value-added services: Many 
" Reputation: Poor 
" Skill and independence: Very high 
" Overall personal compatibility: Highly compatible 
" Ease of deal-making: Easy 
Not at all likely 1234567 Very likely 
How likely would you be to accept this offer. 
" Valuation: 33% higher than other VCs 
" Terms and conditions: Very open 
" Value-added services: Many 
" Reputation: Excellent 
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" Skill and independence: Very high 
* Overall personal compatibility. Highly compatible 
" Ease of deal-making: Easy 
Not at all likely 1234567 Very likely 
How likely would you be to accept this offer. 
" Valuation: 33% higher than other VCs 
" Terms and conditions: Very restrictive 
" Value-added services: Few 
" Reputation: Poor 
" Skill and independence: Very high 
" Overall personal compatibility: Poor compatibility 
" Ease of deal-making: Easy 
Not at all likely 1234567 Very likely 
How likely would you be to accept this offer 
" Valuation: 33% higher than other VCs 
" Terms and conditions: Very restrictive 
" Value-added services: Few 
" Reputation: Excellent 
" Skill and independence: Very high 
" Overall personal compatibility: Highly compatible 
" Ease of deal-making: Very difficult 
Not at all likely 1234567 Very likely 
How likely would you be to accept this offer. 
" Valuation: 33% higher than other VCs 
" Terms and conditions: Very open 
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Value-added services: Few 
" Reputation: Excellent 
" Skill and independence: Very high 
" Overall personal compatibility: Highly compatible 
" Ease of deal-making: Very difficult 
Not at all likely 1234567 Very likely 
ABOUT YOU 
We would like to get some information about your background and experience. 
How many rounds of venture capital financing have you completed overall (for any 
company)? 
"0 
"1 
" 2or3 
" More than 3 
Have you completed a venture capital financing round within the past 12 months? 
9 Yes 
9 No 
What was the $ amount of the most recent venture capital financing you obtained? 
" Less than $1 million 
" $1 million to $10 million 
9 More than $10 million 
What is the total amount of venture capital you have obtained so far? 
0 Less than $1 million 
" $1 million to $10 million 
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" More than $10 million 
Have you ever tried to obtain venture capital financing but been unsuccessful? 
" Yes 
9 No 
In which country do you have the most experience obtaining venture capital financing? 
" Canada 
" USA 
" UK 
" Other 
For which industry do you have the most experience in obtaining venture capital 
financing? (Please choose the closest match) 
" Life sciences/biotechnology 
" Information technology/telecom 
0 Other high-technology 
Manufacturing 
" Distribution/wholesale 
9 Retail 
0 Services 
0 Other 
The next 3 questions refer to the company at which you most recently attempted to 
obtain venture capital. 
What lifecycie stage is the company in? 
" Seed - developing initial concept and product 
" Launch - seeking initial revenues 
" Rapid growth - increasing capacity and revenues 
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" Expansion - increasing scale and breadth 
0 Maturity - optimizing profits despite slow growth 
What are the approximate annual sales revenues of the company? 
. Less than $1 million 
" $1 million to $10 million 
" More than $10 million 
How fast are company sales growing, per year? 
. Less than 20% per year 
" 20% to 100% per year 
" More than 100% per year 
Finally, a few questions about yourself. 
How many years of business experience do you have? 
0 Less than 5 years 
05 to 10 years 
" More than 10 years 
How knowledgeable do you think you are about obtaining venture capital? 
" Novice 
" Average 
" More than average 
" Expert 
Your gender 
" Male 
" Female 
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Your age 
0 younger than 20 
" between 20 and 29 
" between 30 and 39 
9 between 40 and 49 
0 50 or older 
Appendix 4: Detailed Statistical Analyses 
Table A4-1: Normality tests, Chpt 4 
Kolmo orov-Smimov ov(*) Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Si q. Statistic df Si . Ypse . 119 28 . 200(**) . 963 28 . 404 
Yiet . 158 29 . 061 . 931 29 . 059 Yfpi 
. 141 29 . 147 . 935 29 . 073 
Yeet . 251 29 . 000 . 786 29 . 000 Yepi . 290 27 . 000 . 761 27 . 000 Yvc . 157 29 . 067 . 829 29 . 000 Yoi . 317 29 . 000 . 721 29 . 000 Plead 
. 144 29 . 126 . 929 29 . 052 
Narsect . 173 29 . 026 . 928 29 . 049 Narstage . 198 28 . 006 . 912 28 . 022 Punk . 240 29 . 000 . 846 29 . 001 Pstar . 150 29 . 093 . 885 29 . 004 Pexpd . 147 29 . 108 . 883 29 . 004 Pnov 
. 237 29 . 000 . 826 29 . 000 Pfor 
. 308 29 . 000 . 614 29 . 000 Psyn 
. 217 27 . 002 . 804 27 . 000 Nrej . 204 21 . 022 . 809 21 . 001 
' Lilliefors Significance correction 
'" This is a lower bound of the true significance. 
Outliers removed 
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Table A4-2: Normality tests, Chpt 5 
Kolmo orov-Smirnov " Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Si q. Statistic df SI . 
rol . 426 29 . 000 . 601 29 . 000 
over . 193 29 . 007 . 876 29 . 003 
early . 287 29 . 000 . 820 29 . 000 
lead . 172 29 . 027 . 911 29 . 018 hits 
. 420 29 . 000 . 625 29 . 000 hiret 
. 490 29 . 000 . 475 29 . 000 
comp . 219 29 . 001 . 868 29 . 002 
scrn . 216 29 . 001 . 873 29 . 002 
rofr . 268 29 . 000 . 860 29 . 001 
abent . 185 29 . 012 . 889 29 . 005 
abinv . 176 29 . 022 . 893 29 . 007 
abpro . 223 29 . 001 . 851 29 . 001 flow 
. 214 29 . 002 . 897 29 . 008 
I Linietors bigniticance correction 
214 
Table A4-3: Anova of cluster #1 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F SI 
relation Between 
. 674 1 . 674 . 071 . 792 Groups 
Within 257.420 27 9.534 Groups 
Total 258.094 28 
indep Between 
Groups 8.630 1 8.630 1.087 . 306 
Within 
Groups 214.306 27 7.937 
Total 222.936 28 
pickwin Between 
. 278 1 . 278 . 104 . 760 Groups 
Within 
Groups 72.456 27 2.684 
Total 72.734 28 
avoid Between 
Groups 5.314 1 5.314 6.626 . 016 
Within 
Groups 21.655 27 . 802 
Total 26.969 28 
return Between 5.388 1 5.388 2 512 125 Groups . . 
Within 57.912 27 2.145 Groups 
Total 63.300 28 
genexp Between 
Groups 2345.829 1 2345.829 4.196 . 050 
Within 15094.885 27 070 559 Groups . 
Total 17440.713 28 
asym Between 20672.274 1 20672.274 13.917 . 001 Groups 
Within 
Groups 40105.346 27 1485.383 
Total 60777.620 28 
broad Between 5847.047 1 5847.047 4.519 043 Groups . 
Within 34931.897 27 1293.774 Groups 
Total 40778.944 28 
vcexp Between 
Groups 5409.348 1 5409.348 15.120 . 001 
Within 
Groups 9659.791 27 357.770 
Total 15069.138 28 
lead Between 136.308 1 136.308 . 076 . 785 Groups 
Within 48706.725 27 1803.953 Groups 
Total 48843.033 28 
othexp Between 53.809 1 53.809 . 259 615 Groups . 
Within 5607.390 27 207.681 Groups 
Total 5661.199 28 , 
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Table A4-4: Anova of cluster #2 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F SI 
. 
Relation Between 7.734 1 7.734 834 369 Groups . . 
Within 250.360 27 9.273 Groups 
Total 258.094 28 
Indep Between 
Groups 2.842 1 2.842 . 349 . 560 
Within 
Groups 220.094 27 8.152 
Total 222.936 28 
Pickwin Between 1.436 1 1.436 644 467 Groups . . 
Within 
Groups 71.298 27 2.641 
Total 72,734 28 
Avoid Between 
Groups 1.223 1 1.223 1.282 . 267 
Within 
Groups 25.746 27 . 954 
Total 26.969 28 
Return Between 
Groups . 936 1 . 936 . 405 . 530 
Within 
Groups 62.364 27 2.310 
Total 63.300 28 
Genexp Between 
Groups 2766.989 1 2766.989 5.091 . 032 
Within 14673.725 27 471 543 Groups . 
Total 17440.713 28 
Asym Between 
Groups 17790.945 1 17790.945 11.175 . 002 
Within 
Groups 42986.675 27 1592.099 
Total 60777.620 28 
Broad Between 2798.803 1 2798.803 1 990 170 Groups . . 
Within 37980.141 27 1406.672 Groups 
Total 40778.944 28 
Vcexp Between 
Groups 317049 1 317.049 . 580 . 453 
Within 
Groups 14752.089 27 548.374 
Total 15069.138 28 
Lead Between 1370.791 1 1370.791 780 385 Groups . . 
Within 47472.242 27 1758 231 Groups . 
Total 48843.033 28 
Othexp Between 
Groups 1427.101 1 1427.101 9.100 . 006 
Within 
Groups 4234.099 27 156.818 
Total 5661.199 28 , 
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Table A4-5: Anova of cluster #3 
Sum of 
Squares dt Mean Square F Sf 
Relation Between 
. 453 1 . 453 . 048 . 829 Groups 
Within 257.641 27 9.542 Groups 
Total 258.094 28 
Indep Between 8.900 1 900 8 1 123 . 299 Groups . . 
Within 
Groups 214.035 27 7.927 
Total 222.936 28 
Pickwin Between 
. 445 1 . 445 . 166 . 687 Groups 
Within 72.290 27 2.677 Groups 
Total 72.734 28 
Avoid Between 
Groups 5.358 1 5.358 6.695 . 015 
Within 21.611 27 800 Groups . 
Total 26.969 28 
Return Between 4.136 1 4.136 888 1 181 Groups . . 
Within 59.163 27 2.191 Groups 
Total 63.300 28 
Genexp Between 
Groups 1454.968 1 1454.968 2.457 . 129 
Within 15985.745 27 592.065 Groups 
Total 17440.713 28 
Asym Between 23572.165 1 23572.165 17.106 . 000 Groups 
Within 37205.455 27 1377.980 Groups 
Total 60777.620 28 
Broad Between 21134.151 1 21134.151 29.047 . 000 Groups 
Within 19644.793 27 727.585 Groups 
Total 40778.944 28 
Vcexp Between 
Groups 5312.265 1 5312.265 14.701 . 001 
Within 
Groups 9756.873 27 361.366 
Total 15069.138 28 
Lead Between 7667.866 1 7667.866 5.028 . 033 Groups 
Within 41175.167 27 1525.006 Groups 
Total 48843.033 28 
Othexp Between 292.659 1 292.659 1.472 236 Groups . 
Within 5368.541 27 198 835 Groups . 
Total 5661.199 28 
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Table A46: Anova of cluster 04 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Si 
Relation Between 4.432 1 4.432 . 472 . 498 Groups 
Within 253.662 27 9.395 Groups 
Total 258.094 28 
Indep Between 1 467 1 1 467 . 179 676 Groups . . . 
Within 
Groups 221.468 27 8.203 
Total 222.936 28 
Pickwin Between 
. 869 1 . 869 . 327 . 572 Groups 
Within 71.865 27 2.662 Groups 
Total 72.734 28 
Avoid Between 
Groups . 661 1 . 661 . 678 . 417 
Within 
Groups 26.308 27 . 974 
Total 26.969 28 
Return Between 
. 183 1 . 183 . 078 782 Groups . 
Within 63.117 27 2.338 Groups 
Total 63.300 28 
Genexp Between 834.591 1 834.591 1.357 254 Groups . 
Within 16606.122 27 615.042 Groups 
Total 17440.713 28 
Asym Between 7981.607 1 7981.607 4.082 . 053 Groups 
Within 52796.013 27 1955.408 Groups 
Total 60777.620 28 
Broad Between 5119.328 1 5119.328 3.878 . 059 Groups 
Within 35659.616 27 1320.727 Groups 
Total 40778.944 28 
Vicexp Between 277.403 1 277.403 506 483 Groups . . 
Within 
Groups 14791.736 27 547.842 
Total 15069.138 28 
Lead Between 24086.990 1 24086.990 26.270 . 000 Groups 
Within 24756.043 27 916.890 Groups 
Total 48843.033 28 
Othexp Between 230.541 1 230.541 1.146 294 Groups . 
Within 5430.658 27 201.135 Groups 
Total 5661.199 28 
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Appendix 5: Concordance of Interview Themes 
This table summarizes themes that emerged from interviews of six VC investors, and 
provides a concordance between respondents for each theme that was mentioned. 
Chapter 4 Themes 
Screeners try to find diamonds 
GENEXP 
ASYM 
BROAD 
VCEXP 
LEAD 
Chapter 5 Themes 
Early investors want to lead 
Early investors want ROFR 
Demonstrating to unified audience 
Demonstrate to get dealflow 
Demonstrate to get/give ROFR 
Independents mtn reins by giving ROI 
Independence is a signal of skill 
Picking winner % may be another signal 
Getting funded is a signal 
RELATION 
INDEP 
PICKWIN 
AVOID 
ROI 
Additional Rational Reasons 
Early as part of portf diversification 
Demonstrate to get funding 
Demonstrate to get comm partners 
Demonstrate to get invited to syndicates 
Early since underfunded - 
Early to exploit operational skill 
Faster ind/region 
Additional Emotional Reasons 
Early is fun 
Go early for political reasons 
Accomplish things with your buddies 
Wanting to make a splash 
Prove yourself to oldtimers 
Pave the way for next job 
Grab control to serve to buddies 
Returning favours to buddies 
personal validation 
Confident Cautious Cautious but 
Leaders (2) Novices (2) Followers Experienced 
1 Instance 
3 instances 5 instances 1 Instance 
3 Instances 1 Instance 1 Instance 3 Instances 
1 Instance I Instance 
1 instance 
1 instance 
1 Instance 1 Instance 
2 Instances 1 Instance I Instance 2Instancos 
1Instance I Instance 
1 Instance 4 Instances 1 instance I Instance 
2 Instances 
1 Instance 1 instance 1 Instance 
1 instance 
1 instance 1 instance 2 instances 
1 instance 
1 Instance 1 Instance 1 Instance 1 instance 
I instance- 
2 instances 1 Instance 
3 Instances 1 instance 
2 instances 4 Instances 2 instances 
3 Instances 1 Instance 
1 Instance 3 Instances 2 Instances 
1 instance 
2 Instances 1 Instance I Instance 1 instance 
1 instance 
3 instances 1 Instanco 
1 Instance 
1 instance 1 Instance 1 instance 
1 Instance 
2 instances 1 instance 
1 Instance 
1 Instance I Instance 
I Instance 
1 Instance 
1 Instance 
1 Instance 
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